2022 GLOBAL REFUGEE WORK RIGHTS REPORT

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About the Center for Global Development (CGD)
CGD works to reduce global poverty and improve lives through innovative economic research that drives better policy and practice by the world’s top decision makers.

www.cgdev.org

About Asylum Access
Asylum Access supports forcibly displaced individuals and communities as they reclaim their rights, agency, and power. We advocate for a response to forced displacement that honors refugees’ freedom, dignity, and autonomy, while also strengthening the communities that welcome them.

www.asylumaccess.org

About Refugees International
Refugees International advocates for lifesaving assistance and protection for displaced people and promotes solutions to displacement crises around the world. We do not accept any government or UN funding, ensuring the independence and credibility of our work.

www.refugeesinternational.org

Cover Photo: Syrian instructor Rita Butman (in striped shirt), 31, teaches a workshop at the ReDI school in Berlin. Photo credit: Gordon Welters
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FOREWORD

Throughout the world, refugees and other forced migrants lack the basic rights to work, move, and thrive. A range of legal, administrative, and practical barriers prevent their equitable economic inclusion. Removing these barriers would give displaced people greater agency and power, enabling them to more fully rebuild their lives and contribute to their host communities. Asylum Access, the Center for Global Development (CGD), and Refugees International are among the organizations at the forefront of this effort.

Asylum Access began their Refugee Work Rights campaign in 2010, aiming to catalyze global action to dismantle legal barriers to refugee labor market access. As UNHCR, the World Bank, and other powerful institutions began to address refugees’ access to work, Asylum Access expanded its work on refugees’ rights at work, responding to wage theft, sexual harassment, and other workplace abuses against refugees.

CGD and Refugees International launched their “Let Them Work” initiative three years ago to expand labor market access for refugees and forced migrants in low- and middle-income countries. Let Them Work identifies barriers to refugees’ economic inclusion and provides recommendations to host governments, donors, and the private sector for how to overcome them.

Our shared efforts have had an impact. A new norm is emerging: including refugees in national labor markets is increasingly regarded as good practice. States increasingly acknowledge that honoring refugees’ work rights is good for refugees and good for those who live alongside them. As a result, they are beginning to adjust their laws so refugees can access jobs and benefit from work rights protections.

Much remains to be done, however. This groundbreaking new report documents the extent to which refugees and other forced migrants continue to face barriers in achieving equitable economic inclusion around the world. The data shows that laws protecting refugees’ work rights are often adequate. But in practice, progress is slow and, for many refugees, deeply inadequate.

By highlighting the gap between the rights that refugees and forced migrants have in law and in practice, this report demonstrates the need to focus on implementation. Paper promises are not enough. We must make refugee work rights a reality.

Such efforts are even more important as the world looks to economically recover from COVID-19. While the pandemic has created unprecedented challenges, it has also highlighted the importance of expanding economic inclusion. Refugees and other forced migrants can, and do, play a crucial role within labor markets. Given the opportunity, they can help their host countries recover from this crisis.

We hope this report will be a resource for policymakers, practitioners, and researchers alike, as we all work to realize the moral imperative and practical benefits of refugees’ equitable participation in labor markets. To learn more about our initiatives, please visit our websites and get in touch.

Masood Ahmed, President, Center for Global Development (CGD)
Emily E. Arnold-Fernández, Founding President and CEO, Asylum Access
Eric Schwartz, President, Refugees International
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Many thanks to other CGD, Refugees International, and Asylum Access staff who contributed to this project, including Cassandra Zimmer, Jeremy Gaines, Sarah Allen, Emily Schabacker, Diego Laje, Jimmy Graham, Laura Moscoviz, Sarah Sheffer, Daphne Panayotatos, Lisa D’Annuzio, Deepa Nambiar, and Diana Essex-Lettieri. We are grateful to Krista Smith and Renee Pendleton (both at Managed Editing Inc.) for editing, Sundar Maruthu (Medlar Publishing Solutions) and Sandra ten Zijthoff for report and scorecard design, and Stefanie Cruz and Nicolas Cronin (both at DigiGeeks Collective) and Antonio Essex-Lettieri for website development.1

We are also very grateful to the many people who completed the 2021 Refugee Access to Work Rights survey. These responses were invaluable in our assessment of the de facto environment at the country level. Some of the survey participants are acknowledged specifically below, while others responded anonymously. Thanks to Cevat Aksoy, Jedediah Fix, Kellie Leeson, Craig Loschmann, Barri Shorey, Beza Tesfaye and many others who circulated the survey.

The views expressed in this report are the views of the authors alone and do not reflect the views of the survey respondents or their organizations, Asylum Access, CGD, Refugees International, or funders.

CGD and Refugees International are grateful for contributions from the IKEA Foundation, Vitol Foundation, and Western Union Foundation in support of this work.

1 See our website, www.refugeeworkrights.org, for an interactive map, additional information, and further updates.
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PART 1

GLOBAL FINDINGS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Refugees’ right to work has been repeatedly recognized in international agreements—from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees to the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees—and research continues to demonstrate the benefits of this right for refugees and their host countries alike. Yet most refugees today face significant legal and practical barriers to full economic inclusion in the labor markets of their host countries.²

While these barriers are widely discussed in general terms, a systematic, public documentation of these barriers is important to advance the efforts toward economic inclusion. For instance, under Objective 2 of the Global Compact on Refugees, to “enhance refugee self-reliance,” two of the four indicators are the proportion of refugees with access to decent work and the proportion of refugees who are able to move freely within the host country.³ In addition, advocates and researchers have called for a Refugee Policy Index to factor into funding decisions.⁴

Measuring these indicators, however, is a significant challenge. In its 2021 Indicator Report, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) notes that “there is a need to strengthen the measurement of decent work, including by . . . developing the measurement of de facto access to work (e.g., using household surveys).”⁵ We view this report and accompanying dataset as contributing to this effort.

In this project, produced by researchers at the Center for Global Development (CGD), Asylum Access, and Refugees International, we assess refugees’ work rights across the globe. We examine different dimensions of work rights both in law (de jure) and in practice (de facto) across 51 countries that were collectively hosting 87 percent of the world’s refugee population at the end of 2021. Combining legal documents, country-level reports, news articles, and input from more than 200 practitioners with knowledge of refugees’ livelihoods and use of services, we evaluate the de jure and de facto situation within a standardized framework. We believe that the findings and accompanying dataset will be critical tools for policymakers, practitioners, and researchers on refugees’ work rights.

² In this report, we use the term “refugees” as shorthand to refer to all foreign-born people forcibly displaced by persecution or conflict and their descendants who are not citizens. Please see Box 1 for more information.
Box 1. Who are refugees?

We use the term “refugees” in this report to refer to all foreign-born people forcibly displaced by persecution or conflict and their descendants who are not citizens. The term includes those who are recognized or unrecognized refugees, asylum seekers, and other forcibly displaced populations, such as “Venezuelans displaced abroad,” in the country. We adopt this definition in order to standardize across countries, since the proportion of refugees, asylum seekers, and individuals in other categories varies significantly, and a comparison of standards for status determination is outside the scope of this report. Based on UNHCR data, which likely undercount everyone included in this definition, the world’s refugee population stands at 29.2 million people.

However, in some countries, legal refugee status is one of the main barriers to work rights. Asylum seekers are often prohibited from working while they wait for their cases to be heard, a process that can take years in some places. Some countries go further, limiting residence and movement, and even detaining people seeking asylum. These barriers are most common in high-income countries—places that often extend full work rights to those granted asylum. According to UNHCR data, only 55 percent of the people who fit our definition of a refugee have refugee status in high-income countries, compared to 96 percent in low-income countries (Figure 1).6

We account for this issue by adopting the above definition of refugees, which is independent of a country’s asylum decisions, for the assignment of the de facto scores. For the de jure scores, we examine all laws that are relevant to this population.

Our scores cover refugees residing in host countries, but some governments are enacting additional barriers by restricting access to the territory. Border closures, expulsions, and pushbacks, and the detention or internment of asylum seekers have been employed for decades to contain refugee populations and deter new arrivals, mostly by low- and lower-middle-income countries. Today, however, such coercive tactics are increasingly used by upper-middle-income and high-income countries, including across Europe and the United States.7 These tactics are factored into the freedom of movement assessments for de jure and de facto scores, though obtaining accurate information on the full sample of countries is difficult.

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6 Other factors may also contribute to this difference, including variation in reporting to UNHCR and rates of naturalization.
**MAIN FINDINGS**

- Every country in this study imposes barriers to refugees' work rights in practice.
- There is a stark difference between refugees’ overall work rights in law and in practice.
  - At least 62 percent of refugees live in countries where the legal framework for work rights is adequate or better (a 4 or 5 on our five-point scale).
  - Yet many of these laws are not widely implemented: at least 55 percent of refugees live in a country that significantly restricts their work rights in practice (a 3 or below on our scale), and at least 19 percent of refugees live in a country that severely restricts their right to work in practice (scoring a 1 or 2). This represents at least 16 million and 5.5 million people, respectively.
- High-income countries often offer strong work rights—both de jure and de facto—to recognized refugees. However, they also prevent access to these work rights in practice by significantly limiting refugee status (i.e., asylum), restricting the work rights of asylum seekers, and limiting the territorial access of would-be asylum seekers in some cases (see Box 1). Other countries that offer strong de jure work rights frequently fail to issue the necessary work or business permits to refugees specifically or impose other administrative or enforcement barriers.
- While the law is not enough to guarantee refugees' right to work, it is oftentimes a necessary starting point: de jure and de facto scores are strongly correlated, and only 3 of the 19 countries in our sample that have adequate access in practice do not have adequate access in law.
- Amid hope for the Global Compact on Refugees and fear over the impact of COVID-19, we do not see a significant net change in the right to work over the last five years. Approximately 28 percent of the global refugee population lives in a country where access to wage employment in practice has improved, while 29 percent lives in a country where it has worsened.
- We also study additional factors that are critical to refugees' work rights and economic inclusion in practice, such as access to services and documentation.
  - Education is the most accessible factor in our data: at least 64 percent of refugees live in countries that provide adequate access to basic schooling in practice, with similar access—for at least 60 percent of the refugee population—to secondary school.
  - In contrast, formal financial services and credential certification are the least accessible factors: only 2 percent of the refugee population live in countries with adequate access to formal financial services, and only 11 percent can generally certify academic and professional credentials from their country of origin.

Our de jure findings are based on analyses of national, regional, and international law that mandate the work conditions in host countries for people who have been forcibly displaced. Our de facto findings are based on a survey of practitioners in the 51 refugee-hosting countries, as well as supplemental desk research. Countries were scored on questions regarding wage employment, self-employment, mobility, and
access to services, in most cases relative to host-country citizens’ access. We use a government’s treatment of its citizens as the benchmark in order to isolate the discrimination faced by refugees in particular.

Our focus is on the actions (or inactions) of host governments. Our aim is to catalog issues such as an inability to access work or business permits, the potential for fines or arrest while traveling or living outside a camp, or differential enforcement of labor protections for refugees relative to host-country citizens. These are practices that are under the direct control of governments and specific to refugees. They contribute to, but are distinct from, self-reliance outcomes such as employment or wages, where poor outcomes, or even differences between host communities and refugees, do not necessarily signal government barriers.

Both access to and rights within the labor market are important to refugees, enabling them to support themselves and their families, build their skills, promote mental health, and contribute to their host country during periods of displacement. Refugees’ labor market access also benefits host communities on net, opening new employment avenues for host workers, generating additional consumer spending, and expanding the tax base, oftentimes without displacing host workers. The full benefits can only be achieved, however, if refugees can work without sector or geographic limits, move freely, and enjoy robust protections both in law and in practice.

Our findings encompass many factors that influence equitable labor market access (see Box 2 for terminology). In the following sections, we review the results of our de jure research and de facto survey; analyze how labor market access interacts with country characteristics such as the number of refugees hosted and political systems. In Part 2, we provide narrative summaries for each of the 51 countries’ laws and environments in practice.8

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

We also provide a series of recommendations targeted at both refugee-hosting countries and donors that would reduce the many barriers identified in our data.

Refugee-hosting countries should:

- Ensure that domestic laws grant refugees the right to work and freedom of movement, and that these rights are upheld in practice. Refugees should be included as constituents in work rights policymaking and accountability mechanisms.

- Automatically include the right to work and freedom of movement as integral aspects of refugee status and state these rights clearly on documentation issued to refugees. Requiring separate work permits creates an unnecessary barrier that adds bureaucratic delays and sows confusion among employers and refugees alike.

- Safeguard refugees’ rights at work through enforcement and support legal aid for refugees who experience workplace violations.

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8 See our website, www.refugeeworkrights.org, for an interactive map, additional information, and further updates.
Donors should:

- Incentivize host governments to expand refugees’ right to work. Some concessional funding should be tied to policies and implementation of refugees’ rights. Initiatives like the World Bank’s IDA19 Window for Refugees and Host Communities, which is accompanied by a framework to document each host country’s progress on refugees’ rights, should be strengthened and expanded.

- Strengthen accountability mechanisms for Global Refugee Forum (GRF) pledges and involve experts (including refugees) in designing and implementing these accountability mechanisms.

- Support local organizations advocating for refugees’ work rights.

- Provide support to host communities in addition to refugees. While most research finds refugees have small average effects on hosts' economic outcomes, some groups can be negatively affected. External support can mitigate negative effects and reduce opposition to labor market access for refugees.9

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**Box 2. Terminology and definitions**

Throughout this report, we use the following definitions for key terms:

- **Right to work**: The right of a refugee to access wage-earning employment or self-employment.

- **Freedom of movement**: The right of a refugee to be able to choose where to live and travel.

- **Rights at work**: The inclusion of refugee workers in protections that ensure that work is safe, fair, and decent. These protections include requirements regarding minimum wages, maximum working hours, workplace safety and worker well-being, prompt payment, and the right to organize (e.g., to form or participate in a union or collective bargaining efforts).

- **Work rights**: An overall measure encompassing all three dimensions above.

We also use the terms “labor market access” and “economic inclusion.” The former refers to refugees' legal right to work as well as their actual ability to access and participate in the labor market. The latter is a broader concept that could also include access to financial services, social protection, and other such government- and private-sector-led services that affect economic outcomes.

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INTRODUCTION

The rights of refugees were first enshrined at the global level within the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; 149 countries are now party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, or both. These instruments establish obligations for host countries to allow refugees to participate in both wage-earning employment and self-employment, and to safeguard refugees’ labor-related rights. Other international and regional instruments have since attempted to include similar provisions, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, or Economic Covenant) (see Box 3). As a result, even countries that are not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention have pledged to uphold some form of refugee work rights. National, regional, and international institutions have also continuously reiterated the need for equitable labor market access for people who have been displaced.

Research continues to demonstrate that work rights for refugees can benefit both refugees and host communities. Despite the widespread fear that refugees will take jobs from citizens, the evidence often indicates that refugees’ access to the labor market benefits host communities as well. Refugees can create jobs as complementary workers, entrepreneurs, taxpayers, consumers, and investors—and much more so when the host government does not stand in their way. We discuss this evidence below.

Given that most refugee situations last for years, refugee work rights can also allow international assistance to be used more efficiently for new crises. Without the ability to fully participate in the labor market, refugees may need to rely on external forms of support. Yet such support is neither reliable nor sustainable; donors funded only 52 percent of the total UNHCR global appeal in 2021.10

Despite repeated affirmations of refugees’ right to work and the clear socioeconomic benefits, this right is still not afforded to many refugees in practice. Barriers range from internment in remote camps to slow, complicated bureaucracies that require documentation from refugees’ inaccessible origin countries. Our goal in this report is describe the work rights environments where the majority of the world’s refugee population lives and wants to work.

In 2014, Asylum Access published the first Global Refugee Work Rights Report, analyzing refugees’ work rights in 15 countries hosting 30 percent of the world’s refugee population.11 The report also articulated a concise synopsis of the international legal foundations of refugees’ work-related rights (see Box 3). In 2019, the Center for Global Development (CGD) and Refugees International launched the “Let Them Work” initiative, which aims to analyze the impact of expanding labor market access for refugees


Box 3. What work rights have countries already committed to?

Like other workers, refugees are entitled to work-related rights under a wide variety of international and regional instruments, some of which are detailed below.

The 1951 Refugee Convention

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines the term “refugee” and the rights specific to refugee status, articulating how other human rights apply to people in refugee situations. It requires host countries to grant refugees access to wage-earning employment on par with “the most favorable treatment accorded” to other foreigners. A refugee whose spouse or child who is a citizen, or who has lived in the host country for three years, is exempt from labor market restrictions enacted to preserve jobs for citizens—meaning that refugees and citizens should have equal access to wage-earning employment except where jobs are restricted to citizens for other reasons (e.g., jobs requiring access to state secrets) (Article 17). Moreover, refugees must have access to self-employment on par with other foreigners (Article 18).

Per the 1951 Refugee Convention, countries must treat refugees in the same manner as nationals in regard to work rights such as minimum wages, maximum hours, and working conditions, as well as social security programs such as financial support for people with disabilities or for family care (Article 24). Refugees likewise have a wide range of other rights that may impact their equitable access to work: the right to free movement, protection against expulsion or forcible return to the countries they fled, the right to asset ownership, the right to work-related organizing, and access to courts, among others.

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

A seminal international human rights instrument, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, or Economic Covenant), together with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, builds on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by establishing a concrete set of human rights and corresponding obligations. It took effect in 1976 after more than three decades of deliberation and country consideration.
The Economic Covenant requires that countries “take steps to safeguard” “the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts” in “just and favorable conditions” (Articles 6 and 7). It also prohibits discrimination, including on the basis of “national origin . . . or civil, political, social or other status” (Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights [CESCR] General Comment 18). This means countries “should enact legislation enabling refugees to work . . . under conditions no less favorable than for nationals” (CESCR General Comment 23).

The Organization of African Unity Convention and the Cartagena Declaration

In addition to the international instruments mentioned above, two regional instruments address refugees’ rights in Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa extends 1951 Refugee Convention rights to people forced to flee “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order” in Africa. Similarly, the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees reflects a consensus among countries in Latin America (and, more recently, the Caribbean) to extend refugee rights to people whose “lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”

It is important to note that these international instruments do not apply in all countries covered by this report. Of the 51 countries covered, 39 are party to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Moreover, some of the 39 have entered reservations to the convention, declining to accept some or all of its work rights provisions. Similarly, 49 of the 51 countries covered by this report are party to the Economic Covenant. However, 50 of the 51 countries (Malaysia being the only exception) are party to at least one of these three instruments, meaning that refugees in all of those countries are entitled to work rights under international law.

and forced migrants in low- and middle-income countries. The initiative has drawn on quantitative and qualitative research in several studies on refugees’ economic inclusion, including case studies on Colombia, Peru, Kenya, and Ethiopia.

14 While the Economic Covenant permits so-called “developing countries” some leeway in extending economic rights to non-nationals, a complete reading of the Economic Covenant and its interpretive guidance makes clear that this permission cannot be used to deny refugees access to labor markets or work-related protections (see, e.g., Article 2(1); CESCR General Comment 18, paragraphs 19, 20, and 31; CESCR General Comment 23, paragraph 47(i)).
In this report, our three organizations assess the current state of refugees’ work rights and chart a way forward. We break down the domestic legal (de jure) frameworks that support refugees’ right to work and survey findings on how easily work rights can be accessed in practice (de facto). Through an in-depth analysis of national, regional, and international legal frameworks, we set forth a baseline of expectations that host countries have established for themselves. With our survey of more than 200 practitioners to assess the de facto realities, we find that countries often do not meet these commitments.

Box 4. “Respect” and “Protect”

The “respect, protect, and fulfill” international legal framework, developed by the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), is frequently cited in international human rights theory and refugee law. In the 2014 Global Refugee Work Rights Report, for instance, the terms “respect” and “protect” were used to refer to the extent to which refugee host countries support refugee work rights in law (de jure) and in practice (de facto), respectively. For simplicity, we use the terms “de jure” and “de facto” within this report, though the concepts of “respect” and “protect” are closely linked.

We expand upon the research conducted for the 2014 Global Refugee Work Rights Report in several ways. First, we expand the scope. The 2014 report was based primarily on legal research, with supplementary de facto findings where appropriate. Here, we have conducted a novel survey on de facto conditions to more deeply interrogate the reality of refugees’ access to work rights. Second, we expand the coverage from 15 to 51 countries and, consequently, from 30 percent to 87 percent of the global refugee population. Third, we build on the methodology, including adjusting the scoring system to a 5-point instead of a 4-point scale to increase precision (see Box 4). We outline other related research, including past publications and ongoing initiatives, in Annex 2.

Our de facto survey was designed to capture a range of variables that may impact refugees’ right to work in practice, such as the ability to be hired without a work permit, freedom to travel domestically, and the accessibility of legal recourse in the event of workplace violations. In the findings below, we examine an overall work rights score, the factors that contribute to this score, and other factors of economic inclusion that impact livelihoods, such as access to education and formal financial services.

Our findings highlight the many barriers to employment that refugees face and the opportunities for the refugee-serving community to intervene and expand access to work rights. This report provides a global overview of refugees’ work rights today and how they may be improved upon in the years to come.

THE EVIDENCE ON REFUGEES’ WORK RIGHTS

While refugees should have access to the labor market as a basic right, economic inclusion can in addition benefit host communities as well as refugees themselves. Clemens, Huang, and Graham (2018) provide the most extensive review of the evidence on refugees’ labor market access to date. They discuss the expected effects of formal labor market access; how the effects depend on contextual factors like the skillsets and locations of refugees and hosts; and policies that are likely to maximize the benefits of labor market access to refugees and hosts alike. They conclude:

*When refugees are allowed to work, they have the potential to more fully contribute to their host communities as employers, employees, taxpayers, and innovators. This enables them to better provide for themselves while also contributing to the economy—to the benefit of their hosts. And when refugees work and become self-reliant, the cost to host governments and donors of hosting refugees declines or disappears. The more restricted they are from labor markets, the less they can contribute and the greater the costs may be to refugees and those supporting them.*

In related surveys of the research, Legrain (2016) and Bahar and Dooley (2019) reach similar conclusions: refugees in the labor market can create jobs for hosts, increase productivity, boost tax revenues, reduce government expenditures, and earn higher incomes for themselves across a variety of contexts—and more so when their work rights are protected in practice. This section summarizes these findings and highlights additional research conducted since those reviews were published.

**Effects of work rights on refugees**

Clemens, Huang, and Graham’s review argues that formal labor market access leads to higher incomes over time, better jobs, and increased investment in skills for immigrants and refugees, although they note the effects vary across demographics. They draw on evidence from amnesties in the United States and Spain that significantly increased immigrants’ earnings (Kaushal 2006 and Amuedo-Dorantes et al 2013 are two examples), as well as Dustmann and colleagues (2017), who find that undocumented immigrants consume 40 percent less than otherwise similar documented immigrants, among many other studies.

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Some of the clearest evidence on the effects of regularization comes from Colombia, where almost 500,000 Venezuelans were granted work rights through an amnesty program in 2018. This sudden policy change allowed researchers to study the effects of refugee work rights on both refugees and the host communities. Multiple studies, described further in Box 5, find that the regularization program led to large, positive effects among refugees and had minimal effects on hosts.

**Box 5. Colombia and the PEP program: Effects on hosts and refugees**

As of March 2021, an estimated 1.7 million Venezuelans had fled ongoing conflict and instability to neighboring Colombia. To support them, the government of Colombia created the *Permiso Especial de Permanencia* (PEP), a temporary and ad hoc special permit. Issued in 2018, this permit granted Venezuelans two years of regular status, work authorization, and access to public services and could be renewed once. In January 2020 the government created a new permit—the *Permiso Especial de Permanencia para el Fomento a la Formalización* (PEP-FF)—which allowed Venezuelans in an irregular situation with a formal job offer to regularize their status. Finally, in February 2021, the government decided to provide 10-year temporary protection status to all Venezuelans in the country.

These efforts, which are virtually unprecedented among refugee-hosting countries, have had a positive impact on Venezuelans themselves and on the Colombian economy. Ibáñez and colleagues (2022) find that the incomes of Venezuelans who participated in the program increased by 31 percent, consumption increased by 60 percent, and both physical and mental health significantly improved as well. Further, Bahar, Cowgill, and Guzman (2022) find that access to the PEP increased entrepreneurship among eligible Venezuelans and, after four years, led to similar levels of entrepreneurship as Colombians. Finally, Bahar, Ibáñez, and Rozo (2021) find that the PEP rollout had only negligible effects on the formal employment of Colombians.

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Similar results emerge from studies on work bans for refugees and asylum seekers in Europe. Marbach, Hainmueller, and Hangartner (2018) compare refugees in Germany before and after an employment ban was reduced by seven months. They show that after five years, employment rates among refugees who faced the shorter ban were 20 percentage points higher than refugees who faced the longer ban. Fasani, Frattini, and Minale (2021) find similar effects when looking at variation in policies across European countries. They estimate that bans on asylum seekers who arrived in Europe in 2015 led to an output loss of 37.6 billion Euro. In another paper, the same authors find that policies restricting freedom of movement for asylum seekers lead to persistent, negative economic effects on the displaced.

In addition to the right to work, accreditation plays a vital role in securing additional employment and educational opportunities, particularly for those who have professional credentials from their home country. Damelang, Ebensperger, and Stumpf (2020) find that formal recognition of foreign credentials significantly increases the likelihood of an employer inviting a foreign-born applicant for an interview.

Going beyond economic outcomes, researchers have documented the importance of access to work on mental health. Hussam, Kelley, Lane, and Zahra (2022) find that eight weeks of part-time work for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh led to large improvements in psychosocial outcomes, and they show these effects were not driven by income. The improvements in mental health were larger in magnitude than a 40-week counseling program in the same setting, and 66 percent of their sample were even willing to forgo payment and work for free.

In the absence of labor market access, refugees are more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Zetter and Ruaudel (2016) warn that people who have been displaced are “in particularly weak negotiation positions and face more acute pressure to accept substandard and exploitative working conditions and low-paying work in the informal economy.”

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those with work permits who were interviewed said their work conditions were actually verified during labor inspections.

Finally, Schuettler and Caron (2020) review livelihoods programming for displaced populations and argue that greater labor market access would increase the effectiveness of some livelihoods programs. For instance, they note that cash grants can be more effectively invested by refugee entrepreneurs when they can legally own their business. Furthermore, additional job opportunities in the formal market increases the returns to skills, and therefore the gains from some skill trainings, though the review finds that training programs that only target skills are “not promising”.

**Effects of refugee work rights on host communities**

Host communities often fear that refugees will negatively affect jobs, wages, and other outcomes for hosts, and this fear is a common justification for restricting work rights. While refugees and immigrants do compete in labor markets, the evidence shows that the economy is not a zero-sum game. As Clemens, Huang, and Graham describe, refugees represent additional consumer spending and often fill labor shortages, bring skills that complement hosts, and allow hosts to upgrade into higher paying, often managerial, roles.

Verme and Schuettler (2021) review 59 empirical studies on the effects of refugees on host community markets. They find that “on average, host households are most likely to experience an increase in well-being following a forced displacement crisis”. For example, Alix-Garcia and colleagues (2018) show that when more people arrived to Kakuma refugee camp, economic activity in the surrounding area increased due to the availability of new employment and increased prices in agricultural and livestock markets. Özden and Wagner (2014) find that for every 10 immigrants newly employed in Malaysia, employment of host workers increases by 4.1. Other studies find no effects. Fallah, Krafft, and Wahba (2019), for instance, find that labor market outcomes for Jordanians in areas with more Syrian refugees were similar to Jordanians in areas with fewer refugees.

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Refugees can negatively affect some groups in the host community, though many of the effects disappear over time. Verme and Schuettler find that where negative effects occur, they are often among informal, “low-skilled”, young, or female workers, which is important to know when targeting adjustment programs for hosts. For instance, Del Carpio and Wagner (2015) find that men with medium levels of education in Turkey move to higher-paying jobs when Syrian refugees arrive, while men with low levels of education and women are displaced from the labor force altogether. Lebow (2022) similarly finds large negative effects from Venezuelan refugees on less-educated Colombian hosts. However, both studies suggest that occupational downgrading among refugees—often in response to limited labor market access—put unnecessary pressure on the informal labor market. Improved refugee work rights, like access to accreditation and to work in the formal sector, can mitigate negative effects on hosts in the informal sector.

Aksoy and Ginn (2022) compare countries with more inclusive and more restrictive legal frameworks for refugees, examining economic and social outcomes in a sample of most low- and middle-income countries. They isolate regions with a large, rapid increase in the refugee population and find that areas with the right to work evolve similarly in the four years after the refugee arrival as areas without the right to work. Overall, they find no evidence that host communities pay an economic penalty or experience social or political backlash in response to increased refugee economic inclusion.

Multiple papers simulate the economic effects of increased integration of refugees. Sanghi, Onger, and Vemuru (2016) study Turkana, Kenya. They estimate that limited economic integration would increase incomes in the surrounding host communities by 1.6 percent, while full economic integration would increase incomes by 6.1 percent. Todd, Amirullah, and Shin (2019) estimate that extending the right to work for refugees in Malaysia would generate 700 million USD in annual GDP within five years and create over 4,000 jobs for Malaysians. Finally, Graham, Guerrero Ble, Panayotatos, and Leghtas, in a study through the “Let Them Work” initiative, posited that if all Venezuelan-specific

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barriers to economic inclusion were lowered, Venezuelans would contribute US$1 billion to Colombia’s economy annually.43

Formal labor market access can also increase tax revenue, both indirectly, as increasing economic activity is taxed, and directly, as formal refugee-owned businesses and refugee employees pay taxes. Furthermore, when refugees are allowed to work and not forced to rely on the host government or NGOs for basic needs, fiscal expenditures and aid program budgets can be significantly reduced or reallocated. For instance, Marbach, Hainmueller, and Hangartner (2018), in the study described above, also find that shortening the employment ban for refugees in Germany saved taxpayers approximately 40 million Euro each year.44


METHODOLOGY

Country selection

The responses to our survey on the de facto right to work determined the sample of countries covered in this report. Between March and December 2021, we circulated the survey among practitioners with knowledge of refugees’ livelihoods and use of services. We received 260 responses from 83 countries. Given the subjective nature of the questions, we include only countries from which we received at least three responses. Fifty-one countries, with 216 survey responses in total, met this criterion and are therefore included in the report sample.45

The 51 countries covered in the report account for 87 percent of the global population of refugees, asylum seekers, and Venezuelans displaced abroad in 2021, according to UNHCR statistics.46 Our sample includes the top 22 refugee-hosting countries globally and 37 of the top 50. Nevertheless, this set of countries is not fully representative of the global refugee population, as the remaining 13 percent of refugees may face circumstances that differ from those in our sample. We therefore do not make inferences about the remaining populations, nor the refugee population as a whole. Additionally, see Box 6 for a discussion on refugees from Ukraine, where war began in February 2022.

The sample is geographically diverse, including 13 countries in Europe, 12 in Africa, 11 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 5 in the Middle East, 3 in South Asia, and 3 in Southeast Asia. With regard to income levels, 17 countries in the sample are classified as high-income countries by the World Bank, 20 are upper-middle-income, 6 are lower-middle-income, and 8 are considered low-income countries.47

De jure scoring

To analyze the legal environment for refugees' work rights, we first assessed whether a country is party to relevant international law, including the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Economic Covenant, and whether it has made reservations to either.48 We next examined regional instruments, including legally

45 This sample from the de facto survey also determined the countries included in the de jure assessment.
47 For the current 2022 fiscal year, low-income economies are defined as those with a gross national income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of US$1,045 or less in 2020; lower-middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $1,046 and $4,095; upper-middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $4,096 and $12,695; and high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12,696 or more. For more information on World Bank income rankings, see https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups.
48 Reservations to the Convention of articles 13 (right to own property), 17 (right to wage earning employment), 18 (right to self-employment), 19 (right to practice a liberal profession), 24 (right to benefit from labour regulations), 26 (right to move freely) were noted. Reservations to the ICESCR of articles 6 (right to work), 7 (right to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work), 8 (right to form join trade unions and to strike) and 9 (right to social security) were noted.
Box 6. Refugees from Ukraine

Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 and caused one of the world’s largest refugee flows almost immediately. Within five months, more than 5.6 million people had left Ukraine. For the first time in its history, the European Union (EU) invoked the Temporary Protection Directive, which provided Ukrainians residency and the right to work, housing, healthcare, and education throughout the EU for one year, with the possibility of renewal. The directive does not provide Ukrainians with refugee status but eliminates the need for individual asylum applications and allows Ukrainians to avoid employment and movement bans that apply to asylum seekers in many member states.

The Ukraine refugee situation is not included in this report for multiple reasons. First, because of the recency of the event, the environment and information availability in the main host countries, and even where refugees are staying, are changing rapidly—significantly faster than in most other contexts. Second, nearly all of our survey data were collected before the Russian invasion. Although some of the primary host countries are not in the sample, other countries that are in our sample are now hosting Ukrainians, which may have affected the responses. The data and scores in this report are therefore as of December 2021. The situation will be important to monitor and could have far-reaching impacts on how refugees are received in Europe.

binding documents such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and nonbinding expressions of intent such as the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees and the Bangkok Principles on the Status and Treatment of Refugees.

The last aspect of the de jure research focused on the availability of a specific national law that respects and guarantees refugees’ right to work. Legal consultants initially conducted the de jure research and assigned scores based on the definitions in Table 1 and each country's summary and score were reviewed by a group of Asylum Access staff with experience in refugee work rights issues to ensure that scores were standard across countries.

The de jure analysis was performed using primary documents and secondary data published online. UNHCR was a frequent source of information, given that its country data are publicly available and periodically updated. We also cited reputable local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the 51 countries. This methodology has limitations, particularly if a country or relevant legal or judicial body has not published its laws online. Further, we did not standardize specific search terms, but rather led with the national, regional, and international frameworks in our search. Aware of these limitations, we relied on reporting from organizations such as UNHCR, the World Bank, the International Labor Organization, and Human Rights Watch to validate the de jure data.
Table 1. Definitions for overall de jure scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fully-functioning national policies support refugees’ right to work without restrictions and extend labor protections to refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>There are national policies, but they limit full access to work rights, there are bureaucratic barriers that make the process onerous and/or untimely for livelihood purposes, and/or many labor protections are not extended to refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>No existing national policies establish refugees’ right to work or their rights as workers, but ad hoc policies have allowed certain groups of displaced populations to work. Alternatively, the state mandates internment of refugees, preventing their lawful access to markets; the state’s legal recognition procedures create significant barriers to accessing the status needed to qualify for the right to work; and/or many labor protections are not extended to refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Existing national policies prohibit refugees from working by barring access to either work authorization or legal status. However, some inconsistencies among the policies can be read to provide certain limited de jure work rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Existing national policies prohibit refugees from working. There is no law respecting refugees’ right to work or their rights as workers, and very few, if any, ad hoc policies exist permitting certain groups of refugees to work.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

De facto scoring

We designed the Refugee Access to Work Rights Survey in English and translated it into French and Spanish. The survey was circulated to international and local NGOs, refugee-led organizations, NGO networks, and multilateral institutions to reach a variety of people with different perspectives. This was an iterative process in which some individuals forwarded or referred the survey to other individuals they knew. The survey sample is not representative of the sector; however, we attempt to reach objective conclusions, as further detailed below.

The questions covered a range of topics relating to refugees’ rights and access to services within their host country, as reported in detail in subsequent sections of the report. Additional survey questions that covered topics other than work rights (e.g., assistance) were not included in this report, nor were questions that produced responses with significant missing information or inconsistencies.
its citizens as the benchmark in order to isolate the discrimination faced by refugees in particular. We ask, for instance, how easily refugees can acquire business permits relative to citizens; comparing the broader ease of acquiring business permits across countries is outside the scope of this report.

Many questions ask for a rating on a 1 to 5 scale, and we accompany the numerical choices with a general definition to standardize across respondents and contexts.\(^{50}\) For example, the first question is:

**On a scale of 1 to 5, how free are refugees to travel in practice?**

1. *Refugees cannot leave their neighborhood or camp and permits to travel are nearly impossible to obtain.*
2. *(The situation is between 1 and 3.)*
3. *Refugees travel, but they are regularly harassed and occasionally arrested by authorities when outside their residence. Alternatively, some refugees travel freely, while others have their movements restricted by camp boundaries, checkpoints by authorities, etc.*
4. *(The situation is between 3 and 5.)*
5. *Refugees travel freely in practice without interference from the government.*

Other questions on changes over time have three answer choices: the situation for refugees has improved, has worsened, or is the same.

Respondents could skip any question.

Even with our attempts at standardizing, the responses are subjective. Furthermore, the situations often vary substantially within countries across locations, nationalities, legal statuses, and so on.\(^{51}\) In the responses, we received numerous comments that provided additional context and contributed significantly to the final scores and narrative descriptions in Part 2. We interpret the scores as an average across all foreign-born displaced people within the country.

The individuals who responded represent a range of experiences in the humanitarian and development sectors. Thirty-six percent have worked in the country for 11 years or more, and 21 percent have worked in the country between 6 and 10 years. Ninety-two percent have worked with refugee populations for at least 2 years, including 29 percent who have worked for 11 years or more. Respondents’ positions include advocacy officers, CEOs, country directors, program managers, professors, community workers, among others.

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\(^{50}\) The instructions read, “Some questions ask for your assessment on a 1 to 5 scale. Definitions are provided to roughly standardize across countries. However, the situation in every country is unique and the definitions will not match exactly. Please use your judgment and perception relative to other host countries to assign a score between 1 and 5, and then provide details in the comments where possible.”

\(^{51}\) The availability and variety of legal contexts can differ widely between countries, which makes standardizing appropriate and relevant questions challenging. In certain countries, there are quite disparate de jure and de facto conditions for people of various immigration statuses, such as refugees, parolees, or asylees, whereas in other countries, the questions posed around de facto conditions were predicated on legal conditions that are non-existent (e.g., asking whether refugees have legal recourse for workplace violations in a country that does not recognize refugees).
The large and diverse global response, however, still leaves a number of limitations on the ability to directly interpret these data within each country. The people who chose to respond potentially have different opinions than might have emerged from a full survey of the country-based humanitarian sector, and even these practitioners have limited insights into most refugees’ daily experiences with some of the question topics. The ideal data would include responses to a survey of a representative sample of refugees and asylum seekers themselves, using a standard questionnaire to compare experiences across contexts. Nevertheless, these responses from people working in the local environments were an invaluable foundation for our final scoring.

To address the limitations, we used the median response for questions with answers on a 1-to-5 scale and the most common, or modal, response for questions with three answer choices as a starting point for each score. This reduces the influence of the highest and lowest scorers on each question. Two staff members then independently reviewed each country situation using available secondary sources such as news articles, NGO profiles, and government reports. We reviewed questions where answers varied significantly across respondents, where there were fewer than three responses, and where the median was a fraction that needed to be resolved. Using the survey responses as a guide, the two staff members independently proposed a score and then compared answers to decide on a final score (see Table 2). In limited cases, we also assigned scores outside the review criteria that we felt were necessary to improve international comparability.

A country’s overall de facto score is a weighted average of the main work rights measures. The score incorporates the right to wage employment, the right to self-employment, the freedom to travel domestically, the freedom to choose a place of residence, and rights at work. See Box 7 for the survey questions that contribute to the overall de facto score.

To calculate the score, we first generate measures for access to wage employment and self-employment in practice. We use two survey questions for each type of work: access to permits (A1 and B1) and enforcement (A2 and B2). Higher scores denote increased access or less enforcement. Our goal is to capture access in practice, which can happen where either permits are easily available or, if permits are difficult to access, where enforcement is low. For scoring, this means we take the maximum of the access and enforcement variables. Strong enforcement is therefore not penalized if permits are available. In addition, since informality represents a risk even in environments with minimal current government enforcement, we subtract 1 from the enforcement scores before taking the maximum.

52 The closest such survey, to our knowledge, is the Syrian Refugee and Host Community Survey, conducted across Lebanon, Jordan, and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 2015 and 2016. These data are available on the World Bank’s microdata library website: https://micrdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/3471.

53 The US Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, and Section F on the protection of refugees in particular, were especially helpful. For an example, see here for the report on Kenya: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/kenya/.
Since the focus of the index is on the right to work, these wage employment and self-employment measures are then assigned twice the weight of the other inputs (C1, C2, and D1), and the five inputs are averaged. The scores are rounded to the nearest whole number, with 0.5 rounded up. The resulting scores are characterized in Table 2.

Box 7. Overall de facto work rights score

The de facto score includes the following questions from the survey:

**Right to wage employment**

A1. Access to work permits: On a scale of 1 to 5, how easily can refugees acquire work permits (or other necessary forms of work authorization for foreigners) for formal, wage employment in practice?

A2. Enforcement of work permits: On a scale of 1 to 5, how free are formal (registered) businesses to hire refugees without permits in practice?

**Right to self-employment**

B1. Access to business permits: On a scale of 1 to 5, how easily can refugees acquire business permits relative to citizens in practice?

B2. Enforcement of business permits: On a scale of 1 to 5, how free are refugees to operate businesses without permits in practice?

**Freedom of movement**

C1. Freedom to travel domestically: On a scale of 1 to 5, how free are refugees to travel domestically in practice? (Note: We are referring only to government enforcement and not, for instance, to whether refugees can afford to travel.)

C2. Freedom to choose residence: On a scale of 1 to 5, how free are refugees to choose their place of residence in practice? (Note: We are asking about government enforcement only, and not, for instance, whether refugees can afford to live in the same locations.)

**Rights at work**

D1. Recourse for workplace violations: Can refugees access recourse for workplace violations through government institutions? (E.g., if their employers do not pay them.)

Higher scores denote more access to permits, more freedom, or less enforcement. For the answer choices and other questions in the dataset, see Annex 3.

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54 The formula for the overall de facto score is \( \frac{2 \max(A1, A2 - 1) + 2 \max(B1, B2 - 1) + C1 + C2 + D1}{7} \).

55 This question was scored on a 3-point scale and coded to 1, 3, or 5 to calculate the overall score.
Table 2. Definitions for overall de facto scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent does a refugee have the right to work and to labor protections in practice?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ultimately, both the de jure and de facto scores are the opinions of the authors of this report, with the survey responses as well as external comments serving as an influential foundation. Different authors independently assessed the de jure and de facto scores. Though the team reviewed the final rankings, it should be noted that we are all subject to our own implicit biases and limited information.

The de jure and de facto data, collected in 2021, was merged with external datasets, namely the 2018 Polity5 dataset and 2020 economic indicators from the World Bank, for the purposes of the following analysis. These datasets were not all collected in the same year, which may pose complications if a political system changed significantly from 2018 to 2021, such as Brazil, or if a country’s economy grew significantly during 2021, such as Guyana. The datasets used here were the most recent iterations available at the time of analysis, but we seek to update our analysis once later versions are released.

The quantitative scores also condense critical details about each country context. To provide further perspective, we include brief narrative descriptions on both the de jure and de facto situations, as well as references for further reading. These narratives, covering the 51 countries in the sample, are captured as scorecards, which are available in Part 2 of this report.
MAIN FINDINGS

In this section, we summarize our data on refugee work rights in law (de jure) and in practice (de facto). We evaluate the situation as of 2021, explore how de jure and de facto conditions correlate, and examine the relationship with other factors such as the number of refugees a country hosts. The following conclusions are solely drawn from the sample in our data (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Map of refugees’ work rights

Note: Countries are shaded based on their overall de facto score in the 2021 Refugee Access to Work Rights dataset. Countries are listed with their de jure score, left, and de facto score.

DE JURE SCORE SUMMARY

For refugees’ de jure work rights, 9 out of 51 countries in the sample received a score of 5 (green), meeting the criteria that “fully-functioning national policies support refugees’ right to work without restrictions and extend labor protections to refugees.” These 9 countries host 12 percent of the global refugee population (Figure 3). Another 50 percent of refugees live in the 21 countries that scored a 4 (yellow), which means more than half of the world’s displaced population lives in countries that generally respect refugees’ work rights by law. We consider a country to be significantly restricting refugees’ work rights in law and policy if it scores a 3 (orange), 2 (red), or 1 (purple) on de jure rights.

Notably, income levels do not correlate with de jure scores. In fact, low-income countries in this sample had the strongest performance on refugee work rights in law, with 3 out of the 8 low-income countries
receiving the top score (5/green) and 3 more receiving a 4 (yellow). None of the low-income countries received either of the lowest two scores.

Middle-income countries had the lowest de jure scores, on average, in the sample. Seven of the 8 countries that received the two lowest de jure scores (1/purple or 2/red) are middle-income. Three of 6 lower-middle-income countries scored a 4 and none scored a 5, while 10 of 20 upper-middle-income countries scored a 4 or 5.

Only 3 of 17 high-income countries received the top score. Eight received the second-highest score and 5 received a 3. For most of the high-income countries on this list, their score of 4 (yellow) reflects a waiting period of two to nine months before asylum seekers can lawfully access work, sometimes accompanied by other bureaucratic obstacles. The remaining high-income country, Hong Kong, received the lowest score.

**DE FACTO SCORE SUMMARY**

On average, de facto scores are lower than de jure scores. No country in the sample received the top score for labor market access in practice. Instead, at least 55 percent of the global refugee population lives in a country that significantly restricts refugees' work rights in practice, scoring a 3 (orange) or below (Figure 4). This includes 19 percent living in countries that severely restrict work rights—18 percent in countries scoring a 2 (red) and 1 percent in Tanzania, the only country to receive the lowest score. These figures likely underestimate the extent of restrictions globally, as 13 percent of the refugee population was not covered by our survey.
In contrast to de jure scores, de facto scores are correlated with income level. High-income countries have the highest average scores, with 11 out of the 17 scoring 4 out of 5. Five countries received a score of 3, while Hong Kong scored a 2. The 6 lower-middle-income countries scored the lowest, on average, with none receiving a score of 4 or 5. Upper-middle-income and low-income countries scored similarly, averaging about 3. While there is a correlation between income and de facto score, low-income countries Rwanda and Uganda scored as high as any high-income country.

**DE JURE SCORES BY REGION**

Latin America and the Caribbean is the region with the strongest legal (de jure) work rights for refugees, with 4 of 11 countries receiving a top score of 5 (green): Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Panama. Five countries—Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Peru—received the second-highest score of 4 (yellow). Colombia and Costa Rica have the strongest work rights regimes among this group, but they require asylum seekers to wait three months before they may lawfully work. Chile’s and Mexico’s laws permit, respectively, summary deportation or indefinite detention of refugee claimants who entered irregualrly, while Peru has recently appeared to adopt unwritten policies that summarily deny asylum to Venezuelans presenting claims at the Peruvian border. Chile’s, Mexico’s, and Peru’s policies formally limit refugees’ freedom of movement into and within these countries, resulting in lower ratings. Trinidad and Tobago received a score of 3, as the country has no legislation granting asylum or work rights to refugees; however, since 2020 it has implemented various ad hoc policies granting Venezuelan refugees permission to reside and work in the country. Guyana, an outlier in the region, scored a 1 (purple) because it offers no de jure rights to refugees, despite its ratification of the Economic Covenant.

Africa and Europe perform moderately in de jure work rights for refugees, with 9 countries in each region, out of 12 and 13 countries, respectively, receiving the top two scores. In Africa, 3 countries surveyed—Chad, Rwanda, and Uganda—received the top score, while in Europe only Portugal met the highest standard.

Six African countries and 8 European countries received scores of 4: Burundi, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Kenya; and Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, Serbia, Spain, and Switzerland. For most of the European countries on this list, their score of 4 (yellow) reflects a waiting period of two to nine months before asylum seekers can lawfully access work, sometimes accompanied by other bureaucratic obstacles. For most of the African countries on this list, the yellow score reflects internment policies: Burundi, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Kenya56 have policies requiring at least some groups of refugees and/or asylum seekers to reside in internment camps unless granted a free-movement permit, creating a legal barrier to work rights access.

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56 In 2021, Kenya passed a new Refugees Act, for which regulations are currently being developed. These regulations likely will more precisely address refugees’ rights to movement and thus will have a significant impact on refugees’ de jure access to work.
Denmark, Greece, Malawi, North Macedonia, Sudan, and Tanzania, which scored a 3 (orange), all have laws or policies significantly restricting labor market access, effectively making it impossible for at least some groups of refugees and/or asylum seekers to access work rights. In Libya, which scored a 2 (red), refugees cannot lawfully remain in the country and thus cannot access the work rights accorded to other foreigners.

The Middle East lags behind, with most of the 5 countries in this study receiving a score of 3 (orange). Iraqi Kurdistan and Jordan scored a 3 largely on the basis of their limitations on the de jure right to work; in Iraqi Kurdistan, most refugees’ right to work is not guaranteed by law but instead subject to ministerial discretion, while in Jordan, the right to work is significantly limited by nationality and sector.

East, South, and Southeast Asia together form the worst region for refugees with regard to de jure work rights. Four of the 7 countries received the lowest score of 1 (purple), with 2 more receiving the second-lowest score of 2 (red). Iran, which received a 3 (orange), is the only country in this region to have legislation or policies permitting refugees to work, although Malaysia scored a 2 (red), given that the country has occasionally implemented ad hoc policies allowing small groups of refugees to work.

DE FACTO SCORES BY REGION

While Latin America and the Caribbean provide the strongest de jure work rights for refugees, Europe is the strongest region for refugees' de facto work rights, with 8 out of 12 countries scoring a 4 on our 5-point scale. The other European countries—Greece, Italy, North Macedonia, and Serbia,—scored a 3, reflecting significant restrictions to the right to work in practice. Refugees in Greece, for example, are often confined to camps, where it is difficult to leave and secure employment.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, a majority of those in our sample scored a 3, reflecting restrictive access to the right to work. Costa Rica is one of the highest scoring countries in the world, but there is a legal limit on the foreign-born workers businesses can hire. Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Peru—all of whom are hosting many Venezuelans displaced abroad, score a 3 (orange). Guyana, for example, does not have a law on the books that governs employment of refugees, yet Venezuelans displaced abroad there do often work in practice.

Countries in Africa generally do not provide adequate de facto conditions for refugees to work. Rwanda and Uganda have performed relatively well, both scoring a 4 (yellow). Yet all other countries scored a 3 or below, which we define as restrictive. Tanzania received the lowest score due to practices including crackdowns on work even within camps.

Countries in the Middle East were similarly restrictive on de facto refugee work rights; Iraqi Kurdistan is the sole country that scored a 4, while Lebanon received the second-lowest possible score of 2, due to refugees' inability to access work permits and fear of arrest during movement.
Lastly, South, Southeast, and East Asia score the lowest in de facto refugee work rights. All countries in East and Southeast Asia in our sample—Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand—scored a 2 (red). This results from conditions, such as those in Malaysia, in which refugees generally—and the Rohingya people in particular—are rarely, if ever, able to be employed. The Malaysian government did launch a pilot program to employ 300 Rohingya refugees but this was a minor project that did not have any long-lasting impacts on the de facto situation confronted by the displaced population as a whole. Two of the 3 South Asian countries, Bangladesh and Iran, also scored a 2, reflecting working environments that are hostile toward refugees, as well. Pakistan received the highest score in the region of 3 (orange), which is still significantly restrictive.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DE JURE AND DE FACTO SCORES

The 5-point scoring criteria for de jure and de facto environments were designed to be comparable, to the extent possible, so that fully applying the law in practice leads to an equal de jure and de facto score. While environments in practice are more restrictive than the established laws on average, we also find that the de facto environment correlates strongly with the de jure environment (Figure 5). Implementation and bureaucratic facilitation are critical, but laws are often the foundation upon which better de facto conditions can be built.

In addition to being lower than de jure scores on average, de facto scores are also more concentrated. No country received a top de facto score, and only one country received the lowest score. Countries with strong legislation, both positive and negative, are not fully applying the law in practice. Countries with the most inclusive legislation enact some barriers in practice, and countries with the most exclusive legislation allow some access through incomplete enforcement.

The difference between de jure and de facto scores is largest for low-income countries. The de facto score is lower than the de jure score in all 8 low-income countries in our sample—by one point for 6 countries and two points for Chad and Ethiopia. Lower-middle-income countries have the second-largest gap between environments in law and practice. Four of these countries have more restrictive environments in practice than in law, including two-point gaps in Kenya and Tanzania. However, 2 countries in this group have marginally better practices than the law suggests, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Upper-middle- and high-income countries have smaller differences between environments in law

Figure 5. De facto and de jure scores

Source: 2021 Refugee Access to Work Rights dataset.
and in practice. Of these 37 countries, 17 have equal de jure and de facto scores, 11 score one point worse in practice, and 6 score one point worse in law. Ecuador and Panama both score two points worse in practice than in law (3 and 5, respectively), and Guyana scores two points better in practice than in law (3 and 1, respectively).

At every income level, however, de jure scores are strongly related to de facto scores (Figure 6). Although the gap is widest in low-income countries, a stronger legal framework predicts a better environment in practice in low-, middle-, and high-income settings. Even when not fully implemented, legal environments send signals to bureaucrats and can provide refugees recourse in some situations.

While it is possible for refugees to have labor market access in practice without the proper legal environment, we find only 3 countries that fit this description. In most cases, the law appears to be a necessary condition for access in practice. The law, however, is certainly not sufficient; 14 countries have adequate legal environments but implement significant barriers in practice (Table 3).

Overall, 25 countries in our sample have better environments in law than in practice, while 9 countries register better de facto conditions than de jure conditions. Seventeen countries have equal conditions in practice and in law, indicating that those countries are fulfilling the conditions for refugees’ work rights they set out in domestic law—whether good or bad.

**CORRELATION WITH SIZE OF REFUGEE POPULATION AND POLITICAL SYSTEM**

To further characterize the state of refugees’ labor market access, we explore correlations between the refugee rights and two additional characteristics: the number of refugees hosted and the political system.
Refugee population and density

Do countries with larger refugee populations impose more restrictions? Larger displaced populations may increase host community fears of negative effects but also attract increased international attention and resources for support. Blair, Grossman, and Weinstein (2021) find that lower-income countries change their policies when there is a neighboring conflict, and the changes are more likely to be inclusive when the arriving refugees are co-ethnics of the host country's political elites.57

Figure 7. De jure score and refugee population size

Sources: 2021 Refugee Access to Work Rights dataset, UNHCR Refugee Data Finder, and World Bank.

Figure 8. De facto score and refugee population size

Sources: 2021 Refugee Access to Work Rights dataset, UNHCR Refugee Data Finder, and World Bank.

Overall, we do not find a relationship between the size of the refugee population and the de jure work rights score (Figure 7). The same pattern holds when looking at the number of refugees per capita.

We also do not find a significant correlation between the size of the refugee population and the de facto score (Figure 8). In other words, the size of the refugee population suggests little about refugees’ rights in law or in practice.

**Political system**

Do democracies impose more restrictions on refugees than autocracies, which are less constrained by public opinion? To examine this correlation, we merge our data with the Polity IV Project’s index of democracy, using the “Polity5” version, which evaluates where a country’s political system lies on a spectrum ranging from autocratic to democratic (a range of −10 to +10). In our sample, we find no evidence that de jure scores differ across political systems (Figure 9). In other words, democracies are equally as likely to provide work rights by law as autocracies.

![Figure 9. De jure and de facto scores and political system](image)

*Sources: 2021 Refugee Access to Work Rights dataset and the Polity5 dataset.*

However, there is a significant correlation between work rights being upheld in practice and the political system of the host country (Figure 9). If a country is more democratic (higher Polity score), it is more likely to have a higher de facto score. This pattern holds when controlling for income level as well. While this correlation is not evidence of a causal relationship, it does suggest that pressure on democratic governments (i.e., public opinion) does not need to constrain refugees’ right to work in practice.

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58 In the full sample, there is a positive correlation between the de jure score and the size of the refugee population, but this is largely driven by countries that host relatively few refugees, for which our sample is less representative at the global level. In the “Refugee population and density” section we therefore restrict the sample to the top 40 refugee-hosting countries, where our sample is more complete.

RIGHT TO WORK

DE JURE

Although on paper the 1951 Refugee Convention and the Economic Covenant guarantee refugees' access to national labor markets, only 9 of the 51 countries in our sample have a fully functioning national policy that supports refugees' right to work without restrictions.

Forty countries in our sample have a national law or policy under which at least some refugees may access the labor market (see, for example, Chad’s law in Box 8). However, some of these laws and policies may be inaccessible to refugees because they apply to foreign workers generally and thus impose hurdles such as access to origin-country documentation and payment of permit fees. Thirty countries, all of which received overall de jure scores in the top two tiers, have laws that permit refugees to work.

Box 8. Chad’s new asylum law

In December 2020, Chad passed legislation that granted the right to work to refugees and asylum seekers.60 The legislation fulfills a pledge made by the government of Chad, toward the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees, to adopt a law on asylum.61 As the law states, “The Republic of Chad shall grant to any refugee lawfully residing in its territory the most favorable treatment accorded, in the same circumstances, to nationals of a foreign country with respect to the exercise of a salaried, self-employed, and/or liberal professional activity.” This new law also guarantees the right to housing, legal redress, public benefits, education, and travel, among other guarantees (although it prohibits refugees or asylum seekers from engaging in “political activities”).

The work rights guaranteed to refugees, however, are not yet fully realized. As in many countries around the world, de facto implementation of new legislation has been slow to meet expectations. Survey respondents reported that refugee access to work has not changed much in recent years. They particularly highlighted that formal work is difficult to obtain and that refugee women and girls are particularly vulnerable due to the types of work they do, which can include housework and prostitution.62 It will take time and accountability mechanisms for the rights outlined in the new law to be fully recognized by actors at the local level.

DE FACTO

Our de facto data captures two main types of work. Wage employment is defined as contracted work for an employer that is registered with the government. Self-employment is defined as owning a business—keeping the profits and responsible for the losses—instead of receiving wages.

We examine access to each type of work with two measures: access to permits and enforcement. Either easy access to permits or low enforcement leads to a high score for each type of work, as described in the methodology section. The right to work index is the average of the wage employment and self-employment measures (Figure 10).

**Figure 10. Right to work index**

Thirty-five countries score a 3.5 or below, imposing significant restrictions in practice on the right to work. Twenty-eight countries score a 3 (orange) or below on both the wage employment and self-employment measures. The two employment measures are highly correlated overall, with 30 countries receiving the same wage and self-employment scores and another 15 with a one-point difference, leaving six countries where either wage or self-employment are significantly different to access in practice.

**Wage Employment**

Most countries have some de facto barriers to accessing work permits for formal wage employment, scoring a 3 or below on permit accessibility (Figure 11). Low-income countries generally scored either a 1 or 2, reflecting that, even if work permits are available by law in these countries, fees can be exorbitant, and bureaucracies are often slow and under-staffed.

*Source: 2021 Refugee Access to Work Rights dataset.*
In the absence of work permits, refugees often turn to informal wage employment. This is not a substitute for formal work; exploitation and abuse are more likely, and informal workers and their employers risk penalties from authorities. However, this enforcement varies across countries; sixty-eight percent of refugees live in a country that received a 3 or lower on enforcement, meaning documentation status was checked “sometimes” or more and expected punishment was “moderate” or worse (Figure 12). We document that low-income countries, where refugees often struggle to access permits as described above, conduct less enforcement.

Lastly, we find that in the past five years, roughly equal percentages of the global refugee population live in countries where access to wage employment improved, worsened, or stayed the same (Figure 13).

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63 Lower scores indicate stricter enforcement, though if work permits are available, enforcement is not itself a barrier.
Self-Employment

The other main avenue for work is owning a business. As with wage employment, we asked survey respondents about both access to permits—in this case relative to host citizens, who also need a permit—and enforcement of those permits.

For permit availability, we find that at least sixty percent of refugees lives in a country where refugees encounter significant barriers in practice relative to citizens (Figure 14). This is similar to access to wage employment, as is enforcement; 69 percent of the refugee population faces significant barriers to operating a business without a permit (Figure 15). In some places like Indonesia, refugee entrepreneurs, UNHCR, and other agencies have tried to adapt to the barriers by partnering refugees with citizens to start businesses together. However, refugees still have little autonomy in this arrangement and face harassment from local officials.

Finally, over the past five years, we find a slight improvement in access to self-employment (Figure 16). We find at least 26 percent of refugees live—in 2021—in a country that has improved access to self-employment in the last five years, compared to 15 percent who live in a country where access to self-employment has declined in practice.
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Freedom of movement is critical to look for gainful employment, seek out economic resources, and generally support livelihoods through access to markets. The right to work is of little use if one cannot commute to a job. We look at the ability to travel domestically and the freedom to choose where to live.

DE JURE

Thirty-one of the 51 countries in this study impose significant de jure limitations on refugees’ free movement. Of those 31 countries, 14 intern at least some portion of their refugee or asylum seeker population, directly curtailing free movement. Six countries bar significant numbers of refugees from accessing their territory, impeding refugees’ lawful movement across borders. Eleven prevent at least some groups of refugees from accessing legal status and the right to stay, which curtails free movement by subjecting refugees to potential legal consequences if their presence is detected by authorities. Two countries limit the regions where refugees can live. Yet there have been some examples of improvements at the national legislative level (see Box 9).

Box 9. Kenya’s Refugee Act

Since late 2021, with the passage of the Refugee Act, Kenya has made gains in providing refugees access to the labor market. The new law provides for increased refugee economic inclusion, integration, and opportunities to contribute to Kenya’s economy. It is hoped that the act will help refugees overcome obstacles to accessing decent work like limitations on freedom of movement.

However, the government of Kenya is still developing regulations around the law, and determining how it will be implemented at the local level will be critical. In April 2022, the government released a policy paper outlining its intention to improve refugee participation in labor markets and to give refugees from the East African Community citizenship.

This potential progress comes in stark contrast to numerous announcements in recent years about camp closures and the desire to push refugees—particularly Somalis—out of Kenya. These announcements, which frame refugees as a security risk, clash with legal progress that promotes greater integration. Therefore, it remains to be seen if and how the new law will be implemented and whether it will be able to overcome tendencies to scapegoat refugees and call for their departure.

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International law provides for the right for refugees to move freely within a country. However, refugees face a range of barriers to movement in practice, including encampment that requires exit passes, other restrictions on areas of residence, harassment from officials and even arrest while traveling, and curfews that are specific to refugees, among others. In our survey, we ask about the freedom to travel domestically and the freedom to choose one's place of residence in practice. The freedom of movement index averages these two measures.

Figure 17. Freedom of movement index

![Freedom of movement index map]

Source: 2021 Refugee Access to Work Rights dataset.

We find that 50 percent of refugees live in countries that scored 3.5 or less on the freedom of movement index (Figure 17). Barriers to movement in practice are significant impediments to refugees' labor market access. Low- and lower-middle-income countries generally are more restrictive relative to upper-middle-income and high-income countries on both measures in the index. However, asylum seekers in high-income countries often face significant movement restrictions, including assignment to specific regions or detention until cases are resolved.

At least 45 percent of refugees live in countries with adequate freedom to travel domestically, defined as a 4 (yellow) or 5 (green) on our scale (Figure 18). Approximately equal proportions, 20 and 21 percent, live in countries that score a 3 (orange) or a 2 (red), respectively, imposing significant barriers like requiring movement passes from camps or fear of arrest during travel.

Fewer refugees live in countries with adequate choice of residence in practice. Thirty-seven percent of refugees worldwide live in countries that score a 5 (green) or 4 (yellow) on choice of residence, while
at least 50 percent live in countries that impose significant barriers like encampment or requirements to register and live in only certain areas (Figure 19).

Finally, we find a slight increase in the barriers to movement over the last five years. While 43 percent of refugees live in countries where freedom of movement has not changed according to respondents, 27 percent live in countries where freedom of movement has declined for refugees, relative to 15 percent living in countries where freedom of movement has improved. (Figure 20).

**Figure 18. Domestic travel**

**Figure 19. Choice of residence**

**Figure 20. Five-year change in freedom of movement**

**Sources:** 2021 Refugee Access to Work Rights dataset and UNHCR Data Finder. See question C1 and C2 in Annex 3 for survey questions and answer choices for Figures 18 and 19, respectively.

**Sources:** 2021 Refugee Access to Work Rights dataset and UNHCR Data Finder. See question C3 in Annex 3 for the survey question and answer choices.
RIGHTS AT WORK

Both the right to work and rights at work are necessary to ensure that refugees can participate in the labor economy on fair and equitable terms. Guaranteeing the right to work is critical, but it is often only the first step to “decent work,” defined by the International Labor Organization as productive work for women, men, and youth “in conditions of freedom, equity, security, and human dignity.”\(^{65}\)

Once employment is secured, refugees (and other migrants) may be subject to exploitation, harassment, sexual abuse, wage theft, underpayment or delayed payment of wages, and forced labor. Additionally, they may be barred or otherwise deterred from collective organizing.\(^{66}\) Refugees’ rights in the workplace must be guaranteed and enforced regardless of their legal status or movement rights within a host country—not only to ensure that refugees can work safely and on fair terms but to protect all workers from an erosion of labor standards that results in lower wages and worse working conditions for everyone.

Legal protections at work are imperative for all workers, including refugees, whether documented or not, in both formal and informal sectors of the labor economy. Moreover, to adequately ensure refugees’ rights at work, national laws and practices upholding work rights must extend to, and account for, the particular situation of refugee workers. For example, refugees must have the right to work even if they cannot secure the identity documents from their home country that might otherwise be required for labor market participation. Similarly, labor enforcement must not result in refugees’ being penalized for undocumented status or movement outside internment camps.

**DE JURE**

Our research shows that countries that grant refugees legal status, free movement, and the formal right to work also extend de jure rights at work. Where status and movement rights are limited, however, refugees typically—although not always—lack legal protections in the workplace.

“Rights at work” represents a broad category of rights that may be contained in myriad legal instruments. Our de jure assessment examined a few central questions as an indicator of whether refugees have access to rights at work. First, does the law recognize refugees as having legal status and the right to lawful residence? Where it does not, we presume refugees do not have de jure rights at work unless the law explicitly protects undocumented workers. Second, does the law require internment of refugees? If so, we presume refugees do not have de jure rights at work because they cannot lawfully access most jobs and because jobs in camps often pay less than minimum wage and often violate refugees’ rights at


work. Third, are refugees allowed to work, and, when they do, does the law extend workplace rights to them, either by specifically including refugees in workplace rights or by extending the same rights to anyone authorized to work? The answers to these questions offer a reasonable basis for understanding the state of refugees' rights at work.

The laws of 23 countries provide refugees access to legal status, free movement, and the right to work. These countries either specifically extend workplace rights to refugees or implicitly include refugee workers among a general category of those entitled to workplace protections. In many cases, refugee workers receive de jure protections on par with nationals, but in at least two cases (North Macedonia and Serbia) these protections are only on par with other foreign resident workers. This situation offers a promising indication that, when rights to legal status, free movement, and labor market access are granted, refugees tend to have rights at work too—at least in law.

In 7 countries, however, the law subjects refugees to internment and thus denies them work rights; in a further 6 countries, asylum seekers are interned, although recognized refugees are not. Ten countries do not provide de jure access to legal status and lawful stay, although one (Malaysia) offers a degree of legal protection of workplace rights to undocumented workers. The remaining handful of countries impose other de jure limitations on refugees' rights at work, such as prohibiting refugees from working, allowing only certain nationalities to work, or denying certain workplace rights such as a minimum wage or the right to organize (e.g., to participate in a union).

DE FACTO

The primary question in the de facto survey considering rights at work is whether or not refugees can access recourse for violations through government institutions. We found that, in practice, at least 66 percent of refugees live in countries that scored a 3 (Figure 21), meaning that workplace recourse is available but bureaucratic barriers, such as wait times or fear of deportation, prevent many from accessing it. This was consistent across income levels and refugee-hosting ranks. Austria, Costa Rica, Israel, and Rwanda received generally high marks for de facto access to government recourse, while Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Tanzania fared the worst.

Figure 21. Recourse to workplace violations

Sources: 2021 Refugee Access to Work Rights dataset and UNHCR Data Finder. See question D1 in Annex 3 for the survey question and answer choices.

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OTHER FACTORS OF ECONOMIC INCLUSION

Access to and rights within the labor market are inherently connected to refugees’ ability to access public education, health services, official documentation, and financial services. The 1951 Refugee Convention establishes basic minimum standards for refugees, which include access to courts, primary education, and work. The Refugee Convention also requires states to provide identity documents and other “administrative assistance.”

We included questions about access to these rights in practice in the survey. The survey questions are provided in full in Annex 3, and the final scores for these questions are determined by the process outlined in the methodology section. Although these additional factors are important for refugees’ work rights, they are not included in the overall work rights score.

Each measure does, however, strongly correlate with the overall de facto score. In general, countries that offer more access to the labor market also offer more access to education, healthcare, documentation, and financial services. In addition, the factors correlate with each other. When a law on refugees’ economic inclusion is passed, it often covers multiple factors. Furthermore, the factors are related in practice, for instance when documentation is required to open a bank account or attend school.

EDUCATION

De jure

Education enhances economic potential. Access to education is a basic human right established in the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and embedded in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Article 22 of the Refugee Convention requires that refugees have equal access with nationals to primary (elementary) education; Article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child mandates free, compulsory primary education for all. Nevertheless, many refugees do not have access to primary education, even in countries that are party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Lack of legal recognition, internment or detention, and requirements that refugee children pay fees or show difficult-to-obtain documents all contribute to the widespread exclusion of refugees from even basic education.

69 All p-values are less than 0.01 with the exception of credential validation, where the p-value is 0.27.
The Refugee Convention also indicates that refugees should be treated as favorably as possible in regard to postprimary education (e.g., secondary, tertiary, and vocational education), and at a minimum equally with other similarly situated foreigners. The Convention on the Rights of the Child goes further, requiring countries to make secondary education “available and accessible to every child.” Similar principles are also articulated in the 1960 Convention against Discrimination in Education and other legal instruments such as the Economic Covenant. When access to primary, secondary, tertiary and vocational education is limited in practice refugees’ ability to make use of the right to work is impeded.

**De facto**

Overall, education is the most accessible factor in our de facto data. We ask about refugees’ access in practice to primary, secondary, and tertiary education relative to host communities and find that, while many barriers exist, at least 37 percent of refugees live in countries with equal access to primary school as hosts (Figure 22). Another 27 percent live in countries that score a 4 (yellow) out of 5 on primary school access. Barriers to secondary school are higher, but overall at least 60 percent of the global refugee population has adequate access, living in a country scoring either a 4 (yellow) or 5 (green), to secondary school (Figure 23). Barriers to tertiary education, on the other hand, remain significant; at least 68 percent of refugees live in countries with significant barriers to tertiary education relative to hosts (Figure 24).

**Figure 22. Access to primary education**

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<tr>
<td>4</td>
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</tr>
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<td>17%</td>
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**Figure 23. Access to secondary education**

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</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 2021 Refugee Access to Work Rights dataset and UNHCR Data Finder. See question E1.1 and E1.2 in Annex 3 for the survey question and answer choices for Figures 22 and 23, respectively.


HEALTHCARE

De jure

Access to healthcare is important for many reasons, including to utilize labor market access and to redress work-related illnesses and injuries. For refugees, healthcare may be particularly important for economic inclusion, as the circumstances that force a person to become a refugee may lead to health needs as a result of their experiences. This has direct bearing on their ability to work and be self-reliant.

The right to health is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as part of the right to an adequate standard of living, and in the Economic Covenant. The Economic Covenant also requires states to take steps to “assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.”

In the Refugee Convention, refugees’ right to health is clearly articulated: refugees are entitled to the same treatment as nationals in regard to “public relief and assistance,” which includes medical assistance, and social security, which includes “legal provisions in respect of employment injury, occupational diseases [and] . . . family responsibilities.”

De facto

Overall, we find more significant barriers to healthcare access relative to citizens than for primary and secondary education. At least 58 percent of refugees face significant barriers to accessing healthcare relative to nationals, oftentimes in the form of higher fees (Figure 25). However, eight countries in our sample offer similar access for citizens and refugees in practice.

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The level of access did not significantly vary with whether host countries were hosting many refugees or few; the primary correlation was with the income level of the country. Refugees in low-income countries are more likely to face barriers to healthcare relative to citizens than those in middle- and high-income countries.

ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS

De jure

Documentation is one of the most important aspects of accessing rights. In another survey of organizations that work with refugees conducted by the Refugee Self-Reliance Initiative, the Global Refugee Youth Network, and the Refugee-Led Research Hub, respondents ranked documentation as the most important barrier to refugees’ self-reliance by a wide margin. Identity documents, residence permits, work permits, and proof of education credentials are all examples of documents that may be fundamental to accessing safe, fair, and lawful work for refugees.

The Refugee Convention specifically guarantees access to certain documents, including identity papers and travel documents. Furthermore, host country authorities are specifically required to provide “administrative assistance,” which includes documents ordinarily provided by national authorities in a person’s country of citizenship.

This means that, under international law, host countries are required to take proactive steps to ensure that refugees can access the documents they need to transact the ordinary business of life. These may include not only identity documents but also documents pertaining to family status, such as marriage, birth, adoption, or divorce certificates; to property, such as deeds or titles; and others.

De facto

Survey respondents were asked whether refugees could acquire official documents like birth and death certificates relative to members of the host community and whether refugees could have academic or professional degrees validated by the host government. Both measures reveal significant barriers for a majority of refugees. At least 58 percent of refugees live in countries that score a 3 (orange) or below on access to official documents (Figure 26). Validating credentials is even more difficult; at least 69 percent live in countries that score a 3 (orange) or below (Figure 27).


De jure

Access to financial services, such as bank accounts and loans, is central to enabling refugees to equitably participate in the economic life of their host countries and communities. In addition to direct benefits like securely storing savings and accessing loans, many respondents noted how employers needed a bank account to hire employees. However, financial inclusion is not clearly or comprehensively articulated as a right (or set of rights) in international law. No international legal framework specifically guarantees access to financial services, for refugees or anyone else.

Legal grounds for insisting on refugees’ access to financial services can be found, however, in the provision of the Refugee Convention granting refugees property rights “not less favorable than” those held by similarly situated foreigners, as well as in the provision mandating that the state provide “administrative assistance,”79 which was explicitly envisioned to support “the opening of bank accounts” among other personal business.80 Moreover, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination prohibits racial discrimination, including on the basis of national origin, in “the right

of access to any place or service intended for use by the general public,”81 which in today’s world includes banks.

The Global Compact on Refugees mentions financial inclusion in the context of one of the areas in need of support. It states:

Efforts will be made to support access to affordable financial products and services for women and men in host and refugee communities, including by reducing associated risks and enabling low-cost mobile and internet access to these services where possible; as well as to support the transfer of remittances.82

While the Global Compact on Refugees is an important document that represents the political will to support sustainable solutions to forced displacement, it is not legally binding.

De facto

Among the factors of economic inclusion in our data, financial services are the most difficult for refugees to access. Survey respondents were asked how accessible services like bank accounts and formal loans are for refugees relative to citizens in practice. Overall, at least 84 percent of refugees live in countries that impose significant barriers to financial services in practice (Figure 28).

**Figure 28. Access to formal financial services**

Sources: 2021 Refugee Access to Work Rights dataset and UNHCR Data Finder. See question E3 in Annex 3 for the survey question and answer choices.

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RECOMMENDATIONS TO EXPAND LABOR MARKET ACCESS

Refugees’ right to work is repeatedly articulated in international legal instruments. In addition, most studies find that when refugees and asylum seekers are given the right to work, move, and thrive, they contribute to the socioeconomic development of their host countries. Our study documents numerous legal and practical barriers that deny refugees their rights and prevent refugees and host countries from fully realizing the economic gains.

The recommendations below are principles and ideas to address these barriers. They are targeted at refugee-hosting countries and donors, and outline ways in which they could improve both their policies and implementation to safeguard refugee rights. They are not conclusions derived from our main data; instead, they are proposals to address the issues highlighted by our analysis based on the experience of our organizations and many others.

The recommendations target both laws and practices. Our study shows that refugees’ access to labor markets in practice is correlated with policies that enable this access. While policies permitting labor market access are not enough, a lack of such policies—or policies directly prohibiting this access—can pose an insurmountable barrier to equitable labor market access for refugee populations. Every host country is different, and therefore specific recommendations should be tailored for each country. Yet, in general, enacting the right policies is a necessary first step toward ensuring refugees’ equitable access to fair, safe, and lawful work.

Our study also shows that policy improvements alone are not sufficient to create pathways to refugees’ equitable labor market access. Unless these policies are implemented and enforced, they will remain promises on paper, divorced from the daily lives of refugees.

83 Our recommendations target host countries and donors because we believe these two types of actors are positioned to achieve systemic improvement in refugees’ equitable access to safe, fair, and lawful work. We recognize that others, such as private-sector and civil society actors, can make a meaningful difference in the lives of refugees. However, without changes in host country policies and practices, which sometimes require and can be incentivized through donor financing, other actors’ ability to have systemic impact will be limited.
**Refugee-hosting countries**

- **Ensure domestic laws grant refugees the rights to work, move, and thrive without delay.** Domestic laws should enable refugees to enjoy the same legal rights to work in all sectors and to move freely. Refugees and host communities should benefit from equal rights in the workplace, including minimum wages, maximum hours, prompt payment, safe and fair working conditions, the ability to organize, and protection against retaliation for asserting or exercising rights.

- **Ensure refugee status comes with the automatic right to work and move without delay.** In many countries, even recognized refugees need to apply for work permits to be able to exercise their rights in practice. Instead of adding to refugees' and employers' burden by requiring work permits—a costly, inefficient additional barrier to refugee employment—refugees should be able to work automatically just as citizens are. Documentation issued to refugees should clearly state that they are free to move and eligible to work, to avoid confusion and information gaps with employers and state officials.

- **Include refugees as constituents in work rights policymaking.** Refugees should have equitable access to all opportunities for civic participation that influences the design and drafting of work rights policies, regardless of their citizenship status.

- **Ensure that refugees’ rights to work, move, and thrive are upheld in practice without delay.** Laws are not enough to protect rights. In practice, governments should reduce administrative barriers, issue the permits provided for in law, and sufficiently staff the offices responsible for processing permits. What is understood at the national level may not translate to the local level, and host countries must ensure that laws are respected. Moreover, many needs are country specific, and we describe other resources on individual countries where available in Annex 2 and Part 2.

- **Safeguard refugees’ rights at work through enforcement.** Refugees often face exploitation at work because their rights are not enforced, having a negative impact on citizens, driving down wages, and eroding working conditions. It also rewards exploitative employers while raising costs for those who treat their workers fairly. Investing in labor inspectorates and other work rights enforcement mechanisms can help prevent this. Refraining from impeding collective organizing by workers is also important.

- **Support legal aid for refugees.** State labor enforcement should be supplemented with legal support to refugees, so they can challenge policy violations that impede their access to safe, fair, lawful work. This helps all workers by increasing the likelihood that employers will comply with work rights policies overall. It also provides a means for refugees to receive redress for harms such as unpaid wages or sexual abuse.
Box 10. How is international assistance currently connected to refugees’ work rights?

Amid increasing recognition of the need to support host communities alongside refugees and other displaced groups, some development actors and international financing institutions such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank have increased their engagement at the regional, country, and local levels. In particular, the World Bank has begun promoting refugee labor market access through the International Development Association (IDA) Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR) and the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF).

The WHR provides concessional financing and grants over a three-year period to strengthen the capacity of low-income countries that host large numbers of refugees. This funding aims to mitigate shocks produced by refugee flows and create social and development opportunities; facilitate sustainable solutions to protracted refugee situations, including through refugees’ socioeconomic inclusion; and strengthen the host country’s preparedness to receive new refugee flows. In the latest period, the window committed up to $US2.2 billion to address the long-term development needs of both refugees and hosts. Some recipients of IDA funding include Chad, Ethiopia, and Pakistan.

Similarly, the GCFF provides concessional financing for middle-income countries that host large numbers of refugees. As of December 2021, the trust fund had received over $US786.74 million in pledges, of which $US671 million have been disbursed, and have leveraged over $US5 billion in concessional finance support. The GCFF projects are implemented with the leadership of the host nation in countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, Jordan, and Lebanon.

While both financing mechanisms have produced results, they do not guarantee policy reform, which remains a key component to ensure economic inclusion. In response to this challenge, the World Bank developed the Refugee Policy Review Framework (RPRF) to track policy progress in low-income countries that benefit from the WHR. This tool has the potential to leverage policy progress to the benefit of refugee-hosting states. The RPRF measures several policy dimensions, including the right to work and rights at work, with the objective of analyzing the effectiveness of the funding in improving the inclusion of displaced persons. Still, additional paths to policy reform are needed to ensure de jure and de facto access to work.

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Donors

- **Support and incentivize host governments to improve policies and implementation.** The World Bank’s IDA19 Window for Refugees and Host Communities (WHR) and the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) already incentivize improvements to refugee policy in select countries through provision of add-on concessional funding (see Box 10). These initiatives (or appropriate analogues) should be made available to a wider range of countries. Other actors such as regional and national development banks and donor governments should create similar avenues for financial support tied to refugee policy improvements. Progress could be tracked through the World Bank’s Refugee Policy Review Framework (RPRF) or similar tools.

- **Strengthen the Global Refugee Forum pledging mechanism.** The Global Compact on Refugees and its companion process, the quadrennial Global Refugee Forum (GRF), include a pledging mechanism currently used to promote and assess progress on solutions for refugees. Donors should invest in strengthening this mechanism as an accountability tool, for example by developing a more robust and widely-accepted assessment mechanism for reviewing progress; making progress assessments publicly available; and encouraging dialogue about them. Donors should also consider supporting development of a peer recommendation component in the GRF process, such as that used in the Universal Periodic Review.

- **Involve experts, including refugees, in investment design.** Currently, large-scale investments intended to improve refugees’ labor market access are designed without inclusion of refugee-led organizations and other civil society groups with direct expertise in the barriers that these investments aim to address. Further, multilateral investors such as development banks often lack staff with expertise in forced displacement, or do not adequately involve staff with such expertise in their investment decisions. Inclusion of these actors would increase the likelihood that investments aimed at improving national policies on refugee work rights achieve their intended impact. It would also be a first step toward ensuring these investments are accountable to the people they purport to benefit.

- **Support local advocacy for policy improvements.** Policy improvements are unlikely without domestic pressure for change. Donors should invest more in local civil society organizations and campaigns for refugee rights in host countries. Just as donors support local organizations that advocate for women’s rights, gay rights, and improved governance, donors should fund local campaigns that encourage governments to adopt policies that strengthen refugees’ equitable access to safe, fair, lawful work.

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• **Provide support to host communities in addition to refugees.** Host communities often fear that offering work rights to refugees will negatively affect their own economic outcomes. Although most empirical research finds small or null average effects, some groups—often those with the most similar skillsets to refugees—may be negatively affected by refugees and their access to the labor market especially in the short-run. These groups need support to find new jobs and acquire new skills. Furthermore, perceptions of refugees’ effects on host communities matter, through both pressure on government officials and discrimination refugees face in daily interactions. Including host communities in assistance programs—and clearly communicating that the programs are part of the refugee response—can increase support among hosts for refugees’ labor market access and facilitate refugee work rights as a win-win for refugees and host communities alike.

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## ANNEX 1. COUNTRIES COVERED

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<thead>
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<th>Refugee-hosting country</th>
<th>Number of survey responses</th>
<th>Income ranking(^{88})</th>
<th>Refugees under UNHCR’s mandate(^{89})</th>
<th>Asylum seekers</th>
<th>Venezuelans displaced abroad</th>
<th>Total foreign-born displaced population</th>
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<td>6,451</td>
<td>483,343</td>
<td>491,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>964</td>
<td>30,599</td>
<td>1,742,927</td>
<td>1,774,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>9,976</td>
<td>95,275</td>
<td>21,995</td>
<td>127,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>519,819</td>
<td>16,595</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>536,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>36,431</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>55,424</td>
<td>6,565</td>
<td>446,679</td>
<td>508,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lower-middle</td>
<td>277,665</td>
<td>57,320</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>334,985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refugee-hosting country</th>
<th>Number of survey responses</th>
<th>Income ranking</th>
<th>Refugees under UNHCR's mandate</th>
<th>Asylum seekers</th>
<th>Venezuelans displaced abroad</th>
<th>Total foreign-born displaced population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>782,896</td>
<td>2,110</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>High</td>
<td>457,153</td>
<td>82,032</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>539,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1,235,160</td>
<td>232,481</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,467,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>112,022</td>
<td>49,397</td>
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<td>161,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
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<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>23,307</td>
<td>23,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>10,076</td>
<td>3,309</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>800,025</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>800,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>272,215</td>
<td>11,167</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>283,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1,860</td>
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<td>31,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>134,499</td>
<td>53,686</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>188,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>708,308</td>
<td>48,368</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>756,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Lower-middle</td>
<td>466,286</td>
<td>54,878</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>521,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>856,758</td>
<td>8,932</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>865,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>3,701</td>
<td>39,434</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>16,359</td>
<td>34,461</td>
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<td>50,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>131,101</td>
<td>52,012</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>183,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>58,050</td>
<td>114,536</td>
<td>59,942</td>
<td>232,528</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

90 This study covers Iraqi Kurdistan, a semi-autonomous region that sets its own laws and hosts nearly all of the foreign-born displaced people in Iraq. UNHCR statistics described in this table, however, cover all of Iraq.

91 Jordan also hosted 2,334,789 Palestinian refugees under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in 2021. Most had full citizenship.

92 Lebanon also hosted 482,676 Palestinian refugees under UNRWA's mandate in 2021.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refugee-hosting country</th>
<th>Number of survey responses</th>
<th>Income ranking</th>
<th>Refugees under UNHCR’s mandate</th>
<th>Asylum seekers</th>
<th>Venezuelans displaced abroad</th>
<th>Total foreign-born displaced population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>1,785</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lower-middle</td>
<td>1,438,523</td>
<td>10,192</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,448,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>2,542</td>
<td>11,630</td>
<td>121,870</td>
<td>136,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>4,895</td>
<td>536,779</td>
<td>515,162</td>
<td>1,056,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>2,650</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>122,806</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>123,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>25,641</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>115,258</td>
<td>91,585</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>206,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1,068,339</td>
<td>25,102</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,093,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>117,169</td>
<td>5,612</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>122,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lower-middle</td>
<td>202,635</td>
<td>27,829</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>230,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>96,175</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>96,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>3,458</td>
<td>21,089</td>
<td>4,663</td>
<td>29,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>3,696,831</td>
<td>322,188</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,019,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1,475,311</td>
<td>23,126</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,498,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>337,870</td>
<td>1,247,223</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,585,093</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other organizations have studied the de jure and de facto rights provided to refugees in countries around the world. These efforts vary in a number of ways, including their geographic coverage, whether they analyze de jure or de facto environments, and whether countries are “scored” or compared with each other. See Table A2.1 for a summary and geographic coverage of each initiative.

The two most related prior publications are the 2014 Global Refugee Work Rights Report by Asylum Access and the 2016 Refugees’ Right to Work and Access to Labor Markets—An Assessment by Zetter and Ruaudel. These projects build on the World Refugee Survey by the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, which was last conducted in 2008.

The 2014 Global Refugee Work Rights Report examined the legal framework supporting refugees’ right to work in 15 countries hosting 30 percent of the global refugee population. It highlighted the struggles refugees face in accessing safe and lawful employment and suggested ways in which the refugee-serving community could better support refugee work rights. Notably, the Global Refugee Work Rights Report also scored host countries on how well they "respect," “protect,” and “promote” refugee work rights and created both country scorecards and a global map.

Zetter and Ruaudel’s 2016 assessment investigated the legal and practical restrictions on refugees’ right to work in 20 countries hosting 70 percent of the world’s refugee population. While they do not score or rank the countries assessed, they do find that most restrict the right to work, leading refugees to largely work within the informal sector.

Additional publications aim to analyze both the de jure and de facto conditions of refugee-hosting countries across multiple countries. The Global Compact on Refugees developed an indicator framework to provide a global overview of refugee issues and improve data collection and sharing. Many of its indicators dovetail with those analyzed in this report, including the proportion of refugees able to access decent work, move freely, and enroll in education. The first indicator report provides basic statistics from UNHCR’s Global Livelihoods Survey from 2021, which surveyed 25 countries hosting 54 percent of refugees. The authors find that 75 percent of these refugees have access to decent work in law, while only 35 percent have unrestricted access in practice. Further results, including assessments of individual countries, are not publicly available.

The World Bank conducted a systematic review of refugee policies and institutional environments in 14 countries eligible for the IDA19 Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR). This analysis, the Refugee Policy Review Framework (RPRF), included five policy dimensions and measured indicators such as freedom of movement; right to work; access to education, healthcare, and social protection; and access to documentation, along with the legal and regulatory framework. Broadly, the researchers find that the countries analyzed have made important policy improvements in recent years, though the degree of implementation varies.

The “Partnership for improving prospects for forcibly displaced persons and host communities” (PROSPECTS) is organized by the International Finance Corporation, the International Labor Organization, UNHCR, UNICEF, and the World Bank and is funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. The partnership aims to foster durable solutions for refugees in eight countries and is conducting legal and policy mapping in each of these contexts to inform its programming.

The Asylum Information Database (AIDA) is produced by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles for 23 countries in Europe. The reports are detailed analyses of the de jure and de facto hosting environments and updated annually.

The Refugee Response Index (RRI) is led by DARA and supported by partners including the Danish Refugee Council, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, Asylum Access, Premise, and DevStat. The index is designed to monitor and assess a country’s response to refugees under six pillars, including access to rights and access to self-reliance, and 160 indicators. The RRI has been piloted in Costa Rica and Kenya and is working to expand to Australia and other locations.

Two ongoing initiatives focus on de jure policies. First, the Developing World Refugee and Asylum Policy (DWRAP) dataset led by Blair, Grossman, and Weinstein explores de jure policies in 92 “Global South” countries within five main categories: access, services, livelihoods, movement, and participation. The researchers document 229 migration laws between 1951 and 2016 and are expanding the geographic and temporal scope.
Second, the Refugee Self-Reliance Policy Platform, led by the Refugee Self-Reliance Initiative (RSRI), scores countries on a 3-point scale across six de jure indicators: access to regularize, freedom of movement, right to work, right to education, right to healthcare, and the right to housing. To date, eight countries are scored.\(^{101}\)

Finally, we are aware of two related forthcoming publications. First, the Refugee Opportunity Index is a partnership between the Refugee Investment Network and the Economist Intelligence Unit.\(^{102}\) It aims to compare policies impacting refugees across countries to incentivize reforms, with the initial sample including 7 Latin American and 3 African countries. There are 45 subindexes under three broad themes: refugee policies, basic rights and access to services, and employment conditions. To date, the partnership has published a review that outlines the policies the initiative intends to assess and why, along with other relevant literature.\(^{103}\)

Second, Betts and Sterck utilize five indicators on 112 countries.\(^{104}\) Two of the authors of this report (Dempster and Ginn) contributed to that data collection exercise. Betts and Sterck note some limitations of their data, including reliance on online resources that were sometimes outdated or unavailable, the exclusion of asylum seekers and Venezuelans displaced abroad, and the coarse scoring system (oftentimes binary), which we believe differentiate that dataset and the one presented in this report.

Overall, we believe our study fills a gap in the current literature and among ongoing initiatives by providing country-level assessments of both de jure and de facto outcomes for a large proportion of the world's refugee population and major host countries as of 2021. Our aim is to cover a wide geographic area while maintaining sufficient depth and descriptions for each included country. We have utilized many of the analyses described here and look forward to contributing to further efforts in this space.

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Table A2.1. Other analyses of refugee work rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis</th>
<th>Country coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Refugee Survey (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2009)</td>
<td>Algeria, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, China, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, “Europe,” Ghana, Guinea, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, Republic of the Congo, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, the United States, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Refugee Work Rights Report (Asylum Access and the Refugee Work Rights Coalition, 2014)</td>
<td>Canada, Ecuador, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, and the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees’ Right to Work and Access to Labor Markets—An Assessment (Zetter and Ruaudel, 2016)</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Chad, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom, the United States, Venezuela, and Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Compact on Refugees Indicator Report (UNHCR, 2021)</td>
<td>Varies. Questions on education covered 97 countries, while those on documentation covered only 5. Country-level results are not public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership for improving prospects for forcibly displaced persons and host communities (PROSPECTS, 2022)</td>
<td>Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Sudan, and Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum Information Database (2022)</td>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Analysis | Country coverage
---|---
Refugee Response Index (DARA, 2021) | Australia, Costa Rica, Kenya
Refugee Self-Reliance Initiative Policy Platform (Refugee Self-Reliance Initiative, 2022) | Bangladesh, Colombia, Germany, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Pakistan, Peru, Turkey, and Uganda
Refugee Opportunity Index (Refugee Investment Network and Economist Intelligence Unit, forthcoming) | Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Kenya, Peru, Uganda
Bargains of Inclusion (Betts and Sterck, forthcoming) | Countries hosting over 1,000 refugees in 2017 (112 countries in total)

### ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Additional sources are useful in exploring refugees' right to work:

- The Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN), [https://sites.google.com/view/aprrn-frdp/home](https://sites.google.com/view/aprrn-frdp/home).
- The Global Compact on Refugees Digital Platform, [https://globalcompactrefugees.org/channel/countries](https://globalcompactrefugees.org/channel/countries).
ANNEX 3. SURVEY QUESTIONS

Our goal is to document the hosting environments for refugees in practice around the world. By “in practice,” we mean the day-to-day realities that the government enforces (de facto), which may differ substantially from the legal framework (de jure). We know these assessments will be subjective, and we therefore greatly appreciate additional information you provide in the comments that gives more context. For instance, if the situation varies significantly by nationality or location, a note in the comments would be very helpful.

We use “refugees” to refer to all foreign-born people displaced by conflict and their descendants who are not citizens. Since our focus is on the hosting environment in practice, this may not coincide with legal refugee status in some countries. For example, please consider people with legal statuses like “Venezuelans displaced abroad” or “visitors” in your assessments if they are foreign-born and displaced by conflict.

Some questions ask for your assessment on a 1 to 5 scale, and definitions are provided to roughly standardize across countries. However, the situation in every country is unique, and the definitions will not match exactly. Please use your judgement and perception relative to other host countries to assign a score between 1 and 5, and then provide details in the comments where possible.

Finally, any question may be skipped, and no responses will be attributed to you as an individual. You can choose whether to be included in the acknowledgements section at the end of this survey once you have seen the questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A.</th>
<th>Formal, wage employment in practice. Formal, wage employment here means contracted work for an employer that is registered with the government. The next page will ask about self-employment separately.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1.</td>
<td>On a scale of 1 to 5, how easily can refugees acquire work permits (or other necessary forms of work authorization for foreigners) for formal, wage employment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o 1: Formal work authorization is rarely given for refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o 2: (The situation is between 1 and 3.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o 3: Some refugees have work permits, but they are unaffordable for many, the wait time is substantial, and/or the sectors are limited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

105 Annex 3 and the data presented in this report represent a subset of the questions asked to respondents. Some questions are being analyzed for future work, and others were too inconsistent to publish. Annex 3 has also been reordered to the order they appear in the report.
### A2. On a scale of 1 to 5, how free are formal (registered) businesses to hire refugees without permits in practice?
- **1:** Documentation status of employees is often checked by government authorities, and expected punishments are a significant deterrent.
- **2:** (The situation is between 1 and 3.)
- **3:** Documentation status of employees is sometimes checked by government authorities, and expected punishments are moderate.
- **4:** (The situation is between 3 and 5.)
- **5:** Documentation status of employees is rarely checked by government authorities.
- Don't know.

### A3. How has access to formal, wage employment changed over the last five years?
- The situation has worsened for refugees.
- The situation is the same for refugees.
- The situation has improved for refugees.
- Don't know.

### B. Self-employment in practice. Self-employment here means owning a business—keeping the profits and responsible for the losses—instead of receiving wages.

### B1. On a scale of 1 to 5, how easily can refugees acquire business permits relative to citizens in practice?
- **1:** Business permits are easy to obtain for citizens but rarely, if ever, given to refugees.
- **2:** (The situation is between 1 and 3.)
- **3:** Refugees are able to get business permits, but they are more difficult to acquire for refugees than for citizens due to higher fees, longer wait times, sector limitations, etc.
- **4:** (The situation is between 3 and 5.)
- **5:** Business permits are equally attainable for refugees and citizens in practice.
- Don't know.
### B2. On a scale of 1 to 5, how free are refugees to operate businesses without permits in practice?

- **1**: Registration status of small businesses is often checked by authorities throughout the country (including in camps, if applicable), and expected punishments are a significant deterrent.
- **2**: (The situation is between 1 and 3.)
- **3**: Registration status of small businesses is sometimes checked by authorities, or checked only in some places, and expected punishments are moderate.
- **4**: (The situation is between 3 and 5.)
- **5**: Registration status of small businesses is rarely checked by authorities.
- **Don't know.**

### B3. How has the freedom to operate a business changed over the last five years?

- The situation has worsened for refugees.
- The situation is the same for refugees.
- The situation has improved for refugees.
- **Don't know.**

### C. Freedom of movement in practice

#### C1. On a scale of 1 to 5, how free are refugees to travel domestically in practice? (Note: we are referring only to government enforcement, and not, for instance, whether refugees can afford to travel.)

- **1**: Refugees cannot leave their neighborhood or camp, and permits to travel are nearly impossible to obtain.
- **2**: (The situation is between 1 and 3.)
- **3**: Refugees travel, but they are regularly harassed and occasionally arrested by authorities when outside their residence. Alternatively, some refugees travel freely, while others have their movements restricted by camp boundaries, checkpoints by authorities, etc.
- **4**: (The situation is between 3 and 5.)
- **5**: Refugees travel freely in practice without interference from the government.
- **Don't know.**
### C2. On a scale of 1 to 5, how free are refugees to choose their place of residence in practice? *(Note: we are asking about government enforcement only, and not, for instance, whether refugees can afford to live in the same locations.)*
- 1: Refugees cannot live outside of a few designated areas.
- 2: (The situation is between 1 and 3.)
- 3: Some refugees can live wherever citizens live, while other refugees are restricted in practice.
- 4: (The situation is between 3 and 5.)
- 5: Refugees can live wherever citizens live in practice, and assistance does not depend on place of residence.
- Don't know.

### C3. How has freedom of movement changed in the last five years?
- The situation has worsened for refugees.
- The situation is the same for refugees.
- The situation has improved for refugees.
- Don't know.

### D. Rights at work

#### D1. Can refugees access recourse for workplace violations through government institutions? *(i.e., if their employers do not pay them)*
- 1: No, refugees cannot access recourse for workplace violations.
- 3: Recourse for workplace violations is available, but bureaucratic or practical barriers prevent many refugees from accessing it *(i.e., waiting times, fear of deportation).*
- 5: Yes, refugees can access recourse for workplace violations regardless of legal status.
- Don't know.

### E. Other factors of economic inclusion in practice

#### E1. On a scale of 1 to 5, how accessible are the following public (government-provided) services for refugees relative to citizens?
- **E1.1. Primary Education**
- **E1.2. Secondary Education**
- **E1.3. Tertiary Education**
- **E1.4. Healthcare**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E2.</th>
<th>On a scale of 1 to 5, how easily can refugees:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>E2.1.</strong> Acquire official documents like birth and death certificates (relative to the host communities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>E2.2.</strong> Have academic or professional degrees validated by the host government or third parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o 1: Very difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o 2: Difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o 3: Neither difficult nor easily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o 4: Easily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o 5: Very easily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Don’t know.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E3.</th>
<th>On a scale of 1 to 5, how accessible are formal financial services, i.e. a bank account or loan, for refugees relative to citizens?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o 1: Easy to obtain for citizens, but rarely accessible to refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o 2: (The situation is between 1 and 3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o 3: More difficult to access for refugees than for citizens, but available to refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o 4: (The situation is between 3 and 5.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o 5: Equally accessible for refugees and citizens in practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Don’t know.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### De Jure Refugee Work Rights

**Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes**

**Party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes**

**Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? Yes**

#### De Facto Refugee Work Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rights at Work</th>
<th>Access to work permits</th>
<th>Enforcement of work permits</th>
<th>Change over last 5 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>WORSE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rights at Work</th>
<th>Access to business permits</th>
<th>Enforcement of business permits</th>
<th>Change over last 5 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>WORSE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Facts

According to UNHCR, Argentina hosted 4,007 refugees and 10,354 asylum seekers as well as 167,853 Venezuelans displaced abroad in 2021.¹ The most common countries of origin for refugees and asylum seekers were Senegal and Cuba.

### De Jure Summary

Argentina is a party to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as well as the ICESCR. Within the General Law for the Recognition and Protection of Refugees (Law 26.165), Argentina enshrines work rights for refugees in its domestic legislation.

Law 26.165 provides asylum seekers the right to work within 20 days of applying for refugee status.² While their asylum application is underway, refugees are allowed to work legally, move freely, and access public health and education services.³ When refugees are recognized they are then able to obtain a two-year temporary residency visa and national identity document (known as a DNI in Spanish). Refugees may apply for citizenship after two years.⁴

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“Patria Grande” (Law 25.781) provided legal status for immigrants from full and associate MERCOSUR members.\(^5\) It guaranteed work rights for immigrants residing in the country without legal status, the right to stay, exit, and enter the country, and a pathway to permanent residency.\(^6\) While not specifically for refugees, the law enabled more than 650,000 previously unauthorized migrants to regularize their status and gain access to legal employment.

**De Facto Summary**

The legal procedures assuring refugees’ right to work, as described above, are generally upheld in practice. There are rare instances of police officers repeatedly asking for refugees’ documentation when it is no longer necessary, but there are no extralegal detentions. Businesses ask that refugees present a DNI for hiring purposes, and, according to survey respondents, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant delays in the processing of DNIs, which limits formal labor market access.

Refugees and asylum seekers may live wherever they choose. Often, economic conditions dictate that refugees and asylum seekers live in peripheral neighborhoods, which makes accessing government services more difficult. Big cities such as Buenos Aires host many displaced individuals who work informally. Additionally, while resettled refugees are offered housing opportunities from implementing partners, they often lack de facto access to national housing programs, according to a survey respondent.

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Facts

According to UNHCR, Australia hosted 56,229 refugees and 79,819 asylum seekers in 2021. The most common countries of origin for refugees and asylum seekers were Malaysia, China, and Iran.

De Jure Summary

Australia is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR. Recognized refugees have the right to work under domestic law, yet access to refugee status recognition depends on visa status, which is often determined by method of arrival.

As part of the onshore protection program, which requires arrival with a valid visa and not by boat or without legal status, refugees have the right to apply for a permanent protection visa to legally reside and lawfully work. Those arriving by boat or without a valid visa may not apply for recognition of refugee status unless the government exercises discretion to do so, and they are subject to mandatory detention. Those arriving by boat or without a valid visa are subject to interception and push-back policies, and sent to offshore processing sites or onshore detention sites.

Separately, asylum seekers in offshore resettlement programs (those referred to Australia with refugee status already or proposed for a protection visa) may apply for refugee status, a global special humanitarian visa, a community support program, or family reunification. These pathways are not available to asylum seekers in offshore processing sites. These visas provide recognized refugees the right to stay and work but are subject to a total annual cap set by the Australian government.

While domestic law respects refugees’ right to work, this right is afforded in only a few circumstances, for those seeking refuge with a valid visa upon entry or under resettlement programs.

**De Facto Summary**

As described above, the extent to which a refugee or asylum seeker can access the labor market in Australia depends on their legal status. Recognized refugees are granted permanent residency and therefore have full access to the labor market, while others have temporary visas that force them into specific geographic areas to find employment. Regardless of their status, however, there are institutional, financial, intellectual, societal, and language barriers that prevent refugees from finding work, and discrimination among employers that may be prevent hiring. For example, between 2000 and 2016, only 38 percent of recognized refugees were employed, and of those who do manage to find employment, most are casual rather than permanent jobs. There are some state and federal government programs that aim to support the transition to permanent jobs, though only for recognized refugees.

Access to education and healthcare also differs by status. People seeking asylum struggle to access government-funded programs and tend to rely on services provided by NGOs, including cash assistance, food vouchers, and emergency support. These individuals are not able to access government support to attend university or tertiary education. Yet even recognized refugees often struggle to access education and obtain degree recognition. For example, a survey of around 2,400 refugees found that only one in five were able to get their qualification recognized in Australia 2.5 years after arrival.

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AUSTRIA

**De Jure Refugee Work Rights**

*Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes*

*Party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes*

*Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? Yes*

**De Facto Refugee Work Rights**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right to Wage Employment</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to work permits</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement of work permits*</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
<td>SAME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to Self-Employment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to business permits</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement of business permits*</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Movement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic travel</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice of residence</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
<td>SAME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights at Work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recourse for workplace violations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other Factors of Economic Inclusion**

**De Facto Access for Refugees**

| Primary education                         | 5 |
| Secondary education                       | 4 |
| Tertiary education                        | 3 |
| Healthcare provision                      | 5 |
| Acquire official documents                | 5 |
| Credential validation                     | 3 |
| Formal financial services                 | 3 |

Five is the highest score, with access equal to nationals, and one is the lowest score. See Part 1 for definitions, methodology, and survey questions.

*Enforcement is only considered when permits are difficult to access. Strict enforcement of laws, reflected by a low score, is not penalized if permits are accessible. See Part 1 for a discussion.

**Facts**

According to UNHCR, Austria hosted 146,025 refugees and 18,308 asylum seekers in 2021. The most common countries of origin for refugees and asylum seekers were Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

**De Jure Summary**

Austria is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR. While Austria has a generally good record on allowing recognized refugees full access to employment opportunities, asylum seekers are denied the right to undertake employment for the first three months after lodging their asylum application in Austria.

Employers of asylum seekers must complete a labor market test to access gainful employment, proving that the job cannot be filled by an Austrian citizen, an EU citizen, or another third-country national who is a lawful resident.

A 2004 ordinance (Bartenstein-Erlass) restricting the sectors of employment available to asylum seekers and term limits for employment was repealed in July 2021. Asylum seekers are no longer

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barred from certain sectors and do not have term limits on their work permits, but they are still required to prove that their position cannot be filled by another European citizen.19

Refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection have free access to the labor market. Moreover, the Act on Recognition and Evaluation of 201620 has improved refugees’ ability to obtain recognition of their education and professional qualifications by relaxing documentation requirements.21

De Facto Summary

Austria has a generally strong track record of upholding work rights for refugees, though asylum seekers face restrictions. Asylum seekers’ movement, for instance, is restricted to their district during admission proceedings. Furthermore, opportunities for asylum seekers employment were significantly reduced in 2018 when the Ministry of Social Affairs eliminated access to apprenticeships in shortage occupations for those under the age of 25.22

Refugees and those with subsidiary protection have more access to the labor market. They are free to move within Austria, though financial support and accommodation may be limited to a state.

### Facts

According to UNHCR, Bangladesh hosted 889,775 refugees and 27 asylum seekers in 2021. Nearly all refugees were from Myanmar, with only 11 refugees from elsewhere.

### De Jure Summary

Bangladesh is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor its 1967 Protocol. However, in a 2017 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the 1951 Refugee Convention was part of customary international law and therefore binding, notwithstanding formal ratification. Bangladesh is party to the UN Convention Against Torture of 1984 and as such respects the principle of non-refoulement (Article 2). The Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees all persons on the nation’s territory the right to enjoy protection of the law and prohibits forced labor beyond citizens, including all those within its boundaries.

The country has no domestic law relating to refugees, and as such refugees are not guaranteed formal legal status, are not guaranteed the right to work. They are considered ‘illegal foreigners’ under the Foreigners Act of 1946, though classified as “Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals” by the government. Refugees are guaranteed access

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### De Facto Refugee Work Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right to Wage Employment</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Access to work permits</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement of work permits*</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
<td>SAME</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right to Self-Employment</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to business permits</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement of business permits*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
<td>WORSE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freedom of Movement</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic travel</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice of residence</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
<td>WORSE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rights at Work</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recourse for workplace violations</td>
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</tbody>
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### Other Factors of Economic Inclusion

#### De Facto Access for Refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare provision</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquire official documents</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credential validation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal financial services</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*Five is the highest score, with access equal to nationals, and one is the lowest score. See Part 1 for definitions, methodology, and survey questions.

*Enforcement is only considered when permits are difficult to access. Strict enforcement of laws, reflected by a low score, is not penalized if permits are accessible. See Part 1 for a discussion.

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24 Bangladesh Supreme Court, Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit (RMMRU) v Government of Bangladesh, Writ Petition No. 10504 of 2016 (Dhaka: Bangladesh Supreme Court, 2017), [www.refworld.org/cases,BAN_SC,5d7f623e4.html](http://www.refworld.org/cases,BAN_SC,5d7f623e4.html).


26 Government of Bangladesh, The Foreigners Act, 1946,
Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are interned in camps in Cox’s Bazar. \(^{28}\) UNHCR and the government jointly register Rohingya refugees with the aims of enabling access to essential services and future voluntary repatriation to Myanmar. \(^{29}\)

**De Facto Summary**

In Bangladesh, the rights of Rohingya refugees are significantly curtailed. Legally, they are not able to work, meaning many revert to volunteering with the UN or local NGOs, or setting up small informal businesses both within and just outside the camps. \(^{30}\) These shop owners are frequently harassed, and their shops, which are run without obtaining commercial licenses or paying taxes, are frequently destroyed by local officials. \(^{31}\) Rohingya are also informally employed by locals to work outside the camps—mostly as day laborers in the fields or as domestic help. \(^{32}\)

These informal arrangements have been threatened by an increasing militarization of the camps; the Bangladeshi government has taken steps to build barbed wire fencing and guard towers. \(^{33}\) The government also periodically restricts Internet access and confiscates cell phones. Aid groups have argued that these measures seriously hampered their ability to provide emergency health services during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Most Rohingya want to return to Myanmar and have their citizenship rights restored when it is safe to do so. \(^{34}\) The Bangladeshi government and UNHCR have tried to organize repatriation opportunities, but refugees still feel that it is unsafe to return. Instead, the Bangladeshi government has begun moving tens of thousands of the Rohingya population, potentially involuntarily, to Bhasan Char Island, which provides limited livelihood opportunities. \(^{35}\)

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\(^{30}\) See the Cox’s Bazar Panel Survey for more information on economic and social outcomes of Rohingya refugees and hosts, i.e. [https://www.poverty-action.org/study/impact-large-scale-forced-displacement-rohingya-refugees-and-host-communities-coxs-bazar](https://www.poverty-action.org/study/impact-large-scale-forced-displacement-rohingya-refugees-and-host-communities-coxs-bazar).


BRAZIL

De Jure Refugee Work Rights

Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes

Party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes

Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? Yes

De Facto Refugee Work Rights

Right to Wage Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to work permits</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement of work permits*</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
<td>WORSE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Right to Self-Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to business permits</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement of business permits*</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
<td>SAME</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Freedom of Movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic travel</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Choice of residence</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
<td>SAME</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rights at Work

| Recourse for workplace violations | 3 |

Other Factors of Economic Inclusion

De Facto Access for Refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary education</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary education</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare provision</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquire official documents</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credential validation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal financial services</td>
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*Enforcement is only considered when permits are difficult to access. Strict enforcement of laws, reflected by a low score, is not penalized if permits are accessible. See Part 1 for a discussion.

Facts

According to UNHCR, Brazil hosted 60,848 refugees and 206,000 asylum seekers as well as 179,736 Venezuelans displaced abroad in 2021. The most common countries of origin for refugees and asylum seekers were Haiti, Cuba, and Syria.

De Jure Summary

Brazil is a party to the main international instruments concerning refugees, including the 1984 Cartagena Declaration. The National Refugee Act, which was passed in 1997, implements the 1951 Refugee Convention and its related provisions.

The 1997 National Refugee Act establishes that once a refugee application is submitted, the refugee and their family will be issued an authorization ticket that guarantees the right to remain while their application is being processed. This ticket is valid for one year and enables refugees access to a temporary work permit issued by the Ministry of Labor. Recognized refugees are guaranteed access to the National Migration Registration Card.

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
the Work and Social Security Card, an Individual Tax Identification Number, and a passport from the government of Brazil.42

In 2019, the government’s refugee agency granted over 20,000 Venezuelan refugees the right to asylum. This decision applied to roughly 10 percent of the Venezuelan refugee population in Brazil at the time, protecting their rights to refugee status and enabling the right to work.43

De Facto Summary
Survey respondents note that refugees and asylum seekers in Brazil have easy access to work permits, freedom of movement, and choice of residence. However, most are still limited to working informally, where protections are limited.

There is no programming to promote formal employment among refugees, which is seen by many as tacit approval of the large number of refugees who work in the informal sector. Further, according to a survey respondent, there is a dearth of information available for employers with respect to the hiring of refugees—many do not know that they can hire refugees.

There is also a lack of information in key service sectors such as banking and education. The clerical workers often do not know what documents refugees need in order to access services for which they are eligible, such as formal financial lending or basic education.

BULGARIA

**Facts**
According to UNHCR, Bulgaria hosted 21,770 refugees and 1,691 asylum seekers in 2021. The most common countries of origin for refugees and asylum seekers were Syria and Iraq. A large number of refugees were stateless, as well, comparable to the number of refugees from Iraq.

**De Jure Summary**
Bulgaria is a party to both the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as well as the ICESCR. These obligations are supplemented by the EU Regional Council Directive, which requires that member states authorize recognized refugees to work on par with nationals. Bulgaria also has passed national legislation setting forth the rights of refugees, in particular its Law on Asylum and Refugees.

Bulgaria grants recognized refugees full access to employment opportunities in every sector, per the Law for Employment Promotion. However, asylum seekers are denied the right to undertake employment for the first three months. Recognized refugees have access to employment and social benefits when unemployed. Under the law, asylum seekers and refugees also have access to vocation-
Recognized refugees are not restricted in their freedom of movement. Asylum seekers, by contrast, may be restricted to a particular area or administrative zone, as determined by the asylum authority.

Refugees and asylum seekers face difficulty in obtaining recognition of their credentials. There is a legal process for recognition of foreign diplomas; however, the process is convoluted and requires retaking exams and schooling in certain circumstances.

De Facto Summary
Very few refugees seek employment because they consider Bulgaria to be a transit country. According to one survey respondent, many receive remittances from relatives, enabling them to continue westward. Those who seek work tend to find temporary and irregular jobs, mostly in restaurants and retail stores. Professional qualifications or university degrees from refugees’ countries of origin are not generally recognized in Bulgaria, and it is difficult to open a business because of barriers to opening bank accounts.

Initial restrictions on asylum seekers’ right to work and mobility often force them to work informally. In September 2017, Bulgaria restricted registered asylum seekers’ movement to four zones. Asylum seekers cannot leave their assigned zone without official permission from the State Agency for Refugees. While there are exceptions, this regulation is generally enforced.

Furthermore, Bulgaria employs accelerated asylum procedures and sometimes relies on unwritten assumptions that certain countries are “safe,” resulting in the rejection of 100 percent of claims from countries such as Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and others. These barriers to territorial access and legal status impede refugees’ access to work rights in the country.

In 2013, the Program for Employment and Education of Refugees established the employment of refugees as a priority for the Labor Offices. The program included teaching Bulgarian, training, and subsidized employment, all funded by the state. However, these efforts were intended to benefit only 200 refugees and ultimately only one secured employment. An impediment was that the advertisements, application procedures, and documentation were available only in Bulgarian.

In 2016, the Labor Offices initiated a specialized refugee employment and training program for those with international protection. The program is set to run through the end of 2022.

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50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
According to UNHCR, Burundi hosted 76,837 refugees and 4,929 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers were from the Democratic Republic of Congo.

**De Jure Summary**

Burundi is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the ICESCR, and the Organization of African Unity regional convention.

Refugees in Burundi are given the right to work with a valid work permit, which may be obtained with a current employment contract and a valid refugee ID card. Work permits are free to obtain, and refugees may register their own businesses.

However, Articles 88 and 89 of the 2008 Asylum Act require refugees in Burundi to live in refugee camps. While this restriction is paired with the requirement that work permit holders be allowed to move freely outside the camp, legally mandated internment poses a significant barrier to full exercise of work rights for a majority of refugees in the country. All refugees have access to identity cards.

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and travel documents provided by the Burundian administration. Work permit requirements, camp restrictions, and high unemployment rates make the formal labor market challenging for refugees to access.

De Facto Summary

Burundi’s record in practice is mixed. More than half of refugees live in camps, and freedom of movement is curtailed; refugees must have passes to travel and authorization to change their addresses, which impacts their access to employment. However, a significant number (estimated at 41 percent in 2018) live in urban areas and report few issues in dealing with authorities. Work permits for formal employment are somewhat difficult to come by, but business permits are available and self-employment is accepted both in the camps and in urban areas. According to a survey respondent, some refugees are able to leave the camps to participate in economic cooperatives, as well.

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CAMEROON 4.3

De Jure Refugee Work Rights

- Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes
- Party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes
- Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? Yes

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<td>Enforcement of work permits*</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
<td>BETTER</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement of business permits*</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freedom of Movement</th>
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<tbody>
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Other Factors of Economic Inclusion

De Facto Access for Refugees

<p>| | |</p>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>Healthcare provision</td>
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<td>Credential validation</td>
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<td>Formal financial services</td>
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</table>

Facts

According to UNHCR, Cameroon hosted 446,101 refugees and 6,059 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers originated from the Central African Republic and Nigeria.

De Jure Summary

Cameroon is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the ICESCR, and the Organization of African Unity regional convention, whose principles on the definition of refugees, non-refoulement, and exemption from sanctions for illegal entry have been incorporated into the country’s 2005 Refugee Law (Act No. 2005/006).

The 2005 Refugee Law requires that refugees be treated the same as nationals in terms of access to work, education, housing, social assistance, property, justice, naturalization and freedom of movement. All refugees are entitled to identity cards and travel documents provided by the Cameroonian administration, giving them the right to freely move within the country. Refugees in Cameroon are also allowed to start businesses and register them in their own names. In 2018, Law 2018/010 was enacted which enabled the government to verify refugees’ credentials and access vocational training.

The 2005 Refugee Law guarantees asylum seekers the right to remain while their asylum application is being processed, without term limits or renewal periods.\textsuperscript{70} The right to work is not expressly granted to asylum seekers in the 2005 Refugee Law. Notwithstanding the legislation, freedom of movement is restricted for refugees by unwritten administrative policies, including the internment of Nigerian refugees in closed camps, a refusal to grant legal recognition to Nigerian refugees who do not submit to internment,\textsuperscript{71} and administrative practices requiring refugees to obtain a permit for travel outside the district where they have been authorized to reside.\textsuperscript{72}

**De Facto Summary**

While Cameroon has historically been a generous host of refugees, the situation has changed significantly in recent years. Since 2015, authorities have deported more than 100,000 Nigerian asylum seekers and refugees, according to Human Rights Watch.\textsuperscript{73} The forced repatriations appear to be motivated by the threat of Boko Haram and worries about Cameroon’s own conflict, which has internally displaced more than one million people.

For refugees who remain in Cameroon, the crackdown has also restricted freedom of movement. Refugees traveling outside their home villages report harassment and nonrecognition of their IDs.\textsuperscript{74}

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\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.


According to UNHCR, Chad hosted 508,304 refugees and 4,548 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees originated from Sudan. Asylum seekers were most commonly from the Central African Republic.

### De Jure Summary

Chad is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the ICESCR, and the Organization of African Unity regional convention. The country has incorporated the key principles of international protection into its 2020 Refugee Law. It assures refugees and asylum seekers fundamental protections, including freedom of movement; the right to work; and access to healthcare, education, social assistance, and justice.

The law also requires that refugees be treated with the most favorable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in terms of housing, naturalization, movable and immovable property, intellectual property, and trade unions. It also guarantees the right of refugees to wage-earning employment, to self-employment, and to the practice of a liberal profession.

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**De Jure Refugee Work Rights**

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**De Facto Access for Refugees**

| Primary education                             | 5  |
| Secondary education                            | 5  |
| Tertiary education                             | 3  |
| Healthcare provision                          | 5  |
| Acquire official documents                     | 3  |
| Credential validation                          | 4  |
| Formal financial services                      | 1  |

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According to the 2020 Refugee Law, all refugees are entitled to identity cards and travel documents provided by the Chadian administration. Identity cards are valid for five years and are renewable. Asylum seekers with pending applications are guaranteed the right to remain throughout the duration of their application process and receive an Asylum Seeker's Certificate, valid for two months and is renewable.

De Facto Summary

The majority of refugees in Chad are from Sudan's Darfur region. They are largely located in border areas that are isolated and economically lagging. In some cases, refugees are able to settle with host communities and obtain arable land for agricultural production. Broadly speaking, however, refugees are limited in terms of where they can live and work, with survey respondents noting that some face harassment and arrest, while others move more freely. The 2020 Refugee Law, which provides for freedom of movement; the right to work; and access to healthcare, education, and justice, has not yet been fully realized in practice, and its application is inconsistent.

Respondents noted that refugees' access to work has not changed much in recent years. They particularly highlighted that formal work is difficult to obtain and noted that refugee women and girls are particularly vulnerable in the types of work they do, which can include housework and prostitution. It will also take time for the rights outlined in the new law to be fully recognized by actors at the local level.

According to UNHCR, Chile hosted 2,060 refugees and 6,451 asylum seekers as well as 483,343 Venezuelans displaced abroad in 2021. Aside from Venezuelans displaced abroad, the majority of refugees were from Colombia.

De Jure Summary

Chile is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR. The country’s regional commitments are outlined in the Cartagena Declaration, the San José Declaration, and the Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action.

The Chilean government implemented Law No. 20.430 on Refugee Protection and its Decree No. 837, incorporating the main international standards on refugee protection, including the 1984 Cartagena regional definition. According to the law, asylum seekers and refugees are entitled to enjoy the rights and freedoms granted to every person by the Chilean Constitution, the country’s laws and regulations, and the international human rights instruments to which Chile is a party. Refugees and their families have the right to access work, via either wage-earning employment or self-employment.

In 2021, Chile enacted Law No. 21.325, which places new limits on migrants’ access to Chilean territory and increases the government’s power to detain or deport refugees. The law also includes specific visa requirements for Venezuelans and Haitians. In 2022, this law is undergoing adjustment related to court decisions and the development of implementing regulations. However, it appears likely that, when it fully enters into force,

Facts

Five is the highest score, with access equal to nationals, and one is the lowest score. See Part 1 for definitions, methodology, and survey questions.

*Enforcement is only considered when permits are difficult to access. Strict enforcement of laws, reflected by a low score, is not penalized if permits are accessible. See Part 1 for a discussion.

87 Ibid.
the law will limit access to refugee status.88

**De Facto Summary**

The Chilean government grants all recognized refugees a national identity card that allows them to formally work and start a business.89 To asylum-seekers, the government of Chile grants a temporary residency which also grants them work authorization.90 Furthermore, forcibly displaced Venezuelans have access to a special visa that allows them to stay in the country and work for one year, with the possibility of extension.91

However, asylum seekers and Venezuelan visa holders face significant barriers that limit their economic inclusion. For instance, the waiting time to obtain the temporary residency permits is often more than six months, which leaves asylum seekers without the possibility to work.92 As a result, many asylum seekers are pushed to work in the informal sector, where they are subject to exploitation and abuse. Chile seldom grants refugee status and that it is increasingly difficult to apply for asylum or obtain the special visa for Venezuelans.93

Displaced Venezuelans in Chile are facing growing obstacles to regularizing their status and work,94 As the government of Chile has militarized the border and imposed a visa, Venezuelans are pushed to enter through irregular border crossings and constantly face harassment, persecution, and deportation.95 The lack of regular status limits their ability to join the labor market and is their main obstacle to obtaining a job, as Chilean law dictates harsh punishments for those who hire undocumented migrants.96 In 2021, the government of Chile started to conduct mass deportations, instilling fear among employers and displaced Venezuelans alike.97

Even those with the right to work face obstacles to validating their credentials. The high costs and convoluted process prevent forcibly displaced individuals from obtaining recognition.98 As a result, many are forced to work in jobs that do not match their qualifications.


92 Alejandro Carreno and Baltica Cabieses, “Ser refugiado en Chile: Trayectorias institucionales y experiencias de salud de solicitudes de asilo de protección internacional de origen latinoamericano en Chile.” Instituto de Ciencias e Innovacion de Medicina, Universidad del Desarrollo, page 55 (n.d.), https://repositorio.udd.cl/bitstream/handle/11447/3809/Ser%20refugiado%20en%20Chile_Trayectorias%20institucionales%20y%20experiencias%20de%20salud... Carre%C3%B1o%20A%20y%20Cabi%C3%A9ses%20(2020).pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.


COLOMBIA

Facts

According to UNHCR, Colombia hosted 964 refugees and 30,599 asylum seekers as well as 1,742,927 Venezuelans displaced abroad in 2021.99 The majority refugees and asylum seekers were from Venezuela.

De Jure Summary

Colombia is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as well as the ICESCR and regional instruments such as the 1984 Cartagena Declaration.100 Colombia’s domestic legislation, specifically Decree 1067 of 2015, incorporates refugees’ rights to due process, recognition of refugee status, and access to work.101

Resolution 6045 of 2017 specifies that recognized refugees are entitled to a type M migrant visa, which are valid for three years. This visa enables recognized refugees to engage in lawful employment, pursue self-employment, and access education services. After three years expire, renewal is required, and after the fifth year of continuous residence, refugees are eligible to apply for the Resident Visa (type R visa).102

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A person seeking refugee status upon entering Colombia may receive a three-month laissez-passer with a pending asylum application. This laissez-passer may be renewed for an additional 3 months. During this time, the person may not legally work, unless they have another migratory status in Colombia that allows it.

In 2021, the Colombian government issued the Temporary Statue of Protection for Venezuelan Migrants which is valid for ten years and enables work authorization. In 2020, Venezuelans were eligible for a Special Permit to Stay to Promote Formalization (PEP-FF) which enabled those to legalize their status if they were without lawful status in the country and held a formal job offer. Prior to this, in 2017, the Colombian government offered Venezuelans a Special Permit to Stay (PEP), which was valid for two years, and also enabled the right to work.

De Facto Summary

Currently, the majority of Venezuelans in Colombia work in the informal sector regardless of their status in the country. Discrimination, lack of documentation, and inability to validate credentials are among the reasons preventing many Venezuelans from obtaining formal jobs. On average, Venezuelans in Colombia earn less than locals and enjoy little job security. Despite the challenges, the government of Colombia has implemented measures to improve the economic integration of Venezuelans. For example, the government has led programs to recognize the skills of Venezuelans, as well as to connect them with decent job opportunities, among other measures.

There are no effective mechanisms available to Venezuelans (or locals) to protect their working conditions in the informal sector. To avoid abuse, many Venezuelans in Colombia resort to self-employment as a livelihood strategy. While the formalization of businesses is dependent on having a regular status in the country, self-employment in informal settings is common and allowed.

To promote formalization, the government instituted a special visa for undocumented Venezuelans who receive a formal job offer. Nevertheless, the lack of understanding of all the types of visas and permits prevents many employers from hiring Venezuelans. Furthermore, it is very difficult for Venezuelans to validate their professional credentials in Colombia, which further affects their ability to obtain formal employment. Ultimately, those who obtain formal jobs have access to greater protections and safeguards in the labor market.

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107 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.

97
According to UNHCR, Costa Rica hosted 9,976 refugees and 95,275 asylum seekers as well as 21,995 Venezuelans displaced abroad in 2021.\(^\text{115}\) The majority of refugees and asylum seekers were from Nicaragua.

**De Jure Summary**

Costa Rica is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol, and the ICESCR. The country has made regional commitments to refugees through the Cartagena Declaration, the San José Declaration, and the Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action.

Costa Rica’s laws grant refugees legal status and the right to work, and enable an appeal process, enshrined in The General Law on Migration No. 8764.\(^\text{116}\) Asylum seekers with their applications pending are granted the right to work and access education during this period.\(^\text{117}\) Additionally, Costa Rica has an established integration program that helps refugees find jobs, start businesses, and adapt to the culture.\(^\text{118}\)

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Under Costa Rica’s national laws, all those with recognized refugee status are granted the right to work and be self-employed and may apply for work permits. Asylum seekers with pending applications for at least three months are granted the right to work and be self-employed, and may apply for a provisional work permit while the asylum application is being evaluated.\textsuperscript{119} This process for obtaining a work permit and renewal is free.

In 2021, Costa Rica implemented the Asylum Seeker Card for Venezuelans, Nicaraguans, and Cubans which offers legal status for two years and the ability to obtain a work permit after three months.\textsuperscript{120}

**De Facto Summary**

Overall, Costa Rica allows for significant labor market access in practice for refugees, although barriers remain.\textsuperscript{121} Newly arrived asylum seekers must wait 90 days after submitting a refugee status application before they can request a work permit.\textsuperscript{122} Individuals who are granted refugee status in Costa Rica are given a special ID card that allows them access to a variety of employment-related activities, such as opening a bank account.\textsuperscript{123} After being granted status, refugees can request a work permit, which is normally granted for a specific job or job field.\textsuperscript{124} Denial of work permits is rare.\textsuperscript{125} Some businesses have a legal limit on the number or percentage of foreign-born workers that they can hire. However, after a refugee has resided in Costa Rica for three or more years, they automatically become entitled to a work permit and are exempt from any limits on foreign-born employment.\textsuperscript{126}

While refugees are legally allowed to be employed by a business or to be self-employed, the strict requirements and large number of documents necessary to receive a business license often prevent refugees from legalizing their establishments. Refugees and asylum seekers are able to search for work opportunities throughout the country, as freedom of movement within Costa Rica is guaranteed.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
According to UNHCR, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) hosted 519,819 refugees and 16,595 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers were from the Central African Republic and Rwanda.

DRC is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the ICESCR, and the 1969 Organization of African Unity regional convention. In 2002, DRC adopted the national Refugee Law consistent with its international obligations, providing refugees the right to work.

Under the country’s domestic laws, refugees in DRC enjoy the same treatment as nationals with regard to the exercise of political, social, economic, and cultural rights. Refugees and asylum seekers have access to documentation. Indeed, the government of DRC has biometrically registered all refugees and issued refugee ID cards to all those in camps and urban areas. Pursuant to the Refugee Law and the Foreigner Law, recognized refugees benefit from the right to freedom of movement, although asylum seekers must live in designated areas until they are recognized as refugees, which in practice can take years. Additionally, camp regulations state that refugees living in camps may not leave without permits, although in practice these

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regulations are not consistently enforced across the country.\textsuperscript{129}

Refugees with a valid work permit are able to access the formal labor market as foreign workers, subject to sector quotas imposed by the National Commission of Hiring Expatriate Workers.\textsuperscript{130} In 2019, the government pledged to provide ten-year residence permits for Rwandans whose refugee status was terminated.\textsuperscript{131}

\textbf{De Facto Summary}

DRC maintains a range of barriers that prevent refugees from accessing formal work in host communities, camps, and settlements and that contribute to broader rights denials. The country faces immense political, economic, and security challenges in addition to hosting more than half a million refugees from neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{132} It has well over 100 armed groups\textsuperscript{133} and consistently produces some of the largest numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees in the world.\textsuperscript{134}

Survey respondents noted that refugees are able to travel throughout the country but may face some harassment from officials or armed groups in doing so. While refugees have difficulty accessing work permits, respondents emphasized that permits are not needed in many contexts. They also noted that in cities, some refugees are able to receive some support from the government and international organizations. In some parts of the country, refugees can access land to farm like the local population and engage in petty trade. Nonetheless, refugees and the broader population still struggle to access decent work opportunities and other basic rights.\textsuperscript{135}

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DENMARK

De Jure Refugee Work Rights

Facts

According to UNHCR, Denmark hosted 36,431 refugees and 844 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers were from Syria.

De Jure Summary

Denmark has one of the stricter legislative regimes in Europe vis-à-vis refugees. Denmark is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as well as the ICESCR, but maintains a reservation so that refugees are not entitled the same privileges of wage-earning employment as nationals of Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Denmark has opted out of the EU acquis on asylum and thus is not bound by its principles.

Asylum seekers are required to reside in asylum centers throughout the duration of their refugee status determination process. They cannot work or study during this process, but they do receive accommodations and a small living allowance. They must wait at least six months after applying for asylum before applying for permission to work, and they then can work only after meeting certain

conditions. Refugees granted protection have access to an integration program with Danish language courses and accommodation.

In the last few years, Denmark has adopted a “no new asylum seekers” policy. This is evidenced by the fact that from 2016 to 2019, Denmark did not accept any new refugees. In a Parliament vote in June 2021, the Danish government approved the establishment of offshore reception centers outside Danish borders, forcing asylum seekers to apply for asylum abroad. If their claim is rejected, they would be forced to leave; if successful, they would be flown to Denmark. Although this program is not yet fully implemented, it effectively bars any new refugees from seeking legal status and work rights in Denmark.

De Facto Summary

Asylum seekers must meet several conditions to apply to the Danish Immigration Service for permission to work. Because this permission is only temporary, many employers are wary of hiring them. The government encourages companies to hire recognized refugees by providing job training and wage subsidies for the first few months. It has also initiated and improved an integration education package called IGU (integrationsuddannelsen). Language lessons are provided for only a short period and do not enable refugees to achieve the language proficiency needed in most workplaces. The Danish state also appears to penalize people with insufficient language skills, for example, by withholding benefits unless migrants learn enough of the language. For these reasons, long-term integration is poor. A study of 43,000 refugees conducted in 2019 found that only 40 percent of men and 25 percent of women were “self-sufficient” eight years after entry, compared with 75 percent of Danes.

Recently, Danish refugee policy has begun to harden. In 2021, Denmark declared certain parts of Syria to be safe and revoked the residence permits of more than 1,200 Syrians who had come from those areas. These people could either return voluntarily, with a payout from the Danish state, or face lifelong detention in a “departure” center. Many are now appealing their cases in the courts.

ECUADOR

Facts

According to UNHCR, Ecuador hosted 55,424 refugees and 6,565 asylum seekers as well as 446,679 Venezuelans displaced abroad in 2021.147 Aside from Venezuelans displaced abroad, the most common country of origin for refugees was Colombia.

De Jure Summary

Ecuador is a party to the main international instruments concerning refugees, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR, as well as regional instruments such as the 1984 Cartagena Declaration.148

Since 2008, Ecuador's constitution has guaranteed foreigners residing in the country the same rights as Ecuadorian nationals without discrimination of any kind.149 This guarantee extends to the right to work.

Once a person has applied for refugee status, Ecuador grants a 90-day humanitarian visa (renewable for an additional 30 days) that allows the individual to stay and work in the country.150 Once recognized as a refugee in Ecuador, the individual receives a temporary resident visa, valid for two years, after

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which they may apply for a permanent resident visa.\textsuperscript{151} In both cases, the right to work is guaranteed.

While Ecuador has a strong legal foundation protecting the rights for refugees, the government implemented a temporary visa from 2019-2020 for Venezuelans which required them to obtain the humanitarian visa prior to entering the country, limiting access to legal status and work authorization.\textsuperscript{152} The process required a valid passport, which many do not have, and has high costs.\textsuperscript{153} The visa program was stopped in 2020 and a plan to regularize roughly half of the Venezuelans in Ecuador, offering legal status and the right to work, was announced in 2021.\textsuperscript{154}

\underline{De Facto Summary}

Despite the promising de jure framework in place for refugees in Ecuador, the de facto reality does not fulfill expectations. According to multiple survey respondents, employers generally do not know that the humanitarian or refugee statuses grant the right to work; if a refugee does not have a Temporary or Permanent visa, only a humanitarian visa, they often cannot find formal work. Access to obtaining regular status persists as a primary barrier to the labor market.\textsuperscript{155}

The majority (88 percent) of foreigners in Ecuador work in the informal sector despite having the same legal right to work as Ecuadorian citizens.\textsuperscript{156} The Center for International Relations of the Institute of Higher National Studies found that in Quito, local integration is a constant challenge for refugees, and refugee workers have reported labor exploitation, abuse of power, discrimination, and even the need to provide sexual favors to obtain employment.\textsuperscript{157} However, a survey respondent highlighted the case study of Lago Agrio, a region on the border with Colombia, that identifies as a city of refuge and whose population consists of over 25 percent refugees.\textsuperscript{158}

Further, an Ecuadoran ID card is needed to open a formal bank account, which impedes financial integration for people who have been displaced. Banks and economic cooperatives do not see refugees as clients of interest and thus are not proactive in their outreach toward those populations.

\textsuperscript{157} Daniela Célleri, \textit{Situación laboral y aporte económico de inmigrantes en el norte de Quito-Ecuador} (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2019), \url{https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/quito/15204.pdf}.
EGYPT

De Jure Refugee Work Rights

Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes, with reservations to article 24

Party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes

Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? Yes

De Facto Refugee Work Rights

Right to Wage Employment

| Access to work permits | 1 |
| Enforcement of work permits* | 4 |
| Change over last 5 years | SAME |

Right to Self-Employment

| Access to business permits | 1 |
| Enforcement of business permits* | 4 |
| Change over last 5 years | SAME |

Freedom of Movement

| Domestic travel | 3 |
| Choice of residence | 5 |
| Change over last 5 years | NOT SCORED |

Rights at Work

| Recourse for workplace violations | 3 |

Other Factors of Economic Inclusion

De Facto Access for Refugees

| Primary education | 2 |
| Secondary education | 2 |
| Tertiary education | 2 |
| Healthcare provision | 2 |
| Acquire official documents | 3 |
| Credential validation | 3 |
| Formal financial services | 2 |

Facts

According to UNHCR, Egypt hosted 277,665 refugees and 57,320 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers were from Syria, Palestine, and Sudan.

De Jure Summary

Egypt is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the ICESCR, the Organization of African Unity regional convention, and the Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries.

Article 91 of the 2014 Egyptian Constitution gives asylum seekers the right to seek asylum and prohibits the extradition of political refugees. However, despite the large number of refugees in the country, Egypt has yet to develop a clear set of national procedures to regulate the arrival of refugees. Refugee responsibilities and asylum applications are handled by UNHCR, which translates to inconsistencies in accessing documentation and obtaining formal employment.

Refugees in Egypt are legally viewed as foreigners under the 1982 Ministerial Resolution (Article 11) and are required to obtain a foreigner’s work permit, which is costly and requires renewal. Additional information:

tional regulations include employer proof that no Egyptian national can perform the intended work prior to hiring a foreigner, and that there may only be a maximum of 10 percent foreign labor employed. Refugees have the right to establish or join a trade union organization in Egypt.

De Facto Summary

Most refugees and asylum seekers do not have legal residency in Egypt, and few—only nine percent in a recent study—have a valid passport. Even when refugees are able to obtain a work permit, the restrictions placed on Egyptian employers when hiring non-nationals means it is difficult for refugees to access the formal labor market at all. In addition, some, such as Palestinians, are legally barred from formal employment.

Refugees are legally able to register businesses, but the process is lengthy, complex, and requires a security clearance. Many therefore go through an Egyptian partner which can lead to exploitative practices in the long run. As a result of these restrictions, most refugees are forced to work in the informal sector. Women often become domestic workers, while men become drivers, gardeners, and manual laborers. Men are more likely to be economically active, as are those with higher levels of education.

Refugees are largely able to access the healthcare system though often find it difficult to financially cover the medical premium. Barriers to education are more substantial. Access to public education in Egypt is nationality-based, which means some refugees (largely Africans) are barred from the public system. Most refugees also encounter low quality provision, high private education costs, and language barriers.

162 Ibid.
Facts

According to UNHCR, Ethiopia hosted 782,896 refugees and 2,110 asylum seekers in 2021.\(^{168}\) The majority of refugees and asylum seekers originated from South Sudan and Somalia.

De Jure Summary

Ethiopia is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol, the ICESCR, and the Organization of African Unity regional convention.\(^{169}\) Under the Refugee Proclamation 1110 of 2019, Ethiopia guarantees free movement and the right to work to refugees and establishes procedures for refugee status determination.\(^{170}\)

Policy directives both elucidate and limit the rights set forth in the 2019 Refugee Proclamation.\(^{171}\) Under the Right to Work Directive,\(^{172}\) refugees can access employment via two channels. The first is through wage-earning employment on projects funded by the international community, which grants refugees labor market access on equal terms with Ethiopian nationals and is accompanied by a five-year residency permit. The second is

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wage-earning or self-employment in the private or public sector on par with other foreign workers, no Ethiopian nationals are available to fill them.\textsuperscript{173}

The Free Movement and Choice of Residency Directive\textsuperscript{174} allows refugees to move outside of the camps for work. A limited number of refugees are offered Out of Camp permits to live outside camps in approved locations, and in 2019, the government had administered over 35,000.\textsuperscript{175} Refugees who wish to seek a job may obtain a permit for temporary free movement.\textsuperscript{176} In most cases a refugee may only access the right to long-term free movement if they can prove that they already have a sponsor, a job, or the financial means to support themselves.\textsuperscript{177}

**De Facto Summary**

Ethiopia maintains a number of barriers that block refugee access to the labor market in practice.

While some refugees are in urban centers such as Addis Ababa, most are in government-managed camps. Survey respondents indicated that refugees are regularly harassed or even arrested when traveling. Despite some initiatives to increase access to the labor market and variance across country of origin, most refugees still struggle to move freely and obtain official work documentation.

A number of NGOs financing institutions such as the World Bank, have invested in various programs to improve refugee economic inclusion.\textsuperscript{178} For the most part, however, refugees in Ethiopia still struggle to access the formal labor market and earn livelihoods. The conflict over the last year, which has been most intense in the Tigray and Amhara regions, has only exacerbated these challenges.\textsuperscript{179}


De Jure Refugee Work Rights

Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes, with reservations to article 17

Party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes

Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? Yes

De Facto Refugee Work Rights

Right to Wage Employment

- Access to work permits: 4
- Enforcement of work permits*: 2
- Change over last 5 years: SAME

Right to Self-Employment

- Access to business permits: 4
- Enforcement of business permits*: 2
- Change over last 5 years: SAME

Freedom of Movement

- Domestic travel: 4
- Choice of residence: 4
- Change over last 5 years: WORSE

Rights at Work

- Recourse for workplace violations: 5

Other Factors of Economic Inclusion

De Facto Access for Refugees

- Primary education: 5
- Secondary education: 4
- Tertiary education: 4
- Healthcare provision: 4
- Acquire official documents: 4
- Credential validation: 3
- Formal financial services: 2

Five is the highest score, with access equal to nationals, and one is the lowest score. See Part 1 for definitions, methodology, and survey questions.

*Enforcement is only considered when permits are difficult to access. Strict enforcement of laws, reflected by a low score, is not penalized if permits are accessible. See Part 1 for a discussion.

Facts

According to UNHCR, France hosted 457,153 refugees and 82,032 asylum seekers in 2021. The most common countries of origin for people who were displaced were Afghanistan, Syria, Sri Lanka, Russia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

De Jure Summary

France is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol as well as the ICESCR. These international obligations are supplemented by the EU Regional Council Directive, which requires that member states authorize recognized refugees to work on par with nationals. France also has passed national legislation setting forth the rights of refugees, centrally its Code of Entry and Residence of Foreigners and Right of Asylum.

Refugees and those with subsidiary protection are afforded the right to work and freedom of movement once their status has been recognized by the government. For those with pending asylum applications, formal employment is allowable only after the application has been in process for six months. Refugees able to access formal employment must have initially obtained a temporary work permit prior to filing for a work permit, and they must produce a contract of employment for this work permit. Work permits are valid only for the duration

183 Ibid.
of the employment contract. Prefectures have considerable authority in approving work permits to ensure that professions are adequately regulated, resulting in diversity in permit approvals across the country.

Refugees also need a work permit to access vocational training. Asylum seekers’ freedom of movement is restricted to the region of their assigned reception area, where they receive food, housing, and clothing; these benefits can be lost when they leave.

De Facto Summary

Refugees and asylum seekers are generally supported with employment services and corresponding social support, such as language classes and vocational training. However, the qualification recognition system is “poorly efficient,” according to one survey respondent, which makes work in most occupations on the “shortage occupation” list more difficult to obtain. According to a study published by the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), a majority of refugees work in jobs that are a “professional downgrade.” Work permit issuance is also dependent on these lists, and, in practice, it is very difficult for people who have been displaced to obtain a work permit in a timely manner that supports their livelihood. Many therefore accept jobs that are below their skill level and require few prerequisites.

The government does fund NGO programs that support refugee self-employment, such as those developed by Singa, and there are many private initiatives doing the same. In practice, however, asylum seekers generally do not have efficient access to self-employment due to bureaucratic barriers regarding documentation and loans.

Additional services that support livelihoods, such as financial or healthcare services, are also different for those who have been displaced as compared to French citizens. After the first three months following their arrival, asylum seekers’ health coverage is restricted to emergency care, whereas the care offered to citizens covers a wider array of services. Financial services can also be more difficult for refugees to access, though the government has published a tool kit to help banks engage better on this subject.

186 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
189 For more information on SiNGA France, see the organization’s website, https://singafrance.com/.
Facts

According to UNHCR, Germany hosted 1,235,160 refugees and 232,481 asylum seekers in 2021.\(^\text{190}\) The majority of refugees and asylum seekers originated from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

De Jure Summary

Germany is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR. These international obligations are supplemented by the EU Regional Council Directive, which requires that member states authorize recognized refugees to work on par with nationals. Germany also has broad national legislation setting forth the rights of refugees.

Refugees are guaranteed the right to work and be self-employed under the four forms of protection offered: asylum, refugee protection, subsidiary protection, and deportation ban.\(^\text{191}\) These forms of protection are codified in the Asylum Act, Basic Law, and Residence Act. In addition, the Labor Agency provides support for training programs and for fees required for qualifications recognition.\(^\text{192}\) Germany provides the same social benefits to refugees that German citizens receive. Therefore, refugees are entitled to unemployment benefits.

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Since 2016, refugees with protection have been required to reside for three years in the state or town where their asylum procedure was conducted, which limits freedom of movement and work opportunities.

Asylum seekers are obligated to stay in reception centers during their initial asylum proceedings. They are not allowed to work for the first nine months of their stay in the centers. After they are released from the center and after three months have passed, they are permitted to work.\(^{193}\) Work is restricted during this period: a permit must be obtained for a specific job, and self-employment is not allowed. Once recognition of refugee status has been granted, refugees are afforded the same rights to the labor market as German citizens.

**De Facto Summary**

The German government manages specific programs that promote formal employment of people with refugee status, such as the PROFI Program, which seeks to increase the likelihood that academically qualified refugees in Germany will gain employment that matches their level of education.\(^{194}\) Vocational training is often provided by private enterprises, as well.

However, asylum seekers are restricted in certain respects. They generally cannot open their own businesses, as work permits are valid for employed work but not self-employment, and asylum seekers can face discrimination based on nationality or language in certain federal states according to a survey respondent.

In practice, recognized refugees are entitled to the same employment benefits as German citizens. Asylum seekers and various other groups are generally only granted reduced benefits called “asylum seekers’ benefits.” Further, a gray area exists for persons whose applications have been rejected and in cases in which Germany does not accept responsibility for the asylum process (usually because another European country is supposed to be responsible for carrying out the procedure). This leaves the person’s legal status, and resulting labor market access and resources, in limbo.


\(^{194}\) Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, “‘PROFI’ Programme—Promoting Professional Integration of Academics with a Refugee Background in the German Labour Market,” accessed January 20, 2022, [https://www.daad.de/en/information-services-for-higher-education-institutions/further-information-on-daad-programmes/profi/](https://www.daad.de/en/information-services-for-higher-education-institutions/further-information-on-daad-programmes/profi/).
GREECE

De Jure Refugee Work Rights

Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes, with reservations to article 26

Party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes

Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? Yes

De Facto Refugee Work Rights

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<tr>
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<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
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<th>Freedom of Movement</th>
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<td>Domestic travel</td>
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<td>Choice of residence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
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| Rights at Work | 3 |
| Recourse for workplace violations |

Other Factors of Economic Inclusion

De Facto Access for Refugees

| Primary education    | 3 |
| Secondary education  | 3 |
| Tertiary education   | 2 |
| Healthcare provision | 2 |
| Acquire official documents | 3 |
| Credential validation | 1 |
| Formal financial services | 3 |

Facts

According to UNHCR, Greece hosted 112,022 refugees and 49,397 asylum seekers in 2021. The most common countries of origin for refugees and asylum seekers were Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

De Jure Summary

Although Greece is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR, the country’s national policies and practices do not fully align with its international commitments.

Asylum seekers with valid international protection cards are able to lawfully work after six months, with restrictions on self-employment. Recognized refugees are able to lawfully work with a valid residency permit; no work permit is required. The law provides access to vocational training programs for asylum applicants and refugees; in practice, however, the documentation needed to participate in such programs is often hard to produce. Greece, however, has repeatedly suspended the asylum registration process since 2016, preventing refugees from accessing lawful protection. Furthermore, an EU-Turkey deal implemented in March 2016 required that all unregistered refugee arrivals

196 International Protection Act, Article 53(1); International Protection Act, Article 71 L 4375/2016, as amended by Article 116(10).
be sent to Turkey, and in June 2021, Greece designated Turkey as a “safe third country” for asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria.\textsuperscript{199} Applicants from these countries can be rejected as “inadmissible” without their cases being examined on their merits, even though Turkey has not accepted readmissions from Greece since March 2020.\textsuperscript{200}

**De Facto Summary**

While recognized refugees do have freedom of movement, in practice it is difficult and expensive for them to leave the camps.\textsuperscript{201} To work or start a business, refugees need a bank account, but banks often refuse their requests to open an account because of insufficient documentation and discrimination.\textsuperscript{202} Even if they manage to open a bank account, language barriers and bureaucracy make it very difficult for refugees to become entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{203}

It is even more difficult for asylum seekers to work. Businesses can legally hire them for only six months, leading to large gaps in employment due to delays in renewing their documents. Additionally, labor laws prohibit contract renewals after the third iteration, making it impossible for asylum seekers to stay with the same employer.

The situation regarding access to services is similar. For example, Greek government-run schools do not exist in the camps, yet there is insufficient transport to take refugee and asylum seeker children on the islands to the mainland, and language barriers persist.\textsuperscript{204}

To support asylum seekers, cash assistance, accommodations, and food are provided by the state and partner organizations. Once their status is recognized, their assistance is cut off within 30 days. They can then access the Helios program, run by the International Organization for Migration and funded by the state, which provides further cash assistance, access to education, and training for 12 months.\textsuperscript{205} But the procedure to access the program is long and requires complicated documentation.
Facts

According to UNHCR, Guyana hosted 23 refugees and 111 asylum seekers as well as 23,307 Venezuelans displaced abroad in 2021.\textsuperscript{206} Aside from Venezuelans displaced abroad, the majority of asylum seekers were from Cuba.

De Jure Summary

Guyana does not have national asylum and refugee legislation or a government-led asylum procedure but has nevertheless welcomed Venezuelan refugees.\textsuperscript{207} Guyana is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor to its 1967 Protocol, but the country has ratified the ICESCR. Guyana is not a party to the American Convention on Human Rights.

The immigration authorities register Venezuelan migrants and provide them three-month stay permits, which afford them temporary protection. Venezuelans are not given the right to work with these permits. Beyond the initial three months, a Venezuelan can renew their permit; however, this process is lengthy and often results in a loss of legal status.\textsuperscript{208} For non-Venezuelans, refugee status determination is carried out by UNHCR, and successful applicants are issued a UNHCR certificate.


with limited protections that does not include the right to work.209

De Facto Summary

Lack of work rights and minimal protections to stay lawfully result in precarious situations for refugees, who frequently work informally and are often at risk of deportation.210 The International Organization for Migration (IOM), through the Response for Venezuelans (R4V) Platform, also determined that Venezuelans living in Guyana experience limited access to formal employment and livelihoods.211 The language barrier hinders Spanish-speaking Venezuelans from accessing services and integrating in the English-speaking country.212 As a result, many workers, including migrants and refugees, work in the informal economy. A report from the International Labor Organization showed that in 2017 Guyana’s informal employment comprised 48 to 53 percent of total employment in the country, with the majority occurring in the agricultural sector.213 A 2019 IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix showed that 98 percent of Venezuelans interviewed in Guyana reported that income generation and employment were important needs that went unfulfilled.214

The lack of a formal right to work leaves limited opportunities for refugees to gain self-reliance, and

women and children are particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation and trafficking.215 It has been reported that many displaced Venezuelans engage in sex work as a survival mechanism in Guyana.216

212  Ibid.
213  Ibid.
214  Ibid.
216  Ibid.
Facts

According to UNHCR, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) hosted 265 refugees and no asylum seekers in 2021. The most common countries of origin for asylum seekers were Somalia, Yemen, and Rwanda.

De Jure Summary

HKSAR is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol. HKSAR does not have any domestic legal framework providing the right to asylum or protection of refugees. The ICESCR is applicable in its territories.

Since 2014, HKSAR has implemented the “unified screening mechanism” (USM) for determining claims for non-refoulement protection. However, since the USM was launched in 2014, only one percent of applicants have been recognized. In 2021 the Immigration Ordinance was passed, introducing “fast-track” procedures to the USM process; these are largely seen as additional barriers to successful recognition.

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219 Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap. 115), with definitions referring to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Article 3 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap. 383); and the principle of non-refoulement under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
People seeking protection may apply only if they are subject to removal from HKSAR and do not have the right to reside in another foreign territory that could grant them non-refoulement protection. During these proceedings, no temporary protection is afforded, and individuals are classified as “illegal immigrants.” If their application is successful, refugees are protected from removal on a temporary basis, as long as HKSAR deems the claim to be substantiated. This leaves refugees in a constant precarious and deportable state.

The 2021 Immigration Ordinance bars recognized non-refoulement claimants from any paid or unpaid lawful employment. There does exist, however, a discretionary process for recognized claimants to apply to the Immigration Department for a six-month work permit.

De Facto Summary

In practice, only a few non-refoulement claimants are able to obtain work permits. Approvals have increased, but the permit process is complex, requires an employment contract, and is limited to six months at a time. The few that have the permit also struggle to find formal jobs as the duration of the permit is too short to provide stability. Moreover, self-employment is not allowed.

The government provides a monthly humanitarian assistance package to claimants. The support includes food cards; housing allowance paid directly to the landlord; transportation support; and stipend to cover utilities and other basic needs. If a refugee works, they can risk losing this support. However, the assistance does not grant enough cash to cover daily expenses, and refugees in commonly live below the poverty line.

Despite the risks, many claimants resort to work informally in low-paid sectors. Furthermore, due to the weak labor rights in HKSAR, refugees and migrant workers are often subject to exploitation and abuse without access to support to report violations.

With the argument that HKSAR is not party to the Refugee Convention, immigration officers deny asylum seekers the access to the territory or force many to return. Those that ultimately enter the country undergo significant violations to their rights like cavity searches, forced signing of documents without proper interpretation assistance, verbal abuse, and humiliation.

223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
229 Mihir Melwani, “Driven by Desperation: Without the right to work, refugees in Hong Kong face impossible choices.”
231 Justice Centre Hong Kong, “Parallel Report to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.”
Facts

According to UNHCR, Indonesia hosted 10,076 refugees and 3,309 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers were from Afghanistan and Somalia.

De Jure Summary

Indonesia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol. The country does, however, have a legal human rights framework stemming from its commitments to other international and regional human rights conventions. There is no domestic law that protects refugee rights outright, although a constitutional amendment passed in 2000 recognizes the right to seek political asylum, and Law No. 37 of 1999 on foreign relations stipulates that the granting of asylum must be implemented in accordance with international law and practice.

A Presidential Decree in 2016 adopts the definition of refugee presented in the 1951 Refugee Convention and describes procedures for processing asylum claims; however, it does not codify any rights for refugees. The government has enabled UNHCR to implement the refugee status determinations.
nation process. Refugees who are successful in this process are granted a UNHCR identification card. This card does not guarantee the right to work.  

Indonesian Immigration Regulation No. IMI0352. GR.02.07 of 2016 prohibits employment for refugees, stating that they must not engage in income-generating activities and must sign a letter agreeing to this condition. This results in many refugees working in the informal sector; however, refugees pursuing this type of employment have been subject to detention and/or fines.

De Facto Summary

NGOs have delivered some training programs and internships to refugees in Indonesia, but translating these programs into economic opportunity is difficult without full work rights. A very small number of refugees are able to open businesses by partnering with Indonesians, but they often face issues with documentation, harassment by local officials, and a lack of legal recourse for difficulties.

One area in which there has been some slight improvement in recent years is freedom of movement. Until 2019, refugees were confined to detention centers. Today, refugees are able to live in hostels run by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) within the community. However, they are still placed under curfew and are not able to travel outside of their city without permission.

If they breach these conditions, they can be sent back to the detention center. Within the hostel, refugees are given a monthly stipend by IOM. Those living outside these hostels receive no government support.

Refugee children are also eligible to attend state-run primary schools, but in practice they face difficulties in accessing education due to quotas (which prioritize locals over refugee children) and language obstacles. Even if they are able to enroll, they will not be able to obtain an official certification, as this is derived from a citizenship card, which refugees do not have. There is no right to secondary or tertiary education, and many students learn through NGOs.


IRAN

Facts

According to UNHCR, Iran hosted 800,025 refugees and 34 asylum seekers in 2021.239 The majority of refugees were from Afghanistan and Iraq.

De Jure Summary

Iran is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol; however, the country maintains reservations to articles 17, 24, and 26. Iran is also a party to the ICESCR.

Under Iran’s Labor Code, refugees are allowed to obtain a temporary work permit with a valid refugee card or immigration visa, which is valid for one year.240 However, this right to work is limited because the permit is very costly, must be renewed every year, and limits the type of occupations available to refugees.241

Refugees’ freedom of movement is limited; two-thirds of Iran’s territory is designated as no-go areas for foreigners, imposing restrictions on areas where they may legally reside and work.242 Prima facie status was implemented for Afghan and Iraqi refugees before 2002; however, in 2003 a

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new process known as *Amayesh* was introduced to reregister all refugees. This process is complex, lengthy, and expensive and has resulted in many refugees losing their status.\(^{243}\)

Iran has effectively closed its doors to asylum seekers, starting with the right to asylum. Since 2007, the registration process has been suspended for Afghans, and the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees program has been implemented to facilitate the repatriation of Afghans back to Afghanistan.\(^{244}\) Despite the ongoing crisis, the asylum process is still closed for Afghan refugees, repatriations are still ongoing, and refugees are being returned at the border by authorities.\(^{245}\)

**De Facto Summary**

Iran has hosted large numbers of Afghan and other refugees for years, with a generally poor record on de facto access to rights. With the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan and the expected continuing outflow of refugees, there is concern that the situation will worsen.

In addition to blocking access to asylum, including by using detention and deportation for would-be asylum seekers, Iran has a long-standing record of physical abuse, detention in inhumane conditions, forced labor, forced separation of families, among other types of abuses.\(^{246}\) Unaccompanied migrant children in particular have been subject to abuse and exploitation.

Even refugees who are fully registered face significant difficulties, as Iran has imposed a challenging process to maintain status, including regular re-registration with different government agencies, excessive fees, and bureaucratic hurdles. Refugees also risk losing status and deportation if they make even a small mistake, and refugees are not able to move freely, as many parts of Iran are considered “no go” zones.\(^{247}\)

Afghan refugees in particular are often limited to low-paying, dangerous jobs, regardless of their education and skills. In addition, although children can technically access education, in reality bureaucratic obstacles mean that many refugee children cannot attend school. Refugees also face discrimination, scapegoating, and anti-foreigner sentiment.\(^{248}\)

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\(^{243}\) Ibid.

\(^{244}\) Ibid.


IRAQI KURDISTAN

Facts

According to UNHCR, Iraqi Kurdistan hosted over 266,000 Syrian refugees in 2021, which is 98 percent of the Syrian refugees in Iraq and 92 percent of all refugees and asylum seekers in Iraq.

De Jure Summary

Iraqi Kurdistan is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol as part of the State of Iraq.

In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), there is no specific law that governs asylum seeker or refugee rights and the right to work for refugees is not guaranteed in domestic law. The right to work is dependent on legal entry and residency status. Decree No. 7174 and Decree No. 10041 protect refugees and asylum seekers from detention for crossing borders without a visa or lawful status. Individuals seeking asylum are able to apply for a Refuge Asylum Application Certificate and temporary residency permit which must be renewed annually. With this residency permit, refugees in KRI are able to work. However, refugees in KRI are not legally eligible for permanent residency, which presents a barrier to safe, decent, and sustainable living.

De Jure Refugee Work Rights

- Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees? No
- Party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees? No
- Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? Yes, as part of Iraq

De Facto Refugee Work Rights

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<thead>
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Other Factors of Economic Inclusion

De Facto Access for Refugees

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<th>Access for Refugees</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<td>Tertiary education</td>
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<td>Acquire official documents</td>
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<td>Credential validation</td>
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<td>Formal financial services</td>
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* Enforcement is only considered when permits are difficult to access. Strict enforcement of laws, reflected by a low score, is not penalized if permits are accessible. See Part 1 for a discussion.

Five is the highest score, with access equal to nationals, and one is the lowest score. See Part 1 for definitions, methodology, and survey questions.

work entrepreneurship opportunities.\footnote{Ibid.}

**De Facto Summary**

Although the measure is not enshrined in law, the Kurdistan Regional Government has adopted a de facto policy of labor market access for Syrian refugees, who make up the majority of refugees in Iraqi Kurdistan.\footnote{Naomi Petersohn, *Closing the Gap: From Work Rights to Decent Work for Syrian Refugees in KRI* (Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council, n.d.), https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/closing-the-gap/closing-the-gap---report-design.pdf.} Syrians who register with UNHCR and pass a security check are provided with a one-year residency permit, which allows access to basic services such as healthcare and education and can be renewed.\footnote{Caroline Zullo, “Closing the Gap: Syrian Refugees in Kurdistan Deserve Better Work Opportunities,” *The New Arab*, February 15, 2022, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/syrian-refugees-kurdistan-deserve-better-work-prospects.} In practice, the cost to acquire residency (US$33–75) can be a barrier, but 93 percent of Syrians were registered as of 2018, according to a recent report by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).\footnote{Naomi Petersohn, *Closing the Gap: From Work Rights to Decent Work for Syrian Refugees in KRI* (Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council, n.d.), https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/closing-the-gap/closing-the-gap---report-design.pdf; World Food Program / UNHCR / Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, *Joint Vulnerability Assessment* (Rome: World Food Program, 2018), https://www.wfp.org/publications/iraq-wfpunhcrkrso-joint-vulnerability-assessment-june-2018.} Some Syrians obtained residency through shell companies that offered easier access to employment than refugee status, but the government has cracked down on these schemes recently, and many of these Syrians have moved to other countries.

With residency, Syrians are able to access private-sector jobs and start businesses. Survey respondents report that refugees can access jobs and obtain business permits, though the process for starting a business can be complicated. The recent report by the NRC also noted a perception that starting a business outside the camps requires an Iraqi sponsor, though this is not actually a provision of the policy. Refugees are prohibited from working in the public sector, which accounts for a substantial proportion of formal jobs available. Given these barriers, most refugees still work in the informal sector, where the NRC and other organizations have documented frequent violations of labor laws regarding working hours, the minimum wage, and safe working conditions. While the NRC report notes that “work rights violations are common, with redress almost impossible,” respondents to the survey from one NGO (Harikar) note that their legal unit takes many cases like these.\footnote{For more information on Harikar, see the organization’s website, https://www.harikar.org/.}
According to UNHCR, Israel hosted 1,860 refugees and 29,156 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers were from Eritrea and Sudan.

De Jure Summary

Israel is a party to the main international instruments concerning refugees, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, as well as the ICESCR.

The Israel refugee law defines three different types of refugees: recognized refugees, asylum seekers and persons under collective protection. Few refugees are recognized by the state, with a .06% recognition rate between 2011-2019, leaving most as asylum-seekers with almost no rights.

Historically, Israel has held a large number of asylum seekers in administrative immigrant detention until recent years. In 2020, numbers of migrants and asylum seekers declined from 5,000 to ‘a few dozen migrants’.

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Many refugees historically barred from applying for asylum, most of whom are Eritrean or Sudanese, have been given ‘conditional release visas’ under the Entry of Israel Law (Art 2(A)5). These are given alongside pending deportation orders, only enabling the right to stay, and must be renewed every two to three months. This visa does not confer the right to work and includes the phrase “this temporary permit does not constitute a work permit”, despite a High Court ruling in 2011 requiring the government to issue work permits for these visa holders.

In a 2022 court ruling, Israel granted temporary residence status to 2,445 Eritrean and Sudanese asylum seekers, some of whom had been in the country for over a decade. Although unconfirmed, reporting suggests that this legal status may offer a pathway to formal employment.

Even for recognized refugees, the law does not provide the right to work. Israel does not have specific legislation concerning refugees’ labor rights; instead, the Foreign Workers Law regulates the right to work for all persons residing in Israel, regardless of their legal status. This law was not designed to consider the situation of most refugees, thus imposing legal requirements that refugees and their employers often cannot meet.

De Facto Summary

Government-sponsored advertisements previously advocated against hiring refugees without formal work permits. Some employers took advantage of this confusion by threatening refugees with deportation or not paying their salaries. Now, however, the Israeli government seems to tolerate the informal hiring of those seeking refugee status. A work permit system does exist, but not all refugees use it. The Supreme Court ruled that refugees have the right to work, so the absence of a work permit is not punish.

Delays have been reported in the processing of asylum applications for individuals of particular nationalities, including those from Eritrea and Sudan. And many refugees and asylum seekers are de-facto consigned to low-wage jobs.

For years, the Deposit Law required employers to automatically take 20 percent of asylum seekers’ salaries and deposit it into a fund that the workers could only access upon leaving the country. A recent report revealed that while many people’s salaries were docked, the money was never deposited into their funds. This law was repealed in January 2022.

ITALY

Facts

According to UNHCR, Italy hosted 134,499 refugees and 53,686 asylum seekers in 2021. The most common countries of origin for refugees and asylum seekers were Pakistan and Nigeria.

De Jure Summary

Italy is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR. These international obligations are supplemented by the EU Regional Council Directive, which requires that member states authorize recognized refugees to engage in lawful employment on par with nationals immediately after refugee status has been granted. Italy’s domestic legislation, in particular the Reception Decree, also sets forth the rights of asylum seekers and recognized refugees.

An asylum seeker may begin work 60 days after applying for asylum, according to the Reception Decree. Once refugee status is granted, a residence permit is supposed to be issued that provides the right to work, including in government employment. Refugees are treated the same as Italian citizens in terms of their ability to access employment and self-employment and to engage with professional associations and vocational training.
Refugees, asylum seekers, and those with subsidiary protection may move freely within Italy.\(^{278}\) They are given the right to stay within a reception center, but they are not obligated to do so and may settle outside such centers.\(^{279}\) Registered asylum seekers in government reception centers may be subject to curfews and restrictions on travel timing and permission, and they must request permission to transfer between reception centers.\(^{280}\)

**De Facto Summary**

In practice, refugees in Italy experience long delays in obtaining a residence permit, and bureaucratic barriers are significant. It is common to have a short-term stay permit, with renewal requirements, for years on end, which makes obtaining a job very difficult. Employers are responsible for the documentation of anyone they hire, so many do not want to hire refugees with documentation that has a short period of validity or is close to expiration.

A stay permit filed under self-employment is less likely to be renewed than a stay permit filed under formal, wage employment, according to survey respondents. That, in conjunction with de facto discrimination in obtaining the documents necessary to open a business, makes formal self-employment quite difficult.

Additionally, very few refugees are able to access to obtain a loan or establish a savings account. Both asylum seekers and refugees are entitled to a monthly subsidy, but only if they are residing in a reception center. Otherwise, they do not receive these benefits. Most funding for resettlement and support services is provided by European governance structures and is distinct from services available to citizens.

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278 Ibid.
Facts

According to UNHCR, Jordan hosted 708,308 refugees and 48,368 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees were from Syria. Jordan also hosted 2,334,789 Palestinians under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in 2021. Most had full citizenship.

De Jure Summary

Despite hosting one of the highest numbers of refugees in the world, Jordan is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and lacks comprehensive national refugee legislation. The country implemented with UNHCR in 1998, the primary policy establishing processing procedures for refugees.

The 1954 Jordanian Constitution reserves the right to work freely for Jordanian citizens only. Jordan does not have any formal legislation protecting refugees’ right to work. Nevertheless, in 2016 the government signed the “Jordan Compact,” establishing free work permits for 200,000 Syrian refugees, simplifying documentation requirements, and allowing at-home businesses. This enables work in certain sectors that are subject to quotas, which limits the total number of foreign workers in each sector.
Since October 2018, Syrian refugees with work permits have been allowed to move freely between industrial sectors without being sponsored by an employer, but they are still subject to sector quotas. Syrian refugees currently residing in camps are allowed to obtain a permit to work outside the camp, which enables work in sectors approved for non-Jordanians.

This formal pathway is not available to refugees of other nationalities, such as those from Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, or Somalia. Palestinians who are citizens are eligible for full access to the labor market.

Faced with exclusion from formal employment, refugees must often decide between holding legal refugee status and renouncing that status to enter the formal labor market as a foreign worker. The migrant worker system is founded on employer sponsorship (kafala), except for those working in Qualified Industrial Zones, where migrants' admission and lawful residency is tied to their employment.

De Facto Summary:

In practice, labor market access for registered Syrian refugees has improved since the implementation of the Jordan Compact. Work permits are issued, and restrictions on their applicability have slowly been relaxed. As of July 2021, Syrian refugees are able to work in all sectors where non-Jordanians are permitted, and exemptions were made for Syrian healthcare workers during the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite these improvements, 80 percent of Syrians live in poverty, with high debt and food insecurity. Furthermore, movement is restricted for the 18 percent of registered Syrian refugees who live in the two main camps. Residents must seek approval for movement passes that are valid for up to 30 days. Access to work permits and movement passes is more limited in Azraq camp than in Za’atari camp.

The majority of Palestinian refugees are eligible for citizenship and therefore full access to the labor market. Their socioeconomic outcomes are similar to those of other Jordanians on average, though Palestinians in camps have lower incomes, and some groups of Palestinians who are not eligible for citizenship face restrictions in the labor market and on owning property.

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285 Ibid.


Facts

According to UNHCR, Kenya hosted 466,286 refugees and 54,878 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees originated from Somalia, whereas the most common country of origin for asylum seekers is the Democratic Republic of Congo.\(^{291}\)

De Jure Summary

On paper, Kenya has a relatively progressive refugee legal framework, as it is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and the 2021 Refugees Act provides refugees with the right to employment, identity cards, and support in local integration.\(^{292}\) Kenya is also a party to the I-ESCR and ratified the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.

The 2006 Refugee Act, its 2009 Refugee Regulations, and the 2021 Refugees Act governs the status and treatment of refugees in Kenya. The legislation provides refugees the rights contained in the human rights treaties ratified by Kenya. Refugees can apply for free work permits and be employed in any occupation or self-employment as long as they satisfy any county-level regulations that may exist.\(^{293}\)
Currently, the law does not provide refugees with the right to move freely. Kenya’s encampment policy stipulates that refugees must obtain authorization to leave the camps temporarily. The new Refugees Act indicates that refugees will be allowed to move within designated areas, though more details are expected in forthcoming regulations.

Beyond these laws, various development plans seek to support economic opportunities for refugees by enabling greater freedom of movement and work rights, namely, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Nairobi Declaration, the Kampala Declaration, and the area-based Kalobeyei Integrated Socioeconomic Development Program.

**De Facto Summary**

Kenya hosts one of the largest protracted refugee populations in the world, and they generally struggle to access formal work and to move freely. Some refugees reside in urban centers such as Nairobi, where they can move more freely, and others are able to leave the camps. However, survey respondents indicated that most still struggle to move freely and may face harassment or even arrest when moving. Some noted that restrictions on movement have worsened during the pandemic, and nearly all cited the government’s encampment policy as a major limitation on economic inclusion. Formal work authorization, including work permits, is rarely given to refugees and is difficult to obtain.

The Refugees Act and initiatives such as the Kalobeyei Integrated Socioeconomic Development Program hold potential to widen opportunities for refugees to achieve self-reliance and income generation. They demonstrate regional and local implementation of more progressive policies that can benefit refugees and hosts alike. However, the barriers to accessing the labor market in other parts of Kenya—most notably difficulties obtaining documentation and moving freely—remain significant for most refugees and asylum seekers.

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Facts

According to UNHCR, Lebanon hosted 856,758 refugees, including 851,718 people from Syria in 2021.297 UNRWA also reports 479,000 refugees from Palestine.298

De Jure Summary

There is no national for refugee rights in Lebanon, and the country's actions refugees are primarily governed by ad hoc policies. Further, domestic law does not distinguish asylum seekers and refugees from migrants.299 Lebanon is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention; however, the government ratified the ICESCR and embedded principles of human rights law in the country's constitution.

Syrian refugees must either be registered with UNHCR as refugees and thus barred from working or have a Lebanese sponsor to lawfully remain in the country and thus have access to formal employment.300 Annual renewal fees for such residency permits are prohibitively expensive for refugees, leaving many without legal status.301 Foreign labor is regulated by sector, and Syrian labor is restrict-

301 Ibid.
ed to the agriculture, construction, and sanitation sectors.302

Palestinian refugees have access to formal employment, provided by a labor law amended in 2005 and 2010, enabling free work permits and access to work in restricted sectors.303 However, the process for obtaining work permits is lengthy and requires goodwill of employers. In December 2021, Lebanon issued a decree relaxing sector restrictions for Palestinians born in Lebanon.304 However, barriers remain, as low numbers of Palestinians obtain work permits and many employers are unwilling to hire Palestinians.

De Facto Summary

Lebanon has one of the largest refugee populations per capita globally.305 Lebanon is also experiencing one of the worst economic crises since the mid-19th century, with real per capita GDP falling 37 percent between 2018 and 2021.306 In this context, the conditions for refugees have gone from bad to worse. Syrians were under curfew in many municipalities even before COVID-19, and curfews targeting only Syrians expanded during the pandemic.307

Labor market access is also very difficult for refugees.308 Only 20 percent of Syrians have legal residency, as UNHCR has been unable to register refugees since 2015.309 Obtaining a work permit is “practically impossible”, in the words of one survey respondent, and sectors are significantly restricted even for Palestinians born in Lebanon. The EU-Lebanon Compact, signed in 2016, brought hope of expanded access for Syrians but made little tangible difference.310 Instead, authorities launched a crackdown in 2019 on businesses hiring foreign workers without proper paperwork.311 This combination of limited access to documentation and enforcement actions targeting businesses has contributed to the dire conditions experienced by Syrians in Lebanon, with more than 90 percent living in extreme poverty as of 2019.312

According to UNHCR, Libya hosted 3,701 refugees and 39,434 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers were from Sudan and Syria.

**De Jure Summary**

Although not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Libya is a party to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries, the Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States (“Casablanca Protocol”), and the Bangkok Principles on the Status and Treatment of Refugees (“Bangkok Principles”).

Article 10 of the Libyan Constitutional Declaration determines that the state shall guarantee the rights of refugees. However, specific legislation has
not been developed in this regard, leaving refugees without de jure access to legal status, free movement, or work rights.  

Libya's Labor Relations Law (Law No. 12 of 2010) stipulates that foreigners must obtain a permit to work and prescribes a range of labor rights for workers. However, because Libyan law provides no way for refugees to regularize their legal status in the country, the Libyan government most likely would not consider this law as applicable to refugees.

**De Facto Summary**

Libya hosts a sizable refugee population and has historically received migrants seeking work, while often also cited for its maltreatment of migrants seeking to reach Europe. The lack of a national asylum law means refugees are “illegal migrants” and puts them at risk of arrest, detention, and abuse. In recent raids and crackdowns by authorities, refugees' and asylum seekers' homes were demolished, and, in the process, some refugees and asylum seekers were beaten and killed. Many individuals need emergency food and cash assistance, as well as housing and basic social services such as healthcare and education. Libya's ongoing political unrest and the COVID-19 pandemic have exacerbated crackdowns and violence toward refugees and asylum seekers.

Few refugees and asylum seekers have opportunities to access the formal labor market. Survey respondents noted that refugees have little freedom of movement and are regularly harassed and occasionally arrested when traveling. They also reported that the situation has worsened in recent years UNHCR registers asylum seekers, but this process is limited and thus very few have the documentation needed to access formal work. That being said, respondents noted that the government did not often enforce the need for work permits.

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321 Attempted sea crossings represented less than 5 percent of the total migrant population in Libya. In 2020, the overall number of migrants in the country decreased by 80,000, to 570,000, while the number of UNHCR-registered refugees and asylum seekers decreased from 48,000 to 44,000 (41,681 as of October 1, 2021). See https://reporting.unhcr.org/libya for the latest updates.


323 Ibid.

MALAWI

De Jure Refugee Work Rights

Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes, with reservations to articles 13, 19, and 24

Party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes

Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? Yes

De Facto Refugee Work Rights

Rights to Wage Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to work permits</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
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Rights to Self-Employment

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<td>Enforcement of business permits*</td>
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<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
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Freedom of Movement

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<th>Domestic travel</th>
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<td>Choice of residence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
<td>WORSE</td>
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Rights at Work

| Recourse for workplace violations | 3 |

Other Factors of Economic Inclusion

De Facto Access for Refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary education</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tertiary education</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Healthcare provision</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acquire official documents</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Credential validation</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formal financial services</td>
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</table>

Facts

According to UNHCR, Malawi hosted 16,359 refugees and 34,461 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers were from the Democratic Republic of Congo.

De Jure Summary

Malawi is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR. Malawi is also a party to the Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. The Refugees Act of 1989 is the domestic law defining refugees and prescribing structure for status determination.

The Refugees Act provides protections to refugees from non-refoulement and the right to remain during the asylum application process, to enter without lawful status if a refugee intends to seek asylum, and the right to be protected from detention. However, the freedom of movement and the right to work are not guaranteed in this law.

Malawi’s reservations to the Refugee Convention reinforce this lack of work rights: Malawi does not agree to Convention provisions that give refugees rights to own property, join unions, or move freely. Malawi agrees to allow refugees to work on par


with foreigners generally, but denies them access to rights at work.\textsuperscript{328}

Most refugees have long been restricted to living in camps, and in 2021 authorities ordered refugees living outside camps to relocate to the Dzaleka camp that now is supposed to host all refugees in the country.\textsuperscript{329}

\textbf{De Facto Summary}

Malawi was on track to participate in the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework by promoting durable solutions, including local integration and resettlement possibilities. However, the government recently changed course and imposed strict encampment requirements—a clear step backward in its progress toward economic inclusion of refugees. In April 2021, the government made the announcement that all refugees would need to return to the Dzaleka Camp, citing national security reasons.\textsuperscript{330} This move stretched already limited access to services in the overcrowded Dzaleka Camp and uprooted some 2,000 refugees who were living and working alongside hosts in Malawi. The denial of rights most notably affects freedom of movement and the right to work, but also access to other socioeconomic rights.\textsuperscript{331}

\begin{flushleft}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{328} Ibid.
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According to UNHCR, Malaysia hosted some 131,101 refugees and 52,012 asylum seekers registered with UNHCR in 2021. Some 120,126 are from Myanmar, with the vast majority being Rohingya.332

**De Jure Summary**

Despite hosting one of the largest refugee populations in Southeast Asia, Malaysia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor to the ICE-SCR. Malaysia has not developed any domestic or administrative framework that provides rights for refugees. Malaysia’s immigration laws do not distinguish between refugees, asylum seekers, irregular migrants, and undocumented persons.

Therefore, refugees do not have access to fundamental rights such as legal status, safe and lawful employment, formal education, and equal protection of the law. Refugees are at constant risk of arrest, detention, and exploitation. Malaysian law continues to classify refugees as “illegal immigrants.” Nevertheless, UNHCR conducts a registration process and provides identity documentation that “may reduce the risk of arrest” but “has no formal legal value in Malaysia.”333 However, since 2019, the situation of refugees in the country has worsened, as UNHCR has been denied entry into detention centers and is thus unable to provide protection to persons of concern.334

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**Facts**

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334 A. Ananthalakshmi and Mei Mei Chu, “Malaysia Denying U.N. Access to Detained Asylum Seekers, Agency Says,” Reuters, November
In a landmark case in 2014, an industrial court decided that a UNHCR-recognized refugee was wrongfully dismissed from employment. This decision holds that all employees, including those without legal status, are equal before the law. De Facto Summary

In Malaysia, forcibly displaced people are deprived of their basic human rights, education, health, and work. Rohingya especially face significant segregation and discrimination. Given the lack of recognition from the government, refugees fear deportation and are subject to harassment and extortion. This harassment also limits refugees’ freedom of movement.

Some refugees have de facto been able to obtain a visa and work in a limited number of sectors through existing labor migration schemes by foregoing UNHCR registration. Yet these jobs tend to be “dirty, dangerous and degrading” according to the United States Department of Labor.

The country has stated its intention to improve legal work rights for displaced people, with some previous instances limited in scope. For instance, in 2017, the country implemented a pilot program to grant formal work to 300 Rohingya refugees in a state-owned company and a private company. But no further action has been taken to provide regularization and access to employment to other displaced individuals.

A recent report from the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs estimated that providing the right to work could generate over 4,000 jobs for Malaysians, 700 million USD in annual GDP, and 10 million USD in annual tax revenue by 2024.

339 NGOs report that employers often withhold refugees' salaries, and refugees also do not have access to important services, such as bank accounts.
According to UNHCR, Mexico hosted 58,050 refugees and 114,536 asylum seekers as well as 59,942 Venezuelans displaced abroad in 2021. Aside from Venezuela, the most common country of origin was Honduras.

De Jure Summary

Mexico is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention with reservations to articles 17 and 26. Mexico is a party to the ICESCR and a signatory to the Cartagena Declaration.

In 2010, the Mexican government passed the Law on Refugees and Complementary Protection, which incorporates the 1951 Refugee Convention principles into domestic law. The refugee definition adopted in this law is the expanded version contained in the Cartagena Declaration. This law offers broad protection to recognized refugees, including residency, the right to work, healthcare, and education, and the possibility of naturalization.

Domestic law requires that those applying for refugee status submit their application within 30 days of arrival in the country, and they must remain in the state where they lodged their application.

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**De Facto Summary**


The law states that all asylum seekers must receive a temporary humanitarian visa that allows them to work.\footnote{Tent, ACNUR and Casa Refugiados. “Guía Mexicana para la contratación de refugiados y solicitantes de asilo.” August 2020: https://www.tent.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Tent_Mexico-Hiring-Guide_August2020.pdf.} But NGOs indicate that some offices refuse to issue these documents or impose significant processing delays.\footnote{Nadini Dwivedi. “Mexico Human Rights Commission ask immigration authorities to speed up admissions.” Jurist. February 6, 2022: https://www.jurist.org/news/2022/02/mexico-human-rights-commission-asks-immigration-authorities-to-speed-up-admissions/} Thus many abandon their cases and move to other cities in search of opportunities.

Those with refugee status also face barriers to work. Businesses are limited in the number of foreigners they can hire—only up to 10 percent of their total workforce—and also require a special permit to hire non-nationals.\footnote{Government of Mexico, Ley Federal del Trabajo, Article No. 7, June 12, 2015: https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/156203/1044_Ley_Federal_del_Trabajo.pdf.} These regulations make it difficult for refugees to obtain formal jobs. Mexico has a large informal sector, where many refugees work. However, this allows for to abuse and exploitation, as well as harassment from authorities and criminal groups. In practice, there are few effective mechanisms to protect both displaced persons and locals in Mexico from workplace violations, especially when hired informally.
NEW ZEALAND

Facts

According to UNHCR, New Zealand hosted 1,785 refugees and 662 asylum seekers in 2021.358

De Jure Summary

New Zealand is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR. Refugee protections and work rights in New Zealand are governed by comprehensive national legislation, particularly the Immigration Act of 2009, which is aligned with international refugee protections.

New Zealand offers protection to refugees through the Refugee Quota Program for those being referred to New Zealand via resettlement, through the Refugee Claimant Visitor Visa for spontaneous arrivals, and via temporary visas for protected persons (who fall under the protection of the Convention against Torture or Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). New Zealand maintains an annual cap on refugee resettlement from third countries—currently 1,500 persons—which it revises every three years. In 2019, the country overturned a policy that had restricted resettlement quotas for refugees from Middle Eastern and African countries for more than 10 years, improving equality of refugee access to rights.359

De Jure Refugee Work Rights

Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes

Party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes

Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? Yes, with reservation to article 8

De Facto Refugee Work Rights

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<th>Right to Wage Employment</th>
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<tr>
<td>Recourse for workplace violations</td>
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Other Factors of Economic Inclusion

De Facto Access for Refugees

| Primary education | 5 |
| Secondary education | 5 |
| Tertiary education | 3 |
| Healthcare provision | 4 |
| Acquire official documents | 5 |
| Credential validation | 2 |
| Formal financial services | 3 |

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Recognized refugees and protected persons are offered permanent residency and the right to work. After holding residency for five years, they may apply for citizenship. Those with applications in process are able to apply for a temporary visa that provides them lawful stay, work authorization, the opportunity to study, and benefits from the Ministry of Social Development. However, if an asylum seeker makes a claim after already being present in New Zealand without a valid visa, or arrives in the country using fake documents, they could be detained while the application is processed.

**De Facto Summary**

Broadly, New Zealand does a good job of protecting the rights of its refugees, who are usually divided into three categories: asylum seekers, “Convention refugees,” and “quota refugees.” Yet confusion about these three categories and the rights they are granted hinders the ability of these people to access work and services. Government interventions appear to be lacking, with many refugees instead relying on NGOs and other forms of civil society support. Many asylum seekers are not granted work rights, and even those refugees who are granted status may need to wait months to access the labor market. Once they do, discrimination by employers can prevent many from accessing work. There is little support for refugees to start businesses, and little encouragement to do so.

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NORTH MACEDONIA

Facts

According to UNHCR, North Macedonia hosted 296 refugees and 17 asylum seekers in 2021.\(^{362}\) The majority of refugees originated from Serbia and Kosovo, while the most common country of origin for asylum seekers was Turkey.

De Jure Summary

North Macedonia is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol as well as the ICESCR. Refugee work rights in North Macedonia are enshrined in the 2018 Law on International and Temporary Protection and the 2018 Law on Foreigners.\(^{363}\)

North Macedonia maintains three policies for protecting refugees: refugee status, subsidiary protection, and temporary protection. Recognized refugees and persons with subsidiary protection are guaranteed full access to employment opportunities as soon as they receive their status, with the same rights and protections as foreign workers.\(^{364}\) Those with pending refugee status applications are not allowed to apply for a work permit until nine months have passed.\(^{365}\) These work permits are not accessible, however, because asylum seekers are...


\(^{364}\) Ibid.

required to have an identification number in order to obtain it, and they are not granted ID numbers until they are formally recognized as refugees. Often, applications are pending for two to three years, presenting serious challenges to refugees’ ability to access lawful employment.366

Temporary protection is applicable to those seeking asylum in “mass influx” events. This affords protection from non-refoulement for one year and can be renewed for a total of three years but does not guarantee work rights.367

Since 2015, a “state of crisis” has been imposed in the country,368 with border pushbacks justified by a “safe third country” rule,369 hampering individuals’ access to refugee status proceedings. Freedom of movement is granted to asylum seekers who are able to cross the border; however, North Macedonian authorities arbitrarily restrict this right in practice.370

De Facto Summary

Asylum seekers and refugees in North Macedonia are not granted personal identification numbers, a requisite for formal employment, until they are granted status. This prevents them from working; while there is a policy that refugees may work if their case is not processed within 9 months, this is often overlooked by employers according to a survey respondent. The lack of an identification number also makes school enrollment difficult. The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy touts active measures to promote the employment of refugees. The proposals that they have put forth, however, has not yet been adopted, according to UNHCR.371

366 Ibid.
369 Ibid.
Facts

According to UNHCR, Pakistan hosted 1,438,523 refugees and 10,192 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers originated from Afghanistan.

De Jure Summary

Pakistan does not currently have any national refugee legislation. Therefore, refugees and asylum seekers hold no official legal status and cannot work legally. Pakistan is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor its 1967 Protocol but is a party to the ICESCR by ratification with no reservations.

Pakistan has a long history of hosting refugees and hosts one of the highest refugee populations in the world, the majority of whom are Afghan. UNHCR holds the mandate to implement refugee status determination procedures in the country. However, over half of the 3 million refugees remain unregistered. Afghan refugees are allowed to freely move but are not guaranteed rights to work lawfully, access education or financial services, or buy property.

Pakistan has implemented various legalization programs over the years. In 2017, the government

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developed a Comprehensive Policy on the Repatriation and Management of Afghans and affirmed efforts to develop a national refugee law. The Comprehensive Policy included ‘Afghan Citizen Cards’ which legalized Afghans’ stay without term limits but did not grant them refugee status. Alongside this, Pakistan has implemented various programs to repatriate Afghan refugees. Advocates, however, report that these were often coerced and in 2016, a Human Rights Watch cited nearly half of the 600,000 returnees as having been forced to return.375

Regarding a possible national refugee law, there is draft legislation, which has not been released. There is no detail on if and how the government will uphold the protection of the right to work for asylum seekers and refugees.377

**De Facto Summary**

Refugees work informally in a variety of sectors, from day wage laborers in the construction and agricultural sectors to small-scale workers in carpet weaving, fresh fruit production, heavy machinery, and honey beekeeping.378 While some refugees set up businesses, they are either unregistered or under the proxy ownership of Pakistani friends and relatives. The one million Afghans who do not hold Proof of Registration cards mostly live in remote areas and perform menial jobs.379

Many refugees remain in the camps because there they can access limited work, healthcare, and education assistance. Afghan children are legally able to attend Pakistani state schools, though in practice these schools are both oversubscribed and hard to access, leaving much of the provision of education in the hands of UNHCR. Finally, while Proof of Registration card holders are entitled to access public healthcare, not all facilities accept the card as proof of identity. In addition, some hospitals will turn away pregnant refugee mothers, as they would not be able to issue a birth certificate if the baby were to be born at their hospital.

The Pakistani government response has shifted dramatically over the years.380 Afghan refugees are seen as a drain on Pakistan’s economy and resources as well as a security threat. As a result, the government has focused on encouraging voluntary return to Afghanistan.381 Recent events suggest that further repatriation will be unlikely in the coming years, and new refugee waves are likely.

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Facts

According to UNHCR, Panama hosted 2,542 refugees and 11,630 asylum seekers as well as 121,870 Venezuelans displaced abroad in 2021. The majority of refugees originated from Colombia, and the most common country of origin for asylum seekers from Nicaragua.

De Jure Summary

Panama guarantees the right to work to refugees and asylum seekers. In addition to being a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR, Panama is a party to several regional declarations: the 2014 Brazil Plan of Action, the 2016 San Jose Action Statement, and the Cartagena Declaration. In 2017, Panama joined the regional Comprehensive Regional Protection & Solutions Framework (MIRPS, for its acronym in Spanish), as well.

Panama offers both refugee status and asylum status, the latter for those seeking "temporary protection, while they await return to their country of origin or resettlement to a third state." Refugees and asylees are offered the same rights and protections as those with temporary residence.

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Recognized refugees are provided a refugee card for a one-year renewable period. The card confers the right to apply for a work permit under Executive Decree No. 5. For those undergoing the refugee status determination process, temporary residency is offered for one year, renewable, accompanied by the right to work, which was extended under Executive Decree No. 20 in May 2019. The Ministry of Labor has also issued a resolution to enable lawful work while renewal is pending.

Law 74, Article 2, provides the right to apply for permanent residency after 3 years of maintaining refugee or temporary protection status. Those who maintain permanent residency for 10 years may apply for naturalization.

De Facto Summary

Asylum seekers who start the application process at the border cannot freely move or transit within the country until their status is determined. Those who obtain asylum receive a permit to move within the country.

After three years, recognized refugees in Panama can apply for legal permanent residence in the country. This grants them indefinite work permits, access to bank accounts, and a pathway to citizenship.

However, refugees who are not yet eligible for this residency barriers to labor market access. The one-year validity period of the work permit often deters employers. Refugees also struggle to open bank accounts. While there are some microcredit programs for refugees, financial inclusion is difficult until they obtain residency or citizenship.

In other countries that host displaced Venezuelans, retail sales are a major livelihood strategy. However, in Panama, this violates the law. Even other jobs such as hairdressing, food production, or cleaning are restricted since they require special certifications provided by the government.

Panama provides recourse for refugees, asylum seekers, and other forcibly displaced individuals to denounce abuses by their employers. However, informal employment is heavily penalized by the law; these sanctions have been recently increased and target primarily the hiring of undocumented individuals.

387 UNHCR, “Panama,” March 11, 2020, https://globalcompactrefugees.org/article/panama?fbclid=IwAR1l54HPUNZT10tqvBSIR-7e1_217uSL-zVq-ScsQKk40Waxie362m-2LiHQ.
391 Ibid.
392 Ibid.
393 Ibid.
De Jure Refugee Work Rights

- Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes
- Party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes
- Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? Yes

De Facto Refugee Work Rights

**Right to Wage Employment**

| Access to work permits | 3 |
| Enforcement of work permits* | 3 |
| Change over last 5 years | WORSE |

**Right to Self-Employment**

| Access to business permits | 3 |
| Enforcement of business permits* | 3 |
| Change over last 5 years | WORSE |

**Freedom of Movement**

| Domestic travel | 4 |
| Choice of residence | SAME |
| Change over last 5 years | |

**Rights at Work**

| Recourse for workplace violations | 3 |

**Other Factors of Economic Inclusion**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>De Facto Access for Refugees</th>
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<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
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<td>Secondary education</td>
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<td>Tertiary education</td>
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<td>Healthcare provision</td>
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<td>Acquire official documents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Credential validation</td>
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<td>Formal financial services</td>
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</table>

Facts

According to UNHCR, Peru hosted 4,895 refugees and 536,779 asylum seekers as well as 515,162 Venezuelans displaced abroad in 2021.\(^{395}\) The majority of asylum seekers were also from Venezuela. The second most common country of origin for refugees and asylum seekers was Cuba.

De Jure Summary

Peru is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the ICESCR, and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration. Peru’s National Refugee Law guarantees refugee and asylum seekers the right to work.\(^{396}\)

The temporary stay permit (PTP), created for Venezuelans in 2017, granted work rights and stay for two years.\(^{397}\) This program was closed in 2018, with a series of policies implemented thereafter. The government implemented a temporary residence permit card (CPP) for those entering without lawful status while they apply for something more permanent,\(^{398}\) such as refugee status. The CPP is valid for one year (nonrenewable) and guarantees the right to work.\(^{399}\)

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\(^{396}\) See, for example, Ley del Refugiado, Art. 26.


\(^{399}\) Ibid.
Peru also implemented a humanitarian visa (CMH)\textsuperscript{400} for Venezuelans seeking refugee status. CMH requires that Venezuelans apply with a valid passport and other civil documentation, which is often difficult to obtain.\textsuperscript{401} The CMH guarantees the right to work and can be renewed as long as “conditions of vulnerability” remain.\textsuperscript{402} However, Peru has consistently closed its land borders, most of which remain closed at the time of writing.\textsuperscript{403}

Recognized refugees can access the labor market, but labor law stipulates that no more than 20 percent of a company’s workforce may be foreign and that foreign salaries may not exceed 30 percent of a company’s total payroll.\textsuperscript{404} Foreigners must pay an additional 30 percent in income taxes.

**De Facto Summary**

In Peru, over 70 percent of the labor force works informally.\textsuperscript{405} Most Venezuelans and other forcibly displaced individuals are able to work in the informal sector, mainly in the commerce and service industries.\textsuperscript{406}

While access to regularization is important for Venezuelans and other refugees, in practice it has little impact on their labor market opportunities. Even those with regular status and work authorization struggle to obtain formal jobs.\textsuperscript{407} Their status as foreigners also leaves them vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, with many reporting working longer hours or earning a lower income than locals.\textsuperscript{408}

Despite challenges, the government of Peru has instituted initiatives for refugee professionals to integrate into the formal labor market. During the pandemic, the country implemented a program to include Venezuelan doctors in the COVID-19 response. This allowed Venezuelan doctors to work in state-owned hospitals and fast-track their professional accreditation procedure.\textsuperscript{409}


\textsuperscript{407} Martha Guerrero Ble, Izza Leghtas, and Jimmy Graham, *From Displacement to Development: How Peru Can Transform Venezuelan Displacement into Shared Growth*.

\textsuperscript{408} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{409} Martha Guerrero Ble and Jimmy Graham, *The Effect of COVID-19 on the Economic Inclusion of Venezuelans in Peru*.
PORTUGAL

De Jure Refugee Work Rights

Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes

Party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes

Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? Yes

De Facto Refugee Work Rights

Right to Wage Employment

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<tr>
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Right to Self-Employment

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Freedom of Movement

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<td>Choice of residence</td>
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<td>Change over last 5 years</td>
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Rights at Work

| Recourse for workplace violations | 5 |

Other Factors of Economic Inclusion

De Facto Access for Refugees

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Primary education</th>
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<td>Secondary education</td>
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<td>Healthcare provision</td>
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<td>Acquire official documents</td>
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<td>Credential validation</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formal financial services</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Facts

According to UNHCR, Portugal hosted 2,650 refugees and 303 asylum seekers in 2021. The most common countries of origin for refugees and asylum seekers were Syria and Ukraine.

De Jure Summary

Portugal is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR. These international obligations are supplemented by the EU Regional Council Directive, which requires that member states authorize recognized refugees to engage in lawful employment on par with nationals. Portugal also enshrines the rights of refugees in domestic legislation in the Asylum Act of 2008.

The Asylum Act provides asylum seekers, refugees, and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection the right to access the labor market. Further, the law allows for a provisional residence permit for those undergoing the asylum application process, which is valid for six months and renewable. Once asylum seekers are deemed eligible to proceed with the asylum application process, they are granted the right to work after 7 days at a border or between 10 and 30 days elsewhere in the territory.

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Refugees, those with subsidiary protection, and asylum seekers are granted the same employment rights as citizens. Work permits are offered free of charge, and no labor market test is required to determine work suitability. Portugal restricts the sectors that foreign nationals may work in for the public sector only.

Portugal offers refugees and those with subsidiary protection the right to naturalize after five years of legal residency in the country. An amendment to the Nationality Regulation was proposed in 2020 to grant citizenship to all those with pending asylum applications, though this was modified to extend residence permits until 2022.

De Facto Summary

In Portugal, refugees have access to the labor market after their asylum application is accepted. Refugees need to wait only about one month to receive work authorization, making Portugal one of the OECD countries where refugees have the earliest labor market access. Refugees are free to work in any sector of the economy and face few restrictions to their employment. However, NGOs on the ground report that, in practice, refugees struggle to obtain employment.

In Portugal, refugees are overrepresented among the self-employed. The country has implemented a plethora of programs to promote refugee employment and entrepreneurship. In addition, the country has initiated courses and training to help refugees overcome the significant obstacles they face, such as the language barrier. However, credential recognition for refugee professionals remains a major challenge, as there is no process to recognize the professional credentials of those who do not have access to their original diplomas.

415 Ibid.
416 Ibid.
417 Ibid.
418 Ibid.
420 Ibid.
De Jure Refugee Work Rights

According to UNHCR, Rwanda hosted 122,806 refugees and 228 asylum. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers were from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi.

De Jure Summary

Rwanda is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, the ICESCR, and the Organization of African Unity regional convention. Rwanda does make the reservation to the 1951 Refugee Convention “to determine the place of residence of refugees and to establish limits to their freedom of movement.” The status and treatment of refugees is governed by Law No. 13ter/2014 of 21/05/2014 Relating to Refugees, which includes rights to non-refoulement, freedom of movement, and freedom of employment.421

Refugees are granted the same employment rights as Rwandan citizens, including labor protections, private-sector salary protections, and the right to self-employment.422 Rwanda also guarantees refugees the right to pursue Rwandan citizenship after they have demonstrated “self-reliance” for five years.423 Refugees live both in camps and urban ar-
eas and are granted freedom of movement. Those in camps may exit and enter to seek employment outside camps.\textsuperscript{424}

In 2022, the UK government proposed processing refugees and migrants at offshore sites in Rwanda; countries such as Denmark and Austria have considered similar plans.\textsuperscript{425} The Rwandan government states that those undergoing asylum procedures in Rwanda would be offered protection under Rwandan law and guaranteed the right to work.\textsuperscript{426} It remains to be seen how such a plan would protect refugee rights.

\textbf{De Facto Summary}

Rwanda’s refugee population is able to access some rights that are critical to refugees’ economic inclusion. Refugees are able to travel freely, though many live in camps and may face other limitations to their mobility. Research from Rwanda has shown that the proximity of host communities to refugee camps can boost refugees’ economic activity,\textsuperscript{427} yet many still struggle to integrate into local communities due to other constraints. Survey respondents indicated that refugees may be harassed when moving outside camps or their residences, or they may be subjected to checkpoints and other barriers.

Some refugees in Rwanda are able to live outside camps and subsequently access both formal and informal employment. Respondents noted that refugees are generally able to obtain work permits, register businesses, and compete for jobs alongside the wider population. However, work permits can be expensive. Businesses owned by refugees may face additional scrutiny from authorities, and despite the comparatively fewer barriers to employment than in neighboring countries, refugees in Rwanda still have considerably lower employment rates.\textsuperscript{428} Challenges remain due to a lack of work opportunities, misperceptions of refugees’ skills, and employers’ lack of knowledge of acceptable ID cards.\textsuperscript{429} COVID-19 has exacerbated some of these challenges and confined some refugees to camps.


Facts

According to UNHCR, Serbia hosted 5,051 refugees and “persons under other forms of international protection” in 2021. The most common countries of origin were Afghanistan, Syria, and Bangladesh.

De Jure Summary

Serbia is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR. Serbia’s domestic legislation, including the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection (Asylum Act) and the Law on Employment of Foreign Citizens (Employment of Foreigners Act), governs rights for refugees, asylum seekers, and those with subsidiary protection. Individuals in all three categories are guaranteed freedom of movement and the right to work.

Once a refugee is granted asylum in Serbia, they enjoy work rights equal to those of “permanently residing foreigners” under the Asylum Act. For those granted subsidiary protection, the requirements of the Asylum Act and of the Employment of Foreigners Act are in conflict with each other, as the Asylum Act states that grants of asylum and subsidiary protection come with equal work rights, but the Employment of Foreigners Act specifies...
that persons with subsidiary protection shall be granted work permits only for the duration of their protection status. As a result, work permits for persons granted asylum are issued for five years, while work permits for persons with subsidiary protection are issued for one year.

Asylum seekers are able to seek a work permit nine months after the submission of their asylum application if the application is still pending. These work permits require a fee and are valid for six months, renewable for the time that the application is pending.

De Facto Summary

Serbia does not formally encourage the employment of refugees through any government programming; as a result, the de facto conditions of employment largely depend on refugees' ability to navigate the language and labor market. Many people who have been displaced work in jobs that require low levels of education, regardless of the level of education they bring with them from their country of origin.

Self-employment is bureaucratically challenging for refugees and citizens alike. However, due to discrimination against the migrant population, it can be more difficult for refugees to obtain even the minimum level of processing of the required documentation, according to one survey respondent.

Facts
According to UNHCR, Spain hosted 115,258 refugees and 91,585 asylum seekers in 2021.437 The most common country of origin among refugees and asylum seekers was Venezuela, followed by Colombia.

De Jure Summary
Spain is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR. These international obligations are supplemented by the EU Regional Council Directive, which requires that member states authorize recognized refugees to engage in lawful employment on par with nationals. Spain includes these rights in its domestic legislation, particularly in the Asylum Act of 2009.438

Recognized refugees, asylum seekers, and those with subsidiary protection are guaranteed the right to work in Spain; however, asylum seekers are not granted the right to work until six months after submission of their asylum application.439 There are no restrictions on the sectors refugees, asylum seekers, or those with subsidiary protection may work in.440 In addition, refugees and those with subsidiary protection are guaranteed the same employment rights as Spanish citizens under Spanish law.441 Asylum seekers are granted the right to participate in vocational training and language instruction to facilitate greater economic integration.442

440  Ibid.
441  Ibid.
442  Ibid.
Freedom of movement is guaranteed under Spanish law, yet in practice asylum seekers are often held in reception centers, which restricts their movement. Those who “lack financial means” are provided support for 18 to 24 months.443

De Facto Summary
The government of Spain grants long-term residency and work permits to all recognized refugees, which allow them to work and start a business. While recognized refugees enjoy full liberties in the country, refugees’ financial situation affects their economic inclusion and freedom of movement. The government provides accommodation and support within the refugee reception system for six months to all refugees and asylum seekers.444 However, once refugees leave the protection centers, they often face financial precarity and struggle to incorporate into the labor market.445 Some of the barriers include difficulty learning the language, navigating the bureaucracy, and recognizing their credentials.446

Most refugees work informally in jobs that require low levels of education.447 While Spain stipulates strict punishments for those hiring informal workers, in practice, survey respondents indicate that the authorities rarely check the documentation status of employees. As a result, even those without documentation can access jobs in Spain.

Spain grants work permits to asylum seekers six months after they submit their refugee applications, with some nationalities, such as Venezuelans, benefiting from a fast-tracked process. These permits allow them to stay and work in the country until their refugee status determination is completed. Forcibly displaced individuals without documented status can regularize after two years in the country.448 If they have a job offer, people who have been displaced can apply for a special authorization that allows them to remain and work in the country.

Despite these provisions, asylum seekers in some areas of Spain face increasing challenges to their freedom of movement. In particular, asylum seekers in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla—located on the African continent—are not allowed to leave their location.449 The government grants them an asylum-seeker identification card that is valid only in the city where they reside rather than in the whole country. Written authorization from the government is required in order for asylum seekers to move to mainland Spain. Survey respondents indicated that a similar measure is in place on the Canary Islands. The Supreme Court of Spain recently deemed illegal the restriction of movement of asylum seekers in Ceuta and Melilla, but the issue is yet to be resolved in practice.450

443  Ibid.
446  Ibid.
447  Ibid.
Facts

According to UNHCR, Sudan hosted 1,068,339 refugees and 25,102 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers were from South Sudan and Eritrea.

De Jure Summary

In addition to being a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR, Sudan is also a party to the Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the Bangkok Principles on the Status and Treatment of Refugees (“Bangkok Principles”), the Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries, and the Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States (“Casablanca Protocol”). Sudan has a reservation to Article 26 of the Refugee Convention regarding freedom of movement for refugees, however.

In terms of national legislation, Sudan’s Asylum Act provides for an asylum application process and guarantees labor rights to refugees on the same

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terms as other foreigners, once a corresponding work permit has been obtained.456 However, the government rarely issues these permits, often because the refugee seeking the permit lacks a “foreigner number,”457 despite the Asylum Act’s provision that the Refugees Commission “shall issue” an identity card with such a number.458 South Sudanese, Syrian, and Yemeni refugees do not require work permits to legally access the labor market.459

At the same time, Sudan's encampment policy—in line with its Refugee Convention reservation regarding free movement—requires the internment of refugees and asylum seekers. Despite the fact that a large majority of refugees live outside the camps, Sudanese authorities enforce internment rules against refugees and asylum seekers discovered to have left the camps without permission or found residing in urban areas.460

De Facto Summary

Although 70 percent of refugees live outside the camps, the government maintains a strict encampment policy. Smuggling networks are common avenues to leave the camps, and refugees outside camps risk harassment and detention. According to the US Department of State, 150 to 200 refugees and asylum seekers are detained each month in Khartoum.461 The government has also pushed for urban refugees' relocation from areas near Khartoum to camps. For refugees in other areas, freedom of movement varies by region.

Most refugees, including those in urban areas, face significant barriers to labor market access in practice. Permits for formal employment or to start a registered business are rarely issued.462 Syrian and Yemeni refugees are an exception; they are allowed to work, as the government regards them as “brothers and sisters.” The right to work is also supposed to be afforded to South Sudanese refugees under the “four freedoms” agreement with South Sudan, but implementation in practice varies significantly. Most refugees work informally, which is tolerated in most places, including in camps and urban areas.

461 Ibid.
Facts
According to UNHCR, Switzerland hosted 117,169 refugees and 5,612 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers originated from Eritrea, Syria, and Afghanistan.

De Jure Summary
Switzerland is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR. It also has adopted domestic legislation guaranteeing rights for refugees and asylum seekers, particularly the Asylum Act, revised in 2019, and the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration.

Asylum seekers are required to stay in federal asylum centers after they lodge their application, for a maximum stay of 140 days, with exceptions for individuals lodging claims at airports or who are held in detention. During this time, asylum seekers are not allowed to engage in lawful employment. Once allocated to a state (canton), they may seek employment, but hiring is subject to confirmation that the job cannot be filled by a Swiss national or citizen of a country with which Switzerland has free labor agreements.
Refugees with temporary admission and recognized refugees are guaranteed the right to lawful employment upon receiving status.\textsuperscript{468} Recognized refugees are guaranteed the right to work lawfully without restrictions on moving sectors or professions, or requirements for canton approval for employment.\textsuperscript{469}

**De Facto Summary**

Switzerland is divided into cantons, which are given substantial discretion in the implementation of laws. As a result, there is significant variation in access to the labor market, integration, and social assistance for refugees across the country.\textsuperscript{470} Asylum seekers are randomly allocated to a canton and can request permission to work but are subject to the precedence of domestic employees, as regulated by the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration.\textsuperscript{471} A survey by the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies also found that asylum seekers are very unlikely to look for employment outside their assigned canton, as the probability of finding work and receiving the approval of the other canton is very low. Therefore, Swiss cantons essentially act as independent, closed economies for refugees and asylum seekers.\textsuperscript{472} The State Secretariat for Migration reports that only nine percent of asylum seekers between the ages of 18 and 65 are active in the labor market.\textsuperscript{473}

An obstacle to the employment of refugees is that personal qualifications such as diplomas from other countries are not recognized for the most part.\textsuperscript{474} Language is another barrier for refugees. Labor market access regulations favor those who speak the language that is most widely spoken in the canton to which they were assigned (the main languages being German, French, and Italian).\textsuperscript{475}


\textsuperscript{472} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{473} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{475} Ibid.
According to UNHCR, Tanzania hosted 202,635 refugees and 27,829 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers were from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

De Jure Summary

Although Tanzania is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, the ICESCR, and the Organization of African Unity regional convention, the country’s national laws and practices regarding employment are not fully aligned with its international commitments. Rights, status, and treatment of asylum seekers and refugees in Tanzania are governed by the Refugees Act of 1998 and the 2003 National Refugee Policy.

The Refugees Act requires refugees to reside in “designated areas,” which in practice are camps, severely restricting refugees’ freedom of movement. This law also states that work permits may be offered to refugees but does not guarantee refugees the right to work. The 2003 National Refugee Policy goes further, allowing “small income

\section*{De Facto Summary}

While Tanzania has hosted large numbers of refugees for years, in practice, Tanzania imposes some of the most significant barriers to economic inclusion for refugees in the world. After former president John Magufuli told Burundian refugees to “go home,” Human Rights Watch and other organizations have documented torture, disappearances, and beatings committed by Tanzanian authorities against Burundian refugees.\footnote{482}{Human Rights Watch, “Tanzania: Burundian Refugees ‘Disappeared,’ Tortured,” November 30, 2020, \url{https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/30/tanzania-burundian-refugees-disappeared-tortured}; Human Rights Watch, “Tanzania: Burundians Pressured into Leaving,” December 12, 2019, \url{https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/12/tanzania-burundians-pressured-leaveing}.} The government wants Burundian refugees to be repatriated, and violence and economic crackdowns are intended to send that message. While the current government has vowed to improve human rights conditions for Tanzanians, its position on refugees is unclear.

Refugees must live in one of three camps, and even in the camps, livelihood activities are not permitted. All camp markets were closed in 2019.\footnote{483}{Clayton Boeyink and Jean-Benoît Falisse, “Kicking Refugees Out Makes Everyone Less Safe,” \textit{Foreign Policy}, February 18, 2021, \url{https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/18/tanzania-burundi-kicking-refugees-out-makes-everyone-less-safe/}.} Refugees are rarely allowed to leave the camps for work, school, or economic activities.\footnote{484}{Guri Romtvit, “6 Things to Know about Refugees in Tanzania originally joined the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework intended to promote durable solutions but then withdrew and declined the associated World Bank funding.}
Facts

According to UNHCR, Thailand hosted 96,175 refugees and 756 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees originated from Myanmar.

De Jure Summary

Thailand is not a party to any international conventions relating to the rights of refugees, but is party to the ICESCR.

Domestic legislation in Thailand does not recognize refugee status. Refugees are able to access Asylum Seeker and Refugee Cards via UNHCR. However, these do not provide any protection from detention or deportation, do not guarantee any employment rights, and are not recognized by the Thai government. Most refugees in Thailand are ethnic Karen from Myanmar and live in nine camps at the Thai-Myanmar border, where they face restrictions on their freedom to move. Refugees of other nationalities are living in cities with no legal status.

Domestic law in Thailand could be applied to refugees to expand and protect their work rights; however, with a lack of foundational rights that afford and protect refugee status, and a lack of commitment by legislators and enforcement by authorities, these laws do not result in employment protections. The Labor Protection Act B.E.

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487 Ibid.
488 Ibid.
489 Ibid.
2541 protects all employees from abuse and exploitation from employers, but this is not monitored or enforced in practice. The 2017 Foreigners’ Working Management Emergency Decree B.E. 2560 also contains an article regarding the right to employment for those who are in exile or who have entered the country unlawfully, in a “refugee-like” situation; however, this law has not been enacted.491

A Cabinet Resolution was passed in 2021 granting seven unauthorized migrant workers from Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia release from detention and approval to work. This represents a small but positive development in legal precedent for migrant worker protections in Thailand, although no additional legislation has been enacted to grant such rights more broadly.492

The Thai Cabinet approved the establishment of a national screening mechanism that would identify those who need international protection, as opposed to economic migrants, in December 2019. However, this status does not include the right to work and has yet to be implemented.493

De Facto Summary

Refugees in Thailand experience rights denials regularly and are met with a range of barriers that limit their ability to find work. The vast majority of refugees in Thailand live in camps and do not have freedom of movement. Survey respondents emphasized that some manage to travel outside the camps, but when they do they may be subject to inspection or harassment. Refugees also struggle to obtain the documents needed to move freely.

Refugees are not allowed to work and are subject to fines or detention if they do so. Where they do find work—most often in the informal sector—refugees are vulnerable to exploitation, including exploitative wages, illegal conditions, withholding of wages, and arbitrary termination of employment.494 Likewise, businesses are discouraged from hiring refugees and can face severe penalties if they are caught doing so. In addition, refugees are not able to operate businesses, though some do so by paying bribes to the authorities. Those who live in cities are generally undocumented and struggle to access services and livelihood opportunities. They may access assistance from NGOs, including cash support.495

Facts
According to UNHCR, Trinidad and Tobago hosted 3,458 refugees and 21,089 asylum seekers in 2021. The majority of refugees and asylum seekers were from Venezuela, followed by Cuba.

De Jure Summary
Trinidad and Tobago is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, the ICESCR, and the Brazil Declaration and Action Plan. However, Trinidad and Tobago does not have national legislation protecting refugees or guaranteeing their work rights. Because there is a lack of legislation pertaining to refugees in particular, the government oversees refugees' entry under the 1969 Immigration Act. In 2014, the government of Trinidad and Tobago charted a pathway toward the development of a national policy to address refugee and asylum matters, which would set forward a national refugee status determination process. This legislation has not yet been enacted.

UNHCR is mandated to carry out refugee status determination in Trinidad and Tobago. However, in 2019, the government registered Venezuelan refugees who had arrived in the country and issued most Venezuelans permits to remain for six months. The government then extended renewal

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eligibility for six-month periods twice in 2020, and conducted a reregistration exercise in 2021, with the same six-month eligibility period.499 Trinidad and Tobago issued a Work Permit Exemption Order under the Venezuelan registration process, which enabled registered Venezuelans to lawfully work in Trinidad and Tobago for up to one year.500

De Facto Summary
The lack of legislation concerning refugees in Trinidad and Tobago leaves them in a situation in which they are considered undocumented migrants.501 The implementation of special permits for Venezuelans allowed some 16,000 Venezuelans in the country to regularize their status.502 However, most of the 40,000 Venezuelans are still undocumented, and individuals of other nationalities do not even have the option to obtain a permit, leaving them subject to arrest and deportation.503

Displaced Venezuelans with a permit to stay in Trinidad and Tobago have more rights than other unrecognized refugees without these documents; they have freedom of movement and the right to work.504 But unrecognized refugees face increasing risks to their well-being and self-reliance. They cannot formalize their employment, open bank accounts, or access public schools or even health services.505 Many are subject to exploitation and abuse. Their immigration situation also leaves them vulnerable to being cheated by their employers and renters. For instance, some might be evicted after paying rent or earn considerably less than the agreed paycheck.506 Venezuelans in Trinidad and Tobago, particularly women and girls, are also at risk of sexual exploitation, and cases of sexual slavery and trafficking have been reported in the country among Venezuelans.507

In addition, the government has imposed harsh penalties on any individual who facilitates the stay of undocumented immigrants. This means that employers, landlords, and any other individual can be prosecuted if they knowingly support individuals who are in the country without a visa..

Most Venezuelans in the country work informally, many in the tourism sector. Survey respondents indicate that the COVID-19 lockdowns disproportionately affected refugees’ livelihoods. As the government closed nonessential activities, the restaurants, bars, and other businesses that employed Venezuelans were significantly affected.

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502 Georgina Chami and Florence Seemungal, “The Venezuelan Refugee Crisis in Trinidad and Tobago,” Border Criminologies (blog), Oxford University Center for Criminology, April 9, 2021, https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2021/04/venezuelan.
507 Ibid.
De Jure Refugee Work Rights

Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes

Party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes

Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? Yes

De Facto Refugee Work Rights

Right to Wage Employment

| Access to work permits | 3 |
| Enforcement of work permits* | 3 |
| Change over last 5 years | BETTER |

Right to Self-Employment

| Access to business permits | 3 |
| Enforcement of business permits* | 3 |
| Change over last 5 years | SAME |

Freedom of Movement

| Domestic travel | 2 |
| Choice of residence | 3 |
| Change over last 5 years | SAME |

Rights at Work

| Recourse for workplace violations | 3 |

Other Factors of Economic Inclusion

De Facto Access for Refugees

| Primary education | 5 |
| Secondary education | 5 |
| Tertiary education | 4 |
| Healthcare provision | 3 |
| Acquire official documents | 4 |
| Credential validation | 2 |
| Formal financial services | 3 |

Facts

According to UNHCR, Turkey hosted 3,696,831 refugees and 322,188 asylum seekers in 2021.\(^{508}\)

The majority of refugees were from Syria, and the majority of asylum seekers were from Iraq.

De Jure Summary

Turkey is a party to all major refugee conventions and has national legislation pertaining to refugees and work rights. Turkey is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol; however, the country has maintained the “geographical limitation” from the 1951 Refugee Convention. This means that only refugees originating from European countries are able to access refugee status. Non-European refugees are afforded temporary protection under the Law on Foreigners and International Protection.

Protection is defined according to two broad categories: international protection and temporary protection. Three forms of international protection exist: a convention refugee (originating from Europe), a conditional refugee (from a non-European country), and a person under subsidiary protection.\(^{509}\) Refugees from Syria fall under the temporary protection regime.

Those under international protection may be formally employed or self-employed beginning six


months after lodging their application.\textsuperscript{510} These work permits may have term limits or sector restrictions imposed, but they are relaxed if a refugee has lived in the country for more than three years, is married to a Turkish citizen, or has Turkish children.\textsuperscript{511}

Refugees from Syria under the temporary protection regime may apply for a work permit beginning six months after lodging their protection application. These permits are also subject to term limits, sector restrictions, and total annual quotas. In addition, they are also subject to province-specific employment conditions, whereby the government may take into consideration the refugee’s province of residence as a factor when deciding whether to offer a work permit.\textsuperscript{512}

De Facto Summary

In practice, Turkey’s record on refugee rights is mixed. Syrians under temporary protection may choose their province of residence, though some cities are not accepting new applications; Istanbul hosts the largest number of registered temporary protection beneficiaries. However, Syrians under temporary protection can register only in cities that are open, and 100,000 unregistered Syrians were removed from Istanbul in 2019.\textsuperscript{513} Other national-


\textsuperscript{511} Ibid.


Work permits are available under the law, and 63,789 were issued to Syrians in 2019.\textsuperscript{514} However, the permits are tied to a specific employer, must be renewed annually, and require an application fee. The majority of refugees therefore work in the informal sector, where conditions are difficult, and exploitation is widespread.\textsuperscript{515} Large protests for better working conditions took place in 2017. Child labor is also a significant issue that is especially pronounced for Syrians.\textsuperscript{516} Survey respondents report that it is possible to obtain a permit to start a formal business, but unregistered businesses are often closed down.


De Jure Refugee Work Rights

Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes, with reservations to articles 13 and 17

Party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes

Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? Yes

De Facto Refugee Work Rights

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<tr>
<th>Right to Wage Employment</th>
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<tbody>
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Other Factors of Economic Inclusion

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<td>Formal financial services</td>
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Facts

According to UNHCR, Uganda hosted 1,475,311 refugees and 23,126 asylum seekers in 2021.518 The majority of refugees were from South Sudan, followed by the Democratic Republic of Congo.

De Jure Summary

In addition to being a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the ICESCR, Uganda is also a party to the Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa519 and the Bangkok Principles on the Status and Treatment of Refugees (“Bangkok Principles”).520

In terms of national legislation, the Ugandan Refugee Act of 2006 reflects the standards established in international instruments and guarantees refugees the right to work on the same terms granted to foreigners residing in the country.521 This is also extended to asylum seekers who have residency permission. However, the work permit stamp is often difficult to obtain, which requires having a Convention Travel Document.522

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Beyond the reservation lodged to Article 17 of the 1951 Refugee Convention (in which Uganda reserves the right to grant greater benefits to foreigners with whose governments it enters into specific agreements), there is no formal discrimination between refugee populations in the country.\footnote{UNHCR, “Global Focus: Uganda,” accessed May 06, 2022, \url{https://reporting.unhcr.org/uganda}}

**De Facto Summary**

Uganda has hosted a large, protracted caseload of refugees and asylum seekers from neighboring countries for decades.\footnote{UNHCR, “Uganda Comprehensive,” Refugee Response Portal, accessed December 10, 2021, \url{https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/uga}} Unlike many of its neighbors, Uganda’s relatively progressive policies have translated into improved labor market access for refugees. Among its most important policies, Uganda allows refugees to work and own their own businesses, and refugees have had freedom of movement since 2006. Indeed, many survey respondents noted that refugees can travel freely, and many can choose where they live under the self-settlement policy. They can also receive a plot of land to cultivate.

However, notable barriers remain. While refugees can choose to leave, those who wish to receive formal assistance must remain in designated settlements, most of which are far from urban centers. Only six percent of refugees are registered in Kampala, the main location outside of the settlements.\footnote{World Bank, IDA19 Mid-Term Refugee Policy Review (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2021), \url{https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/826851636575674627/pdf/IDA19-Mid-Term-Refugee-Policy-Review.pdf}} Respondents also indicated that formal work permits are still difficult for refugees to obtain, and that some employers still stigmatize refugees or hesitate to hire them because they are unsure about the laws and policies.\footnote{Francesco Loiacono and Mariajose Silva Vargas, Improving Access to Labour Markets for Refugees: Evidence from Uganda (International Growth Centre: Reference C-43445-UGA-1, 2019), \url{https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Loiacono-and-Vargas-2019-final-paper_revision-1.pdf}} Moreover, despite Uganda’s progressive regarding refugee rights, refugees are still less likely than Ugandans to be employed and more likely to take work that is below their skill level, education, and pre-displacement occupation.\footnote{UNHCR, “Uganda Knowledge Brief: Using Socioeconomic Data to Promote Employment Solutions for Refugees In Uganda,” July 2021, \url{https://www.unhcr.org/5fe31b2b4.pdf}, and World Bank Group. Informing the Refugee Policy Response in Uganda: Results from the Uganda Refugee and Host Communities 2018 Household Survey, 2019, \url{http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/571081569598919068/Informing-the-Refugee-Policy-Response-in-Uganda-Results-from-the-Uganda-Refugee-and-Host-Communities-2018-Household-Survey}.}
De Jure Refugee Work Rights

Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees? No

Party to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees? Yes

Party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? No

De Facto Refugee Work Rights

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Facts

According to UNHCR, the United States of America (US) hosted 337,870 refugees and 1,247,223 asylum seekers in 2021. The most common country of origin for refugees was China, and the most common country of origin for asylum seekers was El Salvador.

De Jure Summary

While the US is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it agreed to uphold the convention’s provisions by ratifying the 1967 Protocol. In US domestic law, this commitment to international refugee law is reflected by the Refugee Act of 1980, which incorporates the refugee definition contained in the 1951 Refugee Convention.

The US grants the right to work to those with refugee status through resettlement or a grant of asylum. Resettled refugees may begin working immediately upon entry into the US, and the Office of Refugee Resettlement supports programming that facilitates their job placement and training, business creation, and credentialing. Asylum seekers may apply for work authorization 150 days after filing an asylum application, which may be granted as soon as 30 days later. In addition to these aver-
nues, people granted parole, Temporary Protected Status, or Deferred Enforced Departure are eligible for work authorization.531

Since 2019, the US has restricted access to US territory for asylum seekers coming from the Americas through executive rulemaking, creating nearly insurmountable barriers for the largest populations seeking asylum. These policies include the Migrant Protection Protocols, also known as the Remain in Mexico policy, which requires non-Mexican asylum seekers who enter at the US southern border to pursue their US asylum claims while remaining physically in Mexico532; and the COVID-19 pandemic-era use of Title 42,533 a public health law, to bar asylum seekers from entering the US and to expel those found inside the country (the same public health standard is not applied to citizens).534 Both policies are the subject of court disputes at the time of writing.535

De Facto Summary

In the US, the Trump administration significantly limited access to employment eligibility for asylum seekers by changing regulations and diverting resources such as staff away from adjudication, leading to long delays in the processing of employment documents. This prevented asylum seekers from being able to legally work, made them reliant on private charity for support (since they are ineligible for federal benefits), pushed them into exploitative informal work, and made it difficult for them to afford shelter, food, and healthcare. Anti-immigrant rhetoric such as “Hire American,” followed by the COVID-19 pandemic, also impacted refugees’ ability to obtain formal employment.

De facto barriers to freedom of movement in the US occur largely when individuals lack identification documents. The long delays in issuing work authorization documents make it harder for asylum seekers and asylees to travel if they do not have other valid government ID.

In the US, healthcare is generally obtained through employment, so inaccessibility to formal work also hinders access to healthcare. Asylum seekers are eligible for marketplace health coverage (known as “Obamacare”), but only once they have obtained work authorization.536 Resettled refugees are eligible for health benefits through the Office of Refugee Resettlement and some states; however, only some states grant refugees the right to state Medicaid programs.537
